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This dissertation consists of three essays on the relation between executive 
compensation, capital structure and corporate governance. 
In the first essay, I examine the relation between CEO option compensation and 
firm capital structure. The empirical challenge in studying this relation is that these are 
both choices of the firm that are made simultaneously. Therefore, it is difficult to 
conclude from the existing literature the causation of this relation. Using the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to the compensation 
structure in a natural experiment setting, I can identify now firm leverage changes as a 
result of the CEO option compensation changes. The evidence provides strong support 
for the debt agency theory. The results indicate that firms decrease leverage when CEOs 
are paid with more option grants and as those options become a higher percentage of the 
firm’s future cash flows. The findings are robust to addition of corporate governance and 
convertible debt dimensions to estimation.  
The second essay studies the effect of internal board monitoring on the firm’s 
debt maturity structure. I use the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations as exogenous shocks to board structure in a 
natural experiment setting. Supporting the agency theory, the findings indicate that firms 
have debt with longer maturity as board independence increases and internal board 
monitoring becomes powerful. The results are even stronger for complex and larger firms 
such as conglomerates. I find the relation between internal monitoring and debt maturity 
becomes less clear during times of financial instability. 
The third essay investigates the impact of externally mandated versus organically 
determined corporate governance modifications on firm performance. SOX and SEC 
regulations are employed as a natural experiment in order to examine the imposed rules 
and elucidate the identification issues. The findings suggest that companies which 
voluntarily determine the necessary corporate governance modifications based on firm 
specific characteristics and needs perform better than the case where they are all forced to 
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The Effect of the CEO’s Option Compensation on the Firm’s Capital 
Structure: A Natural Experiment 
1.1 Introduction 
Numerous studies have examined the relation between CEO option compensation 
structure and the firm’s capital-structure choice. Some papers define leverage as the 
dependent variable and examine its relation to the CEO’s option compensation, explicitly 
assuming that pay structure variation causes differences in observed firm leverage. Others 
describe option compensation as the dependent variable and investigate how it varies 
with the firm’s leverage decision. The empirical challenge is that these are both choices 
of the firm that are arguably made simultaneously. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude 
causation of this relation from the existing literature. In this paper, I use an exogenous 
shock that only influences the CEO’s compensation and examine how changes in the 
CEO’s option compensation resulting from that shock affect the firm’s capital structure. 
By doing that, I can identify whether changes in compensation structure cause changes in 
firm leverage ratios. 
 The specific exogenous shock used in the natural experiment is Section 162(m) of 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC 162(m)). The Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 
added Section 162(m) to restrict the corporate tax deduction for executive compensation 
to $1 million but with an exception for performance-based compensation:
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“…In the case of any publicly held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed 
under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with respect to any covered 
employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with 
respect to such employee exceeds $ 1,000,000…” 
 Consequently, beginning on January 1, 1994, companies have largely adjusted 
their compensation packages so that pay over $1 million qualifies under the performance 
based exception. That change primarily occurs in the form of increased option 
compensation. Importantly, IRC 162(m) should have no direct influence on the firm’s 
capital structure. This tax deduction limitation and linkage to performance based 
compensation should not alter the tax benefits, financial distress costs, information 
asymmetry, or market timing motivations of a firm when determining its optimal capital 
structure. As a result of that, I can use IRC 162(m) as a valid instrument for the 
exogenous shock in my natural experiment. Moreover, IRC 162(m) is not a binding 
constraint for all companies. Only firms paying CEOs a cash salary of $1 million or more 
are affected. This binding constraint enables me to compare these treated firms (those 
paying at least $1 million in salary) to the untreated companies in the after exogenous 
shock period, not just contrasting the before exogenous shock period to the after shock 
period. 
 With respect to the studies that investigate the relation between the CEO’s option 
compensation and the firm’s capital structure, there is a substantial disagreement over the 
nature of this relation. The research suggests a positive, negative or even no relation 
between option compensation and leverage. John and John (1993), Bryan, Hwang and 
Lilien (2000), Ortiz-Molina (2007), Hassan and Hosino (2008), Andrikopoulos (2009) 
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and Sepe (2010) claim either empirically or theoretically that there is a negative relation 
between CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s leverage decision. Their results rely 
on the agency cost of debt. Stock options mitigate the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers by incentivizing the CEO to act in the best interest of the 
shareholders and tying their wealth together. In order to increase the benefit gained from 
the option compensation, the CEO can increase stock-price volatility by investing in 
riskier projects and the potential debtholders may need to bear the costs and risks of these 
risky investments which results in wealth shifting from debtholders to shareholders and 
the CEO. Thus, debtholders may require higher interest rates to compensate the risk of 
those investments which potentially creates the agency cost of debt. To keep the cost of 
funding at minimum, the CEO may decide to raise less debt that result in a negative 
relation between CEO’s option compensation and leverage.  
On the other hand, Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987), Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack (1997), MacMinn and Page Jr. (2006), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) and 
Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2009) argue in their empirical or theory paper this relation 
should be a positive one which is supported by the managerial agency theory. When the 
CEO is paid with more options, this compensation package may create incentives for the 
CEO to use more debt-funding strategies. If there is an information asymmetry and 
equityholders are not well informed, then the shares of the firm may be underpriced. In 
such a case, the CEO doesn’t want to raise equity. Also, if debtholders are passive or 
uninformed, they don’t ask for higher interest or any kind of a compensation for the 
wealth shifted away from them. Therefore, the CEO can easily raise more debt in order to 
increase the stock-price volatility and she can benefit more from their stock-option 
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compensation as the shares become riskier. But highly volatile stocks may destroy the 
firm value and harm the shareholders. On the whole, this theory suggests a positive 
relation between CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s leverage. 
The theory and empirical papers of the existing literature can not come to an 
agreement about the causality and the nature of the relation between managerial option 
compensation and the firm’s capital structure. I overcome this identification challenge by 
conducting a natural experiment in my paper with the setting of 162(m) tax law as the 
exogenous shock to the CEO compensation structure. I use a difference-in-difference 
analysis and compare the treated firms, affected by the IRC 162(m) law, with the 
untreated firms in terms of the change in the CEO compensation and its impact on the 
firms’ leverage decisions. In the analysis, I conduct this comparison both before and after 
the exogenous shock. I consider my main variables of option compensation to be the 
value of and the number of options. While the CEO’s option value normalized by the 
total CEO compensation captures the wealth impact, the CEO’s number of options 
normalized by the shares outstanding provides insight into what percentage of the firm’s 
future cash flows is granted to the CEO as opposed to the shareholders. Moreover, to 
check the robustness of my findings, I also use an instrumental variable (IV) regression 
model, where I estimate the CEO option compensation measures via several instruments 
in the first stage and regress the firm’s leverage on my instrumented option pay measures 
along with controls in the second stage.  
The main finding of this study is that the firm decrease leverage as its CEO is 
compensated more and more through options and as those options become a higher 
percentage of the firm’s future cash flows. Furthermore, the CEO chooses less debt 
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financing as she receives more valuable options. My findings are consistent with the 
agency theory of debt stating a negative relation between CEO’s option compensation 
and the firm’s leverage. 
A strong corporate-governance mechanism disciplines the CEO by reducing the 
discretion the CEO has over her compensation. This mechanism can prevent the 
destruction of the firm’s value and the excessive wealth transfer from shareholders to the 
CEO through more and more incentives such as options. In addition, implementing a 
convertible-debt issuance system mitigates the concerns of debtholders about bearing too 
much risk and receiving low returns compared to the CEO and shareholders. Because of 
these potentially mitigating effects, I control for corporate governance and convertible-
debt issuances in my analyses as a robustness check.  
I examine new debt issuance and investigate the change in leverage due to new 
debt issuance through the influence of the change in the CEO’s option compensation, 
rather than the level of leverage as in the original model. In addition to that, I introduce 
the vested CEO options in my analyses to capture the motivating effect of this type of 
option pay on the CEO’s decisions as they become exercisable to buy stocks. I also 
control for the CEO ownership of firm shares because it may have a similar impact on 
leverage. Further, I examine CEO salaries of $900,000 and $800,000 as alternative cut-
off points different from $1 million in order to test the validity of the IRC 162(m) as an 
exogenous shock and observe how my original findings are affected. Placebo tests are 
also conducted in which I run the same models but with data in a shifted time range in 
order to observe whether there are any other factors affecting either the CEO’s option 
compensation or the firm’s capital structure different from the exogenous shock I rely on. 
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Additionally, I examine the unlevered firm risk before and after the shock. I try to detect 
if the IRC 162(m) law causes increased “real” risk taking by the CEO who is 
compensated with more options. Finally, I construct several robustness tests in which I 
redefine the treatment variable as the size of the firm in order to control for the effect of 
firm size on the investigated relation in my models. After implementing all these tests in 
my analyses, I observe that the original results for the relation between the CEO’s option 
compensation and the firm’s leverage decision stay robust. 
In this paper, I contribute to the literature by suggesting a solution to the long 
debated identification and causality problems in linking executive compensation with 
capital structure.  Via the introduction of a natural experiment to the analysis, I argue that 
increased option compensation leads to less use of debt, all else equal.  As a result, my 
analysis can offer clear and unambiguous findings and presents a baseline for future 
studies to be built upon. Due to the clear identification which I use in the natural 
experiment, my findings can suggest without a doubt the option compensation as a strong 
determinant of the firm leverage. Thus, this study can help the CEO compensation 
committee and the board to make better and efficient decisions about the CEO 
compensation regarding the impact on the firm leverage. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on the relation between the CEO’s options and the firm’s capital structure and provides 
two different theories to explain this relation. Section 3 describes the data selection and 
the variables. Section 4 discusses the implications IRC 162(m) law and the initial 
findings. Section 5 explains the empirical method used to examine the relation and 
provides the main results. In Section 6, I present my conclusion. 
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1.2  Literature Review and Related Theories 
The capital structure literature has documented several factors that have high explanatory 
power for leverage. Tangibility, operating profitability, firm size, growth, firm volatility, 
top executive tenure, industry concentration, and industry debt level can be counted 
among the most commonly used factors in the studies. In addition to these well-known 
factors, a fairly new concept has been discussed in the last two decades: the structure of 
the CEO’s compensation. The attention focuses primarily on the CEO’s option 
compensation. This literature examines the relation between the CEO’s option 
compensation and the firm’s leverage choices in a broader aspect, and the results are 
mixed. In some studies, researchers state that the firm’s leverage decreases with option 
compensation or the leverage has a negative impact on the granting of options to CEOs, 
but others claim the opposite relation. In this study, without taking a side, I present these 
different views regarding the relation between the executive option compensation and the 
firm’s capital structure. Then, I use the natural experiment setting via an exogenous 
shock and let the data speak to those theories.  
 Considering the previous studies on capital structure decisions by Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), Leary and Roberts (2005), Mackay 
and Phillips (2005), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Billett, King and Mauer (2007), 
Hassan and Hosino (2008), Ma and Martin (2010), Rauh and Sufi (2010), Rampini and 
Viswanathan (2011), Faulkender and Petersen (2011), and Faulkender, Flannery, Henkins 
and Smith (2011), there are several frequently used determinants of leverage. The 
findings of these studies suggest that high-leverage companies are relatively larger, have 
higher tangibility, lower growth, and less volatile earnings. Further, the results indicate 
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that firms managed by CEOs with long tenure and that have low operating profitability 
have higher leverage. Moreover, close examination of the relation between the firm’s 
leverage and the industry’s characteristics shows that companies operating in more 
concentrated industries and in industries with higher debt averages prefer higher leverage 
as their capital structure choice.  
The CEO’s option compensation and its interaction with the firm’s leverage have 
been attracting the interest of researchers in the last several decades. The studies 
suggesting a decreasing impact of CEO option compensation on the firm leverage rely on 
the debt agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that stock options tie the 
wealth of the CEO and the equity holders together and mitigate agency problems between 
them. When potential debtholders are informed about this compensation structure of the 
CEO, they hesitate to grant funds and ask higher interest because they know that the CEO 
wants to increase stock-price volatility by investing in more risky projects. In that case, 
debtholders bear the costs and risks of those investments while the CEO and shareholders 
get the majority of the returns; and the wealth is shifted away from the debtholders to the 
shareholders. Consequently, debtholders demand higher interest for debt; and to keep the 
cost of debt at minimum, the CEO compensated by more options decides on less debt 
which decreases the firm’s leverage. 
The decreasing effect of CEO option compensation on firm leverage is examined 
by several studies. John and John (1993) investigate the interaction between top-
management compensation and the design of external claims issued by firms. They 
analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for when the external claims are 
equity and risky debt and equity and convertible debt. The article claims equity-based 
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compensation ties CEO wealth changes to shareholder wealth changes, and that creates 
trust for potential shareholders. This trust incentivizes the CEO to raise more equity that 
decreases the firm’s leverage. Further, Andrikopoulos (2009) examines the significance 
of compensation and alternative sources of income on investment timing, endogenous 
default, yield spreads, and capital structure. Andrikopoulos (2009) claims the higher the 
CEO’s compensation is, the more the CEO will be aligned with shareholders. The yield 
spread will be higher because the CEO will have a stronger tendency to abide by an 
equity maximizing policy. So, the increased risk of debt contracts can lead to an 
increased yield spread affecting the cost of debt and lowering the optimal leverage ratio. 
Furthermore, Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000) find that the number of new stock options 
decreases with the firm’s leverage. Hassan and Hosino (2008) analyze the economic 
justifications of options in Japanese companies by using a framework of three different 
theories: agency theory, a retention and sorting model, and the financial and ownership 
structure of a firm. Their findings suggest a negative relation between leverage and the 
use of stock options. Moreover, Sepe (2010) specifically examines the Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010 and shows low leverage reduces overinvestment through a smaller debt cushion, 
but high equity-based compensation is very effective in inducing the CEO to perform 
better. Thus, Sepe (2010) proposes that firm leverage should decline as equity-based 
CEO compensation increases. In general, all of these papers provide evidence of a 
negative relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s leverage. 
Managerial agency theory provides a counter argument. Executives compensated 
with options are willing to increase stock-price volatility. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) 
examine the relation between common stock and option holdings of managers and the 
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choice of investment and financing decisions by firms. They find that firms undertaking 
variance increasing decisions have management compensation contracts with larger stock 
and option components. Moreover, DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) focus on the 
effect of CEOs’ option compensation on risk taking and claim that for firms announcing 
changes in executive option plans, there is a significant increase in stock variance. As 
stated in these studies, CEOs engage in more risk-taking decisions as they are paid with 
more options. If debtholders are uninformed and don’t ask for higher interest for the 
wealth shifted away from them, CEOs can easily raise more debt in order to boost stock-
price volatility because they can extract more benefits from their stock-option 
compensation as the shares become riskier. On the other hand, very high volatility in 
stock prices might affect the shareholders in a negative way by destroying the value of 
the firm. This theory suggests that as the CEO receives more options, the firm issues 
excessive amounts of debt that increases the firms’ leverage. 
 There are also a considerable amount of studies that suggest the positive relation. 
Lewellen, Loderer and Martin (1987) conduct an empirical analysis on executive 
incentive issues and argue a positive impact of the firm’s leverage on stock options. 
Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2009) investigate the relation between CEOs’ equity 
incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. They argue that 
performance pricing contracts give CEOs a tool to gain private benefits by increasing 
firm risk. Tchistyi, Yermack and Yun (2009) find that CEOs with high pay sensitivity to 
stock volatility (vega) decide on more risky performance pricing schedules, while 
managers with high pay sensitivity to stock price (delta) choose less risky ones. 
Moreover, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) study the relation between the managerial 
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compensation structure, such as option compensation, and investment and debt policy. 
The paper provides empirical evidence that higher CEO wealth sensitivity to stock 
volatility is connected with more R&D investments and higher leverage. Further, Ortiz-
Molina (2007) analyzes the effect of the firm’s capital structure on executive-
compensation policies. The article documents that pay-performance sensitivity declines 
in straight debt, but the sensitivity increases in convertible debt. Ortiz-Molina (2007) 
argues that as leverage increases, the sensitivity to the firm’s performance for the CEO’s 
wealth in options falls more rapidly than it does for her wealth in stocks. Also, MacMinn 
and Page Jr. (2006) conduct a theoretical analysis on the CEO option compensation and 
leverage. Relying on the pecking-order theory, they show that a CEO prefers debt to 
equity funding to maximize the firm’s value when she is compensated with stock options.  
There are also some papers that do not favor either type of relation. Yermack 
(1995) analyzes stock options by using the Black-Scholes valuation approach. The article 
claims that there is no significant relation between option compensation and leverage 
decisions. Similarly, Mehran (1995) examines the executive compensation structure of 
randomly-selected manufacturing firms. Even though the paper suggests that firm 
performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by CEOs and to the 
percentage of their equity-based compensation, it doesn’t find evidence for a significant 
relation between the equity-based compensation and the leverage choice.   
1.3  Data Selection and Variable Construction 
My data sample comes from the Compustat and Execucomp databases for the years of 
1992–1997. I exclude financial firms and utilities and winsorize the variables with 
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extreme values at 1% and 99% in order to mitigate the effect of outliers. While the data 
related to the firm’s capital structure and controls come from Compustat, the data 
necessary for the explanatory variables and the option compensation come from the 
Execucomp database. The missing values crucial for the calculation of option 
compensation measures are hand collected from the EDGAR system through the SEC-
Def 14a filings where available. My sample consists of 1,329 observations with 410 
firms.1 
 In my analyses, the CEO’s option compensation is represented in two different 
ways. I define “Option Ratio” as the Black-Scholes value of the option grants in a certain 
year for the CEO of a specific firm divided by the CEO’s total compensation for that 
year. This measure represents the percentage of total compensation derived from option 
pay. The second major explanatory variable represents the number of the CEO’s option 
shares as the “Option Grant Ratio” that is basically the number of options granted to the 
CEO in thousands divided by the number of the firm’s shares outstanding in the millions. 
This measure explains what percentage of the firm’s future cash flows have been granted 
to the CEO as opposed to the shareholders. By using multiple measures of CEO option 
compensation, I seek to establish the robustness of the relation between the CEO option 
compensation and leverage in terms of both the quantity and the value. 
 I evaluate the firm’s capital structure with two different measures of leverage. 
Leverage is the book leverage of the firm that is calculated by dividing the sum of the 
debt in current liabilities and the long-term debt by the book value of total assets. The 
                                               
1 Data back to 1992 cover only S&P 500 firms. Out of 500 companies, there are around 30 financial and 
utility firms; from the remaining 470 companies, I lose about additional 60 firms due to the missing values 
on tenure, growth variables and CEO compensation data. 
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literature uses this measure frequently (recently by Ma and Martin, 2010). This measure 
allows me to focus on only the debt itself that is possibly influenced by the structure of 
the CEO’s compensation. The other proxy for capital structure (recently by Faulkender 
and Petersen, 2011), Net Leverage, is calculated by subtracting the cash holdings of the 
firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and the long-term debt and then 
dividing the new sum by the book value of total assets.2 This measure includes the cash 
component as “negative debt.” The effect of the cash is the following: Firms can keep the 
same amount of debt but increase cash to reduce the equity volatility. This alternative 
proxy captures this different aspect of firm leverage that serves as a test for the 
robustness of my findings. 
 As discussed in the capital-structure and executive-compensation literature by 
Titman and Wessels (1988), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999), Guay and Harford (2000), Leary and Roberts (2005), Mackay 
and Phillips (2005), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Billett, King and Mauer (2007), 
Hassan and Hosino (2008), Ma and Martin (2010), Rauh and Sufi (2010), Rampini and 
Viswanathan (2011), Faulkender, Flannery, Henkins and Smith (2011), I use certain 
control variables in this study. One of them is operating profitability that is the net cash 
flow from operating activities over total assets. Growth opportunity is constructed as 
capital expenditures over total assets. Size represents a natural logarithm of sales. 
Tangibility is controlled by two variables. One of them is defined as the total of property, 
plant, and equipment over the total assets, and the other variable represents leasing. 
                                               
2 I construct the same leverage measures by also using the market value of total assets even though these 
leverage variables with the market value of assets potentially have a mechanical effect on options because 
both options and market leverage are functions of stock price returns.  My results stay robust. 
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Leasing is formulated as the sum of property, plant, equipment, and ten times the rental 
expenses over the sum of total assets and ten times the rental expenses. Cash flow 
volatility is controlled as the quarterly standard deviation of the percentage of change in 
operating income for the last three years. This percentage is an important measure of 
volatility because the firm’s debt level does not directly affect it. Tenure, the natural 
logarithm of the years served as CEO, is also controlled for because it is a strong 
representative of the CEO’s characteristics. The last control variable focuses on the 
industry. Specifically, this variable is the natural logarithm of the debt average of the 
industries in which the firms operate. Fama-French 12 industries are used for the industry 
classifications.  
 Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for all of the variables used in the 
models. Both, Leverage and Net Leverage show similar patterns in their distributions. 
Net Leverage is slightly more volatile compared to Leverage because it is the measure 
with the cash taken from the leverage. On the other hand, the statistics for the option 
compensation proxies are quite interesting. Considering the mean and median, the Option 
Ratio and especially Option Grant Ratio variables display right-skewed features. Along 
with high variance, this positive skewness shows that between the years 1992 and 1997, 
there are some firms compensating their CEOs with very high option compensation while 
the majority does not. The statistics for the firm characteristics are similar to the ones 
documented in previous studies. On the other hand, the measure of volatility is quite 
different. Cash flow volatility has a very right-skewed distribution with an extremely 
high standard deviation that shows my sample consists of a large spectrum of firms with 
varying volatilities that mainly have a high level of risk. According the statistics for 
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industry characteristics, the distribution of the industry debt average is consistent with the 
literature. Considering the CEO characteristics measure, the statistics show that CEOs 
have tenure of approximately 6.5 years on average while the median value is 7 years, as 
similarly documented in the literature. 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
      
This table provides descriptive statistics for the mean, standard deviation, 75th, 50th, and 
25th percentiles of all types of variables used in the regression model. There are 410 
firms with 1,329 firm-year observations. Net Leverage is calculated by subtracting the 
cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term 
debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is constructed by 
dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of 
total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for 
the CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined 
as the amount of options granted to CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares 
outstanding in millions. Operating Profitability is the net cash flow from operating 
activities over total assets. Growth represents capital expenditures over total assets. 
Lease is constructed as the sum of property, plant, equipment total, and 10 times the 
rental expenses over the sum of total assets and 10 times the rental expenses. Tangibility 
is property, plant, and equipment total over total assets. Size is defined as the natural 
logarithm of sales. Cash Flow Volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of the 
percentage change in operating income for the last three years. Industry Debt Mean 
represents the natural logarithm of the debt average of industries. Tenure is the natural 
logarithm of the years served as CEO. 
            
Variables Mean Stdev P75 P50 P25 
Net Leverage 0.196 0.194 0.319 0.193 0.073 
Leverage 0.243 0.161 0.335 0.227 0.129 
Option Ratio 0.289 0.302 0.449 0.227 0.000 
Option Grant Ratio 1.674 5.046 1.167 0.389 0.000 
Operating Profitability 0.083 0.119 0.105 0.040 0.013 
Growth 0.062 0.046 0.083 0.055 0.032 
Lease 0.425 0.239 0.610 0.422 0.260 
Tangibility 0.326 0.244 0.508 0.290 0.121 
Size 8.360 1.349 9.263 8.502 7.630 
Cash Flow Volatility 1.058 7.482 0.591 0.279 0.117 
Industry Debt Mean 8.302 1.047 9.269 8.031 7.516 
Tenure 1.843 0.943 2.565 1.946 1.099 
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I provide a broader view of the relation between the CEO’s option compensation 
and the firm’s capital structure before I move to the next step and focus on the main 
model in this study. Figure 1.1 shows the yearly average values of all the independent 
and dependent variables in my analyses. Before the exogenous shock (the pre-period), 
Option Ratio has steady values around 0.26 and the yearly average Option Grant Ratio 
shows a slight increase. In the pre-period, Net Leverage and Leverage follow an 
incremental pattern on average, from 0.20 to 0.22 and from 0.25 to 0.27, respectively. At 
the time of the IRC 162(m) in 1994 and in the following years up to 1997, Option Ratio 
begins to increase after a drop in 1994 from 0.21 to about 0.37. Likewise, Option Grant 
Ratio increases drastically in the post-period from 0.10 to 0.27. The annual mean values 
of Net Leverage start to drop from approximately 0.22 to 0.17 after the exogenous shock. 
Similarly, Leverage starts to decrease gradually to 0.24 in the post-period. This reversed 
relation between option and leverage measures around the time of the exogenous shock 
clearly shows the impact of the CEO’s option compensation changes after 1993 on the 











This figure displays the distribution of Leverage, Net Leverage, Option Ratio, and Option Grant Ratio
mean values by years for the firms paying CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million. Net
Leverage is calculated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current
liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is
constructed by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value
of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO
over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of
options granted to the CEO in ten thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions.
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1.4  The IRC 162(m) Law and Initial Findings 
1.4.1 IRC 162(M) 
In this study, I employ IRC 162(m) law as the exogenous shock to the CEO 
compensation in a natural experiment setting. The Revenue Reconciliation Act with the 
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Section 162(m) was enacted in 1993; and it limits the corporate tax deduction for 
executive compensation to $1 million with an exception for performance based 
compensation. Therefore, for the taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1994, 
some firms have altered the structure of their compensation packages so that any excess 
over $1 million qualifies under the performance based exception. Stock-option plans 
were preferred more as opposed to other compensation forms for compliance as 
performance based (by Perry and Zenner, 2001). As an exogenous shock, IRC 162(m) 
clearly provides suitable conditions for the identification of the changes in the CEO’s 
option pay, because IRC 162(m) only influences the CEO’s option compensation but not 
the firm’s capital structure. Due to the CEO’s altered compensation structure, causality 
occurs from the option compensation towards the firm’s capital structure. 
After the IRC 162(m) Statement, the CEO’s compensation structure changed 
drastically. Rose and Wolfram (2002) investigate the changes in CEO total compensation 
and cash salary caused by IRC 162(m) and they find that in general, the affected firms 
choose to pay CEO salaries around $ 1 million. Reintenga, Buchheit, Yen and Baker 
(2002) examine the impact of IRC 162(m) on performance based pay and earnings 
management and they conclude the law affects the CEO’s performance based payment 
drastically which incentivizes the CEO to smooth reported earnings. As documented by 
Perry and Zenner (2001), CEOs started to be compensated with more performance based 
compensation after the IRC 162(m). They state that companies prefer option 
compensation significantly more over other types of performance based payments, such 
as bonuses. One of the possible explanations for this choice may be the fact that bonus 
plans can destroy firm value by providing incentives to manipulate earnings ineffectively. 
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Murphy and Jensen (2011) discuss that CEOs may withhold effort, shifting the earnings 
and cash flow unproductively from one period to another to justify the bonus payments. 
Furthermore, via regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Murphy 
(2011) justifies the choice of options over the bonuses as the CEO’s incentive 
compensation. In the early 1990s, the SEC decided that shares acquired by exercising 
options could be sold right after they are exercised. This change eliminated the six-month 
holding requirement. The SEC also required the disclosure of only the numbers of 
options granted and not their value. On the other hand, companies needed to report the 
value of bonuses they pay their CEO. All these new regulations made option 
compensation more attractive for firms compared to bonus payments. Consequently, 
CEOs were compensated with more and valuable options after the IRC 162(m) law as 
performance based compensation. 
1.4.2 Univariate Analyses 
The time interval for the univariate analyses is from 1992 until 1997. Thus, the interval 
covers the two-year pre-period before the announcement of IRC 162(m), 1992–1993 and 
the four-year post period, 1994–1997. 
I conduct two univariate analyses in order to investigate the relation between 
options and the firm’s capital structure decision. In the first univariate analysis, I compare 
the leverage measures and the option measures in the pre- and post-periods to observe 
any significant differences in their values. Further, I repeat the same analysis only for 
years 1993 and 1997 to discern any differences on a larger scale. Then, I replicate the 
same tests for two sample groups: firms paying CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 
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million and the firms paying less than $1 million. I compare the results for these 
unaffected and affected firms and show the significance of those findings under the under 
the binding condition of the exogenous shock. 
Table 1.2 provides the results of my first univariate analysis. Focusing on a 
comparison of the pre- and post-periods in Panel A, I find a statistically significant 
increase both for Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio values in treated firms. While 
considering the untreated firms in Panel B that are not affected by IRC 162(m), the 
increase is insignificant for Option Grant Ratio and Option Ratio. This is a strong sign for 
the influence of IRC 162(m) on the CEO’s option compensation. On the contrary, both 
Leverage and Net Leverage values for treated firms either remain unchanged or decrease 
after the exogenous shock despite the broader trend of increasing leverage of untreated 
firms. The decrease for these measures is small and statistically insignificant. One of the 
possible reasons for this small decrease contrary to the expectation of a greater decline 
might be the fact that firms’ leverage values on average continued to increase in 1994, 
which is the first year in the post-period of my natural experiment. Because the mean 
values of the pre- and post-periods are compared in this test, that increase affects the 
difference. For the untreated firms in Panel B, both leverage measures increase 
significantly. Even though the decline in leverage measures for the treated firms is small, 
it shows that the main trend of leverage increase is broken and even slightly reversed for 




Table 1.2: T-Test Mean Comparison for Leverage Measures, Option Ratio and Grants
Pre-Period Post-Period Year 1993 Year 1997 Pre-Period Post-Period Year 1993 Year 1997




Ratio 1.138 2.170 1.562 2.399
Option Grant 
Ratio 1.520 1.662 1.347 1.566
dif dif
p-val p-val
Net Leverage 0.201 0.194 0.200 0.185 Net Leverage 0.179 0.215 0.182 0.222
dif dif
p-val p-val
Leverage 0.252 0.245 0.250 0.242 Leverage 0.230 0.253 0.232 0.262
dif dif
p-val p-val














This table presents results of the t-test mean comparison for Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Leverage, and Net Leverage in the two main columns
regarding to two different samples of CEO salaries greater and less than $1 million, respectively. In Column I, the mean values of each of these variables
for the pre-period (1992-1993) are compared to their mean values for the post-period (1994-1997). The mean difference and related p-values are









Column II shows the findings for the same tests when considering the years 1993 
and 1997 only. The mean value increases of Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio for 
treated firms are statistically significant, which is important evidence for the impact of 
the exogenous shock on the CEO’s option compensation. That is also documented by 
Perry and Zenner (2001). Focusing on the firms that pay CEO salary of less than $1 
million in Panel B, there is slight and insignificant increase in the Option Ratio and the 
Option Grant Ratio value, which indicates the IRC 162(m) law influences the option 
compensation only in firms with the binding condition. Interestingly, the decrease in Net 
Leverage and Leverage is also greater in this case although neither of them is statistically 
significant. On the other hand, there is a big and statistically significant increase for both 
leverage measures in untreated firms in Panel B which means firms that are not subjected 
to IRC 162(m) raise their leverage in this period and create a trend of leverage increase. 
All these results give a general idea about how the exogenous shock changes the option 
compensation which affects the firm’s leverage decision. 
For the second analysis, I contrast the highest and lowest quartiles of Option Ratio 
and Option Grant Ratio individually in terms of the associated Leverage and Net 
Leverage quartile averages for the pre-period. I repeat the same analysis for the post-
period and examine whether there is a significant difference between the pre- and post-
periods’ quartile differences. If the option compensation influences the firm’s capital 
structure, then the effect should be mainly reflected in quartile differences of the post-
period. If there is a relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s 
capital structure changes then it can be uncovered through this analysis. I include both 
data sets with CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million as the binding condition of 
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the IRC 162(m) and less than $1 million, so that I can compare my results and show their 
significance for the treated firms. All these tests provide a general insight into the relation 
between the option compensation and the firm’s leverage choice.  
Table 1.3 shows the findings of my second univariate analysis. Considering the 
quartile averages of Leverage and Net Leverage for Option Ratio in the pre-period, there 
is a difference between the mean values even though the difference is not statistically 
significant. Specifically, in Panel A for treated firms, the mean of leverage measures are 
higher for the lowest Option Ratio quartile (Q1) and lower for the highest quartile (Q4), 
which suggests a reverse, weak relation between the CEO’s option compensation and 
capital structure. Moving on to the post-period results, the proposed relation becomes 
strong and statistically significant. The mean leverage difference is larger for the post-
period which shows the clear influence of option compensation on leverage in post-
period and the negative relation between them. Furthermore, for untreated firms, the 
relation is exactly the opposite. Particularly, the mean leverage values are lower for the 
lowest Option Ratio quartile and higher for the highest quartile that indicates a positive 
relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s capital structure choice. 
For the post-period results, that relation stays the same. These findings strongly suggest 
the influence of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s leverage after the IRC 
162(m) law. Another important point to focus on is the mean leverage changes of the 
same quartiles before and after the exogenous shock. For treated firms in the post-period, 
the value for the lowest quartile drops from 0.219 to 0.209 for Net Leverage and from 
0.275 to 0.257 for Leverage. The value change for the highest quartile is even greater. 
This finding shows that both Leverage values decrease after the exogenous shock and the 
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change is even bigger for high Option Ratio values. This decrease might be due to the 
impact of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital structure decisions which 
I investigate further in detail in the next section of this paper. 
PANEL A:                                   









PANEL B:                                     









Table 1.3: T-Test Leverage Mean Comparison for Option Ratio and Grants
This table reports results of the t-test mean comparison for Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio in two
panels considering both data sets with CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million and less than $1
million. In Panel A, the highest and the lowest quartiles of Option Ratio are compared in terms of the
associated quartile mean leverage values, namely, Net Leverage and Leverage seperately. The analysis is
conducted for both the pre-period (1992-1993) and the post-period (1994-1997) considering the two different
data sets. The mean difference and related p-values are provided. In Panel B, the t-tests are performed for
Option Grant Ratio with the same logic.
Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Post-Period
Treated Treated Untreated Untreated 
0.219 0.209 0.171 0.205
0.206 0.168 0.185 0.218
0.013 0.041 -0.014 -0.013
0.420 0.088 0.497 0.279
0.275 0.257 0.221 0.242
0.257 0.222 0.230 0.262
0.018 0.035 -0.009 -0.020
0.379 0.084 0.578 0.137
0.242 0.225 0.165 0.227
0.223 0.183 0.171 0.230
0.019 0.042 -0.006 -0.003
0.389 0.092 0.602 0.442
0.267 0.263 0.221 0.263
0.252 0.232 0.224 0.276
0.015 0.031 -0.003 -0.013




Panel B reports the results of the same analysis for Option Grant Ratio. The 
findings for Option Grant Ratio have the similar pattern as for Option Ratio in both 
treated and untreated firms. In both periods, there are big quartile differences of mean 
leverage measures that are even greater and statistically significant in the post-period. 
Also, all leverage values of quartiles seem to decline in the post-period compared to the 
pre-period due to the possible influence of increased option compensation on the firm’s 
leverage decisions.   
1.5 The Empirical Method and Main Results 
1.5.1  The Model 
The time period for the natural experiment is from 1992 until 1997. The interval covers 
the two-year period before the announcement of IRC 162(m), 1992–1993 and compares it 
to the two two-year periods after the statement, 1994–1995 and 1996-1997. The main 
reason for the two-year pre-period is the availability of company data. I also restrict the 
experiment with two two-year post-periods because the power of the experiment 
deteriorates over time after the exogenous shock due to other potential factors that affect 
the relation between the CEO’s option compensation and leverage.  
The natural experiment to disclose any possible impact of the CEO’s option 
compensation on the firm’s capital structure is done via a difference-in-difference 
analysis. In the analysis, I use dummy variables for the post-period and the treated 
observations along with the interactions from these variables with the option measure so 
that I can examine all the possible effects from option measure variations on the capital 
structure. The treated firms are the IRC 162(m) binding firms that compensate their 
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CEOs with salaries equal to or greater than $1 million; and the post-period data cover all 









where Y is the leverage measure; X is the option measure; the firm-year observation is i = 
1, … , N; the entire period is t = 1992, … , 1997;  the number of control variables is l = 1, 
… , 8; and α, β, γ, δ, θ, ε, λ, φ, ρ, μ are the coefficients of the constant term, post-period, 
treated firms, post-period treated firms, option measures,  post-period option measures, 
treated firms’ option measures, post-period treated firms’ option measures, controls, error 
term, respectively. 
 To validate the robustness of the results, I also estimate an instrumented 
regression (IV) model. I introduce an IV approach in order to focus only on the treated 
firms’ option compensation in the post-period and its influence on leverage decisions. 
Thus, the IV approach excludes the effect from the untreated firms’ option compensation 
and the pre-period that might crowd out the real impact of the treated firms’ option 
compensation. In this analysis, the treated firms are also the IRC 162(m) binding firms 
and the post-period data start with 1994. This model consists of two stages where the 
option measure is estimated with instrumental variables in the first stage. In addition to 
the necessary controls, dummy variables for the post-period and treated observations are 
included along with their interactions that become the instruments for the option 
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Treated and Post*Treated as valid instruments because the change in the option payment 
is primarily caused by the IRC 162(m) (Post) and observable for the firms paying CEO 
salary of $1 million or above (Treated). The Post*Treated is the only factor identifying 
the treated firms’ option compensation in the post-period whose impact on the leverage 
decisions is examined in the second stage of the model. 
 






where X is the option compensation; the firm-year observation is i= 1, … , N; the entire 
period is t = 1992, … , 1997; and the number of control variables is l= 1, … , 8. 
At the second stage, the leverage measure is regressed on the instrumented option 
measure with the controls, year and fixed effects. Even though this approach provides a 
clear interpretation of the option compensation’s influence compared to a regular 
difference-in-difference analysis, the regression omits the effects of the other possible 




where Y is the leverage measure; X̂  is the instrumented option compensation from the 
first-stage regression; the firm-year observation is i= 1, … , N; the entire period is t = 
1992, … , 1997; and the number of control variables is l= 1, … , 8.  
The fixed effect approach is used in the analyses because it controls for the 




















a necessity for difference-in-difference analysis. Moreover, I want to examine the change 
in a firm’s response before and after the exogenous shock. So, I need to focus on the 
difference between the average post-period values and the average pre-period values for 
that firm after removing changes explained by other factors. That requires using the firm 
specific intercept which is estimated via the fixed effect. Finally, for precision, I conduct 
the Hausman test and decide to use the fixed effect approach. 
 To strengthen the robustness of my findings, I focus on different CEO salary 
groups to show how the results change by different salary cut-offs. If the choice of IRC 
162(m) as a natural experiment is correct and my model is valid, then in general the 
influence of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital structure decision 
should be less significant or even insignificant for alternative salary cut-offs, such as 
above $900,000 or above $800,000. The results are presented in Table 9 in Appendix A. 
Moreover, I examine corporate governance and convertible debt issuance within the 
context of option compensation and leverage relation. These variables offer useful tools 
to mitigate both managerial agency and debt agency problems, each of which supports 
opposite findings about the CEO’s compensation and the firm’s leverage relation in the 
literature. In addition to that, I use placebo tests in which I run the same models but with 
data in a shifted time range. The purpose is to examine and prove the validity of the 
exogenous shock and its effect. Further, I investigate the unlevered firm’s volatility 
before and after the shock aside of the financial risk in order to find out whether the IRC 
162(m) results in increased “real” risk taking by the managers who are receiving more 
stock options. Finally, I conduct robustness tests to control for the impact of firm size on 
the investigated relation in my models. 
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1.5.2 Multivariate Analysis (Difference-in-Difference Regression Model) 
The main analysis on the relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s 
capital structure is a difference-in-difference analysis. There are two main dummy 
variables in this model. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-period 
(1994–1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that equals one for CEO salaries 
equal to or greater than $1 million and zero otherwise. Option Ratio*post, Option 
Ratio*treated, Option Ratio*post*treated, Option Grant Ratio*post, Option Grant 
Ratio*treated, Option Grant Ratio*post*treated, and post*treated are the interaction 
variables of Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Treated, and Post. Consequently, this 
model enables me to observe and control for any possible effects from option measures of 
treated, untreated, pre- and post-periods of firm data. The major focus should be on the 
estimated coefficients for Option Ratio*post*treated and Option Grant 
Ratio*post*treated because they are the main variables that explain the possible impact of 
the CEO’s option compensation, which is influenced by IRC 162(m), on the firm’s 
leverage choice.  Year and fixed effects along with controls such as tenure, operating 
profitability, growth, leasing, tangibility, firm size, cash flow volatility, and average 
industry debt are also added in the model. This test contains firm data from all CEO 
salary groups because the dummy Treated controls the data set for CEO salaries equal to 
or greater than $1 million. This analysis also eliminates any potential effects specific to 
each industry because the difference is calculated via the regressions. Also, the time 
interval is six years which is a very short time period for the industries to change and 
cause an effect on the variables in my model.  
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  Considering the baseline regression estimates for controls in Table 1.4, I get 
mixed results. Consistent with the literature, my findings indicate that longer tenured 
CEO’s decide to raise less debt as well as the firms with high operating profitability, high 
growth rates, high leased properties and equipment, low tangibility, and operating in 
industries with low debt average. Interestingly, contrary to the literature, the outcomes of 
this baseline regression analysis suggest that firms with higher cash flow volatility choose 
to issue more debt as a method of funding, and this needs further investigation. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 1.4 have the results from the CEO’s 
option-compensation ratio impact on the firm’s leverage decision. Option 
Ratio*post*treated represents the Option Ratio for the treated firms after the exogenous 
shock that are influenced by the IRC 162(m) and expected to affect the firm’s leverage. 
Thus, they are the firms believed to show the true impact of the CEO’s option 
compensation on the firm’s leverage. Considering Option Ratio*post*treated, the 
variable has a strong and statistically significant, negative influence. This result suggests 
that CEOs of the treated firms decide to raise less debt as they are compensated more 
with valuable options after the exogenous shock from the enactment of IRC 162(m). In 
particular, the firm’s net leverage deteriorates by 2.55% (= 0.085 * 0.302) with one 
standard deviation increase (about 30%) in the option ratio. In other words, if the dollar 
value of the CEO’s options increases 30% of the total compensation keeping the total 
compensation constant, or similarly, if the CEO is paid 30% over her current options’ 
dollar value with options keeping the total compensation constant, then the CEO will 
raise less debt that will lead to a decline of 2.6 % in the firm’s net leverage. Considering 
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firm’s leverage, the decrease is around 2.64% (= 0.088 * 0.302) for an option ratio 







Option grant ratio 0.002 0.002
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post -0.001 -0.001
0.001 0.001
Option grant ratio*treated 0.003 0.004**
0.002 0.002





Option ratio*post 0.054** 0.052**
0.021 0.021
Option ratio*treated 0.058 0.066
0.057 0.056
Option ratio*post*treated -0.085* -0.088*
0.051 0.051
Table 1.4: Difference in Difference Analysis of Leverage on Option Measures
one for values in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that equals one for
CEO salaries equal to or geater than $1 million and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post, Option
ratio*treated, Option ratio*post*treated, Option grant ratio*post, Option grant ratio*treated, Option grant
ratio*post*treated, and Post*treated are the interaction variables of Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio,
Treated and Post. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
Treated ≥ $1 Million
This table reports difference-in-difference analysis estimates for Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, and
their interactions with treatment variables along with CEO tenure, operating profitability growth, leasing,
tangibility, size, operating income volatility, average industry debt as control variables, and also year
dummies and fixed effects. It also provides the baseline regression results in the first two columns. The
analysis is conducted using two different option measures for two different leverage measures
individually. Net Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the
debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage
is calculated by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of
total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over the
CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to










Treated -0.020 -0.020 -0.030 -0.032
0.018 0.018 0.025 0.024
Post -0.016 -0.027 -0.035* -0.043**
0.019 0.018 0.020 0.019
Post*treated 0.017 0.016 0.035 0.034*
0.017 0.017 0.021 0.020
Tenure -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Operating profitability -0.795*** -0.232*** -0.847*** -0.186*** -0.825*** -0.146*
0.078 0.060 0.098 0.079 0.097 0.088
Growth -0.102 -0.206 0.004 -0.058 -0.037 -0.078
0.187 0.183 0.180 0.177 0.194 0.193
Lease -0.305*** -0.228** -0.092 -0.066 -0.098 -0.081
0.106 0.096 0.215 0.216 0.206 0.205
Tangibility 0.363*** 0.323*** 0.125 0.099 0.148 0.151
0.090 0.082 0.221 0.219 0.218 0.212
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -0.021 -0.022 -0.026
0.007 0.006 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018
Cash flow volatility 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.128***
0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.022 0.021
Industry debt mean 0.024** 0.012 -0.010 -0.027 -0.017 -0.033*
0.011 0.010 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Constant 0.107 0.193* 0.494* 0.674* 0.603** 0.756***
0.121 0.112 0.293 0.405 0.232 0.215
Adj. R-sq. 0.23 0.04 0.26 0.08 0.23 0.07
No of Obs. 1329 1329 1329 1329 1329 1329
No of Firms 410 410 410 410 410 410
Table 1.4 (cont.): Difference in Difference Analysis of Leverage on Option Measures
Treated ≥ $1 Million
 
 
For all firms from 1992 to 1997, Option Ratio, the CEO’s option compensation has a 
statistically significant but a small negative effect on the firm’s capital structure. This is a 
rather general finding and contains the effect of various parameters because data for these 
variables also contain untreated firms as well as the entire time interval. Moving on to the 
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other findings, if all firms after 1994 are taken together, Option Ratio*post, the potential 
option compensation effect becomes slightly weaker but a positive impact. One possible 
explanation can be the fact that the untreated firms are also included in this group and the 
influence of option-compensation on leverage for these untreated firms might be strongly 
positive so that it dominates the effect in general. Similarly, if the treated companies 
paying CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million are taken into the consideration 
for the entire time period; then the option compensation impact, Option Ratio*treated, is 
positive and statistically not significant. This result shows that the exogenous shock from 
IRC 162(m) influences the option compensation so that the positive effect before the 
announcement overcomes the negative impact on the firm’s leverage in the post-period.  
In Columns five and six, the real and significant impact of options on leverage is 
evident in Option Grant Ratio*post*treated. The option compensation influence is 
negative and statistically very significant, which suggests as CEO’s of treated firms are 
paid more and more with options after IRC 162(m), they choose to decrease the leverage 
and net leverage of the firm. Particularly, Leverage and Net Leverage, decrease about 
3.53% (= 0.007 * 5.046) for one standard deviation increase in the option grant ratio. 
Specifically, if the amount of options granted to the CEO (in millions) is increased by 
0.5% keeping the total firm shares outstanding (in millions) constant or if the CEO is 
offered more options in the amount of 0.5% of her current existing options without 
issuing new company shares, then the CEO chooses less debt that reduces the firm 
leverage by 3.53%. This negative relation persists for all firms after the exogenous shock, 
Option Grant Ratio*post, but loses its statistical and economical significance because of 
the joint impact of untreated firms in that sample. For Option Grant Ratio, the relation 
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between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s capital structure is positive and 
very weak both statistically and economically when considering all firms from 1992 to 
1997. Moreover, the effect of Option Grant Ratio*treated becomes a positive impact for 
the entire time period considering only the firms paying CEO salaries equal to or greater 
than $1 million3. 
After the difference-in-difference analysis with Option Ratio and Option Grant 
Ratio4, the conclusion is that after IRC 162(m) CEOs are compensated with more and 
valuable options that lead them to make leverage decreasing decisions, consistent with 




                                               
3 In untabulated difference-in-difference analyses, I additionally control for both the total CEO 
compensation and the increase in total CEO compensation via including them as control variables 
separately. Using the natural logarithm of total compensation and a dummy variable representing whether 
there is an increase in total pay, respectively as control variables, I obtain significant results showing the 
robustness of the negative effect of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital structure. 
 
4 I conduct the same difference-in-difference analysis with other independent and dependent variables in 
order to catch different aspects of the researched relation and to test its robustness. I construct an 
independent variable as the new debt issuance over total assets. Differently from Leverage and Net 
Leverage, this variable represents the change in leverage due to new debt issuance through the influence of 
the CEO’s option compensation rather than the level of leverage. I use a dependent variable calculated as 
the vested CEO options over the number of shares outstanding to capture the motivating effect of vested 
options on CEOs’ decisions. I repeat the dif-in-dif analysis by adding these new variables; and in each of 
the cases, I observe that the negative impact of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital 
structure stays robust. 
 
5 I repeat the difference-in-difference analysis including the CEO ownership aspect as a control. As the 
CEO owns more shares of the firm, it may have a similar effect on the leverage such the option pay. 
Therefore, I control the CEO ownership calculated as the percentage of common shares outstanding owned 
by the CEO. I obtain a significant and decreasing impact of the CEO option pay on the firm leverage as in 
my original findings. 
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1.5.3  Robustness  
1.5.3.1 Instrumented Variable Regression Model  
As a robustness test, I follow another approach and use an instrumented regression 
analysis. In the first stage, Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio are estimated with 
treatment dummies as valid instruments: Post, Treated, Post*treated, and related controls. 
In the second stage, Leverage and Net Leverage are regressed individually on the 
instrumented Option Ratio* and Option Grant Ratio* along with controls, year and fixed 
effects. Similar to the previous analysis, this test has firm data from all of the CEO salary 
groups because in the first-stage regression the dummy Treated controls for the data set 
for CEO salaries equal to or greater than $1 million. This analysis concentrates on the 
effect of option compensation for the post-period on the treated firms’ capital structure 
and doesn’t include the interaction variables in the previous difference-in-difference 
model. The option measures are estimated via treatment dummies6. In the second stage, 
only the effect from the treated option measures of the post-period are represented and 
directly linked to the leverage measures that exclude the other interactions of the 
treatment and period dummies with option compensation proxies such as; Option 
Ratio*post, Option Grant Ratio*treated, etc. Therefore, it isolates any other potential 
impacts from those variables on the firm’s leverage decision, and it provides a simpler 
and clearer interpretation of the option compensation influence on the firm’s leverage 
decision compared to a regular difference-in-difference analysis. 
                                               
6 Following Stock and Yogo (2002), I test the weakness of my instruments for Option Ratio and Option 
Grant Ratio in the IV regression model. I compare the Cragg-Donald F-statistics of the first stage 
regression to the critical values in Table 1 by Stock and Yogo (2002) and find that Post, Treated and 
Post*treated are strong instruments enough to explain the option measures in the IV regression model.  
 36 
 
Table 1.5 shows the results of the instrumented regression analysis. Columns I 
and II provide the outcomes of the first- and second-stage analyses that focus on the 
Option Ratio, Leverage, and Net Leverage relation. In the first stage, most importantly, 
Post*treated is very significantly and positively related to Option Ratio suggesting that 
treated firms’ option ratios increase after the IRC 162(m) announcement. This first-stage 
finding is crucial for two reasons. First, the finding provides evidence for the validity of 
the natural experiment by indicating that IRC 162(m) inflates the CEO’s option 
compensation. Second, this strong result is going to be the instrumented Option Ratio* 
whose impact on leverage will be examined in the second-stage regression. In the first-
stage results, I have statistically significant and negative coefficients for Post when all 
firms after 1994 are taken together. According to the estimates for Post, the IRC 162(m) 
influences all firms in such a way that their CEOs are not paid more with valuable 
options. This finding suggests that the untreated firms that are expected to pay less 
valuable options in the first place have an overweighting effect in the sample. 
Furthermore, option ratios decline in treated firms when both pre- and post-periods are 
considered. The data set for this variable, Treated, includes the companies from the pre-
period where firms don’t pay too many options with high values to their CEOs. This 
might explain the dominating negative relation. 
The outcomes for Post*treated for Option Grant Ratio in Columns III and IV 
provide a weak positive relation which shows the treated firms compensate their CEOs 
with more options in the post-period. Moreover, Post estimates for Option Grant Ratio 
demonstrate that all companies after 1994 compensate their CEOs with more options. 
Similar to the first-stage Option Ratio findings, firms with CEO salaries equal to or 
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greater than $1 million pay fewer options to their CEOs when both pre- and post-periods 
are taken into consideration. 
Option Ratio    
(I)






Post -0.135*** -0.135*** 0.464 0.464
0.044 0.044 0.713 0.713
Treated -0.063 -0.063 -0.106 -0.106
0.076 0.076 0.590 0.590
Post*treated 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.688 0.688
0.073 0.073 0.604 0.604
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Net Leverage    
(I)




Leverage                                     
(IV)
Option ratio* -0.100** -0.050*
0.051 0.037
Option grant ratio* -0.038* -0.037*
0.023 0.023
Treated ≥ $1 Million                                                                                                          
Second Stage Results
Table 1.5: Instrumented Regression Analysis of Leverage on Option Measures
This table reports instrumented regression analysis estimates for option ratio*, option grant ratio* as instrumented
independent variables along with CEO tenure, operating profitability, growth, leasing, tangibility, size, cash flow
volatility, average industry debt as control variables and year effects. The analysis is conducted using two different option
measures for two different leverage measures individually. In the first stage, Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio are
estimated through treatment dummies and related controls as a difference-in-difference analysis. In the second stage, the
leverage measures are regressed on the IVed Option ratio* and Option grant ratio*. Net Leverage is formulated by
subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing
that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-
term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the
CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to
the CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that equals one for values
in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that equals one for CEO salaries equal to or geater
than $1 million and zero otherwise. Post*treated is the interaction variable of Treated and Post. Year dummies are
included in the model. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.










Tenure -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
0.007 0.005 0.010 0.009
Operating profitability -0.072*** -0.055*** -0.110*** -0.046***
0.018 0.013 0.014 0.014
Growth -0.034 -0.001 -0.036 -0.210
0.135 0.100 0.301 0.288
Lease -0.153 -0.138 -0.500** -0.408**
0.123 0.091 0.207 0.193
Tangibility 0.175 0.040 0.049* 0.042*
0.138 0.103 0.025 0.024
Size -0.001 -0.011 -0.036 -0.025
0.013 0.010 0.040 0.036
Cash flow volatility 0.050 0.049* -0.040 0.031
0.034 0.026 0.102 0.097
Industry debt mean -0.011 -0.004 0.023 -0.001
0.011 0.008 0.035 0.033
Constant 0.353** 0.461*** 0.423 0.514
0.175 0.130 0.357 0.333
Adj. R-sq. 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.05
No of Obs. 1329 1329 1329 1329
No of Firms 410 410 410 410
Treated ≥ $1 Million
 
For the second-stage findings, both Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio have 
negative and statistically powerful estimates. This instrumented regression analysis helps 
to show that the negative impact of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital 
structure still persists under different settings such as the case where the focus is on the 
treated companies in the post-period, but the possible influences of variations in the 
option-dummy interaction variables are isolated.  
The negative estimates for Option Ratio* and Option Grant Ratio* indicate that 
CEOs choose less debt as they are paid more and valuable options after the IRC 162(m). 
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In particular, the firm net leverage decrease around 3% (= 0.100 * 0.302) for one standard 
deviation increase (about 30%) in Option Ratio. In other words, if the dollar value of the 
CEO’s options increases 30% of the total compensation keeping the total pay constant, or 
similarly, if the CEO is paid 30% over her current options’ dollar value with options 
keeping the total compensation constant, then the CEO will raise less debt that will lead 
to a decline of 3% in the firm’s net leverage. Considering the firm leverage the decrease 
is around 1.51% (= 0.050 * 0.302) as the option ratio increases one standard deviation. 
For the option grant ratio one standard deviation increase reduces both Net Leverage and 
Leverage, for 19.18% (= 0.038 * 5.046) and 18.67% (= 0.037 * 5.046), respectively. 
Specifically, if the amount of options granted to the CEO (in millions) is increased by 
0.5% keeping the total firm shares outstanding (in millions) constant or if the CEO is 
offered more options in the amount of 0.5% of her current existing options without 
issuing new company shares, then the CEO chooses less debt that reduces the firm net 
leverage and leverage by 19.2% and 18.7%, respectively. 
After the instrumented regression analysis with the findings from Option Ratio 
and Option Grant Ratio, there is strong evidence that after the exogenous shock of IRC 
162(m), CEOs are paid with more and valuable options, which motivate them to make 
leverage decreasing decisions as proposed by the debt agency theory.7 
 
 
                                               
7 I conduct the same instrumented regression analysis with another independent and dependent variables: 
the new debt issuance over total assets and the vested CEO options over the number of shares outstanding, 
respectively. The negative impact of the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital structure persists 
in each case. 
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1.5.3.2  Robustness Checks 
In the literature, some papers suggest that compensating the CEO with stock options ties 
the interests of shareholders and CEOs together and thus increases the cost of debt, 
because the wealth is shifted away from the debtholders and they worry that they will 
bear the risk of CEO’s investments without receiving enough benefits from them. This 
problem is called the debt agency issue. As suggested by Haugen and Senbet (1981), 
issuing convertible debts can mitigate this problem because the issuance gives the 
debtholders the chance to trade the debt into stock in times of need such as when they 
think projects are too risky. In order to control for any possible effect of debt agency on 
the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s capital structure relation, I rerun my 
models by using the “Convertible debt dummy” variable. I form two subsamples with 
Convertible debt dummy. In the first, Convertible debt dummy equals one and comprises 
firms that face less debt agency problems because they issue convertible debt. In the 
second subsample, Convertible debt dummy equals zero and the companies do not issue 
convertible debt. The results are presented in Table 1.6. The negative impact of option 






                                               
8 As an additional robustness test, I construct three subsamples (none, medium, high) based on the ratio of 
the dollar amount of convertible debt over total assets, in order to observe the effect of varying convertible 
debt levels. I obtain robust results. 
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Table 1.6: Difference in Difference Analysis with Managerial and Debt Agency Controls
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio*post*treated -0.016 -0.014 -0.017 -0.017
0.074 0.071 0.067 0.062
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.34 0.38 0.44 0.16
No of Obs. 144 144 482 482
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated 0.140*** 0.119*** 0.006 0.004
0.019 0.018 0.008 0.008
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.16
No of Obs. 144 144 482 482
PANEL B: Test for Option Grant Ratio with GIM index dummy
GIM index dummy = 1 GIM index dummy = 0
This table reports a replication of the difference-in-difference analysis for option ratio, option grant ratio with
additional control variables such as, the GIM index dummy, compensation committee dummy, and
convertible debt dummy. The analysis is conducted in the exact same way as before. Net Leverage is
formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and
long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated via dividing the sum
of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio
of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year.
Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands divided by the
number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-period (1994-
1997) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that equals one for CEO salaries equal or geater than $1
million and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post*treated and  Option grant ratio*post*treated are the interaction 
variables of Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Treated, and Post. GIM index dummy is a dummy that equals
one if the firm has a GIM index value less than eight. Compensation committee dummy is a dummy variable
that equals one if the CEO is a member of compensation committee. Convertible debt dummy is a dummy
that  equals one for the firms issuing convertible debt. The *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level.
PANEL A: Test for Option Ratio with GIM index dummy





Table 1.6 (cont.):Difference in Difference Analysis with Managerial and Debt Agency Controls
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio*post*treated -0.076 -0.070 -0.593*** -0.603***
0.056 0.054 0.177 0.176
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.25 0.07 0.39 0.39
No of Obs. 985 985 107 107
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.092*** -0.090***
0.002 0.002 0.030 0.034
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.27 0.09 0.38 0.34
No of Obs. 985 985 107 107
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio*post*treated -0.202** -0.177** -0.048 -0.052
0.089 0.082 0.053 0.053
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.49 0.4 0.25 0.07
No of Obs. 177 177 915 915
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant 
ratio*post*treated -0.012* -0.012** -0.004 -0.004
0.007 0.006 0.003 0.003
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.51 0.34 0.29 0.10
No of Obs. 177 177 915 915
PANEL F: Test for Option Grant Ratio with Convertible debt dummy
Convertible debt dummy=1 Convertible debt dummy=0
Pay committee dummy = 0 Pay committee dummy = 1
PANEL E: Test for Option Ratio with Convertible debt dummy
Convertible debt dummy=1 Convertible debt dummy=0
PANEL C: Test for Option Ratio with Compensation committee dummy
Pay committee dummy = 0 Pay committee dummy = 1




The managerial agency theory states that CEOs engage riskier investment projects 
as they are paid more stock options that can potentially destroy the firm’s value and lead 
to an excessive wealth transfer from stockholders to CEOs. A typical solution for this 
problem is strong corporate governance. As proposed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), the Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable (2003), Jiraporn and 
Gleason (2007), Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala and Senbet (2011), the reduction in 
the high level of discretion CEOs have on their own compensation by implementing a 
board with independent directors helps to mitigate this agency problem. To control any 
potential impact of managerial agency on the relation between the CEO’s option 
compensation and the firm’s leverage decisions, I replicate my main analysis with four 
subsamples formed in the following way: “GIM index dummy” (as a corporate 
governance dummy) is a dummy that equals one if the firm has a GIM index value less 
than eight and zero otherwise. The “Compensation committee dummy” is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the CEO is a member of the compensation committee and zero 
otherwise. The samples where GIM index dummy is one or Compensation committee 
dummy is zero should have firms with stronger corporate governance compared to firms 
in the other samples because the firms with low GIM index values have strong corporate 
governance with weak CEO influence; and companies that have the CEO on the 
compensation committee experience weak corporate governance. The results are 
presented in Table 1.6. As supported by my previous findings, the negative effect of the 
CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s capital structure stays robust and statistically 
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significant 9 although the difference-in-difference analysis for Option Grant Ratio has 
some mixed results only for GIM index dummy subsamples. 
 The correct choice of the exogenous shock for a solid identification is essential in 
this study. In order to examine the robustness of the natural experiment with IRC 162(m), 
I conduct placebo tests in which I keep the main structure of my model the same but only 
shift the time range of the study. By doing this, I can observe whether there are other firm 
related endogenous or independent exogenous shocks influencing the relation between 
the option compensation and leverage. If I have significant results from the placebo tests, 
it means there are other trends than the IRC 162(m) law that affect the CEO’s option 
compensation. In the first test, I move the time frame of the difference-in-difference 
analysis one year earlier and define a dummy variable, Post1, that equals one for values 
in the shifted post-period (1993–1996) and zero otherwise. In the second test, I shift the 
time range of the model three years later and use a dummy variable, Post3, that equals 
one for values in the shifted post-period (1997–2003) and zero otherwise. The findings 
are given in Table 1.7. These analyses provide statistically insignificant results that 
support the validity of the use of IRC 162(m) in the natural experiment as the only 




                                               
9 As another robustness test, I construct three subsamples (low, medium, high) based on the GIM index 
values of firms in order to control the effect when the quality of corporate governance varies among firms 
and through time. My results stay similar and robust as in previous analyses. 
 
10 I conduct an additional placebo test with a time shift of four years in order to be away from the effect of 
IRC 162(m) and I obtain similar robust results. 
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Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio -0.018 -0.028
0.021 0.022
Option ratio*treated 0.009 -0.002
0.070 0.066
Option ratio*post1 0.010 0.016
0.017 0.016
Option ratio*post1*treated 0.020 0.029
0.068 0.063
Treated -0.028 -0.021 -0.021 -0.013
0.029 0.027 0.021 0.019
Post1 -0.017 -0.026 -0.016 -0.025
0.020 0.019 0.020 0.019
Post1*treated 0.019 0.012 0.024 0.015
0.028 0.025 0.023 0.020
Treated ≥ $1 Million
Table 1.7: The Placebo Tests for the Difference in Difference Analysis 
This table presents the placebo test estimates for the difference-in-difference (dif-in-dif) analysis. In
the first placebo test, the time frame of the dif-in-dif analysis is shifted one year earlier and the
estimates are given in columns I - IV. In the second placebo test, the time frame is shifted three year
later and the estimates are shown in columns V - VIII. The analyses comprise control variables and
year fixed effects. The tests are conducted using two different option measures for two different
leverage measures individually. Net Leverage is formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the
firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book
value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and
long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value
of the option grants for the CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio
is defined as the amount of options granted to CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares
outstanding in millions. Post1 is a dummy that equals one for values in the shifted post-period (1993-
1996) and zero otherwise. Post3 is a dummy that equals to one for values in shifted post period (1997-
2003) and zero otherwise. Treated is a dummy that equals one for CEO salaries equal or geater than
$1 million and zero otherwise. Option ratio*post1, Option ratio*treated, Option ratio*post1*treated,
Option grant ratio*post1, Option grant ratio*treated, Option grant ratio*post1*treated, Post*treated,
Option ratio*post3, Option ratio*post3*treated, Option grant ratio*post3 and Option grant
ratio*post3*treated are the interaction variables of Option ratio Option grant ratio Treated, Post1 and
Post3. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
PANEL A: The First Placebo Test
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Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant ratio 0.005 0.005
0.004 0.004
Option grant ratio*treated -0.007 -0.010
0.009 0.008
Option grant ratio*post1 -0.001 -0.001
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post1*treated 0.005 0.008
0.009 0.008
Constant 0.463* 0.671*** 0.416* 0.638***
0.249 0.231 0.233 0.216
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.24 0.06 0.27 0.07
No of Obs. 906 906 918 918
No of Firms 342 342 343 343
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio -0.023 -0.019
0.016 0.014
Option ratio*treated 0.022 0.021
0.036 0.035
Option ratio*post3 0.021 0.010
0.017 0.016
Option ratio*post3*treated -0.033 -0.023
0.037 0.036
Treated 0.003 0.001 0.011 0.008
0.017 0.017 0.014 0.013
Post3 0.024 0.036** 0.035** 0.042***
0.016 0.015 0.016 0.014
Post3*treated -0.014 -0.018 -0.024* -0.025*
0.018 0.017 0.014 0.013
Table 1.7 (cont.): The Placebo Tests for the Difference in Difference Analysis 
Treated ≥ $1 Million
PANEL B: The Second Placebo Test






Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant ratio 0.003 0.003
0.003 0.003
Option grant ratio*treated -0.002 -0.002
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post3 -0.002 -0.001
0.003 0.002
Option grant ratio*post3*treated 0.002 0.001
0.003 0.002
Constant 0.040 0.048 -0.008 0.026
0.150 0.146 0.150 0.144
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04
No of Obs. 8,116 8,116 8,185 8,185
No of Firms 1,849 1,849 1,856 1,856
Table 1.7 (cont.): The Placebo Tests for the Difference in Difference Analysis 
Treated ≥ $1 Million
 
 Although I control for the firm size at a level throughout my analyses in this 
paper, there still might be an impact of size on the option compensation and firm leverage 
relation because size is somewhat correlated (approximately, 0.20) to the treatment effect. 
In order to eliminate this concern, I use two robustness tests. In the first test, I replace the 
treatment variable with an indicator for the firm size above the top 25th percentile so that 
I can exactly mimic the original treatment variable. I define a dummy variable, TreatedQ, 
that equals one for the firms with sizes in the top 25th percentile and zero otherwise. In 
the second robustness test, I substitute the treatment variable with an indicator for the 
firm size above median and I use a dummy variable, TreatedM, that equals one for the 
firms with sizes above the median and zero otherwise. The findings are shown in Table 
1.8.  I obtain statistically insignificant findings in both cases that indicate firm size is not 
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the main factor impacting the relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the 
firm’s leverage. This provides evidence for the robustness of my previous results. 
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio -0.039*** -0.040***
0.015 0.015
Option ratio*post 0.027 0.029
0.023 0.022
Option ratio*treatedQ 0.041 0.033
0.040 0.037
Option ratio*post*treatedQ 0.013 0.011
0.045 0.043
TreatedQ 0.032 0.037 0.036** 0.034**
0.024 0.023 0.017 0.016
Post -0.009 -0.019
0.019 0.018
Post*treatedQ -0.036 -0.035 -0.025* -0.023*
0.023 0.022 0.014 0.014
TreatedQ > 75th percentile of firm size
Table 1.8: The Size-Robustness Tests for the Difference in Difference Analysis 
This table presents the size-robustness test estimates for the difference-in-difference (dif-in-dif)
analysis. In this robustness test, the treatment variable is replaced by an indicator for the firm size.
The analysis comprises control variables and year fixed effects. The test is conducted using two
different option measures for two different leverage measures individually. Net Leverage is
formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities
and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by
dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets.
Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the option grants for the CEO over the CEO’s
total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the amount of options granted to
CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions. Post is a dummy that
equals one for values in the post-period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. TreatedQ is a dummy that
equals one for the firms with the size in the top 25th percentile and zero otherwise. Because the
treated firms are 25 percent of the whole sample, the cutoff point for firm size is the top 25th
percentile in order to exactly mimic the effect of the original treatment variable. For the second test,
TreatedM is a dummy which equals to one for the firms greater than median firm size and zero
otherwise. Option ratio*post, Option ratio*treatedQ, Option ratio*post*treatedQ, Option grant
ratio*post, Option grant ratio*treatedQ, Option grant ratio*post*treatedQ, Post*treatedQ, Option
ratio*treatedM, Option ratio*post*treatedM, Option grant ratio*treatedM, Option grant
ratio*post*treatedM, Post*treatedM are the interaction variables. The *** indicates statistical
significance at the 1% level.




Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant ratio 0.003 0.002
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post -0.004* -0.003
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*treatedQ -0.005 -0.005
0.003 0.003
Option grant ratio*post*treatedQ 0.006 0.005
0.003 0.003
Constant 0.586*** 0.745*** 0.577** 0.745***
0.223 0.212 0.224 0.217
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.24 0.08 0.26 0.07
No of Obs. 1329 1329 1329 1329
No of Firms 410 410 410 410
Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option ratio -0.032 -0.031
0.020 0.020
Option ratio*post 0.013 0.016
0.032 0.032
Option ratio*treatedM -0.004 -0.013
0.026 0.025
Option ratio*post*treatedM 0.040 0.037
0.037 0.036
TreatedM 0.035* 0.035* 0.042** 0.043**
0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018
Post -0.009 -0.019 0.002 -0.009
0.022 0.021 0.019 0.018
Post*treatedM -0.028* -0.026* -0.031* -0.030**
0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015
Table 1.8 (cont.): The First Size-Robustness Test for Difference in Difference Analysis 
TreatedQ > 75th percentile of firm size
PANEL B: The Second Size-Robustness Test






Net Leverage Leverage Net Leverage Leverage 
Option grant ratio 0.003 0.002
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post -0.003 -0.003
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*treatedM 0.000 0.001
0.005 0.005
Option grant ratio*post*treatedM -0.001 -0.001
0.005 0.004
Constant 0.683*** 0.826*** 0.511** 0.691***
0.235 0.227 0.227 0.215
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.07
No of Obs. 1329 1329 1329 1329
No of Firms 410 410 410 410
Table 1.8 (cont.): The Second Size-Robustness Test for Difference in Difference Analysis 
TreatedM > median firm size
 
 In my paper, I focus on the capital structure implied by financial risk. In order to 
investigate the relation between the exogenous shock and the “real” risk taking by CEOs 
paid more stock options, I conduct another robustness test. I examine the unlevered firm 
volatility before and after the shock for the treated firms. In untabulated analyses, the 
statistically significant findings suggest an increased firm volatility for treated firms 
while the firm risk stays about the same after the exogenous shock for untreated firms. 
This result provides robustness for the original findings in the paper and supports the idea 
that the IRC 162(m) law results in increased risk taking by managers as they are 
compensated with more options.11 
                                               
11 I investigate the potential impact of the increase in the CEO option pay on the firm investment policy. 
After examining the dividend, cash holding, capital expenditures and R&D policies of the firms in relation 
to the CEO option pay changes, I find that only the R&D policy is affected significantly which is calculated 
as the ratio of R&D expenditures over total assets. As suggested by Bryan, Hwang and Lilien (2000), 




This paper examines the relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s 
capital structure. Specifically, the main interest is to uncover any possible impact of the 
CEO’s increased option compensation on the firm’s leverage choices. Controlling for the 
other channels of potential effects on the firm’s leverage decisions, I use an exogenous 
shock, the IRC 162(m) law, in the natural experiment setting to clearly identify the 
CEO’s option compensation. Relying on this natural experiment during the period of 
1992 to 1997, I find that when CEOs are compensated with more and valuable options, 
they decide to engage in less debt financing suggested by the debt agency theory. 
 This paper contributes to the CEO compensation and capital structure literature by 
providing insight into the impact from the CEO’s option compensation on the firm’s 
leverage decision. This study investigates the interaction between the proposed relation 
and the corporate governance. Controlling for any possible effects by the firm’s corporate 
governance mechanism on the option compensation and leverage relation provides robust 
findings. Further, this study presents a thorough research by including two different 
empirical models. These models comprise a difference-in-difference analysis and an 
instrumented regression analysis. Maybe most importantly, this research is built on a 
natural experiment based on the IRC 162(m) law. To the best of my knowledge, there is 
no study on the relation between the CEO’s option compensation and the firm’s capital 
structure that is conducted in a natural experiment setting. Thus, my paper does not only 
present a solid, reliable identification of variables and a strong, precise causality but also 
                                                                                                                                            
via the increase in R&D expenditures. Likewise, I obtain a strong and significantly positive impact from 
the CEO’s option compensation on the firm R&D policy in my analysis. 
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provides a baseline for further studies by using natural experiments while investigating 
the option compensation and leverage relation. Lastly, this study with the clear 
identification and consistent findings can provide assistance to the compensation 
committee and the board in firms to make better decisions about the CEO compensation 


























A.1 Distribution of Leverage and Option Measures 
I plan to show whether there is a trend for the leverage and option pay measures. 
Therefore, I investigate the distribution of the mean values of the net leverage, leverage, 
option ratio and option grant ratio over the years from 1992 until 1997 for untreated firms 
only. I present the findings in Figure 1.2. I also compare the distribution of those 
measures for the untreated firms and treated companies in Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4. For 
the treated firms after 162(m) Statement, I show the deviation from the trend in option 









Figure 1.2: Distribution of All Leverage and Option Measures for Untreated Firms
This figure displays the distibution of Leverage, Net Leverage, Option Ratio, and Option Grant Ratio mean values
by years for the firms paying CEO salaries less than $1 million, i.e. the untreated firms. Net Leverage is calculated
by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and
dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is constructed by dividing the sum of the debt in current
liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value
of the option grants for the CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as
















































Figure 1.3: Distribution of All Leverages Measures for Treated and Untreated Firms
This figure displays the distibution of Leverage and Net Leverage mean values by years for the firms paying CEO
salaries less than $1 million, i.e. the untreated firms, and for the companies paying CEO salaries equal to or
greater than $1 million, i.e. the treated firms. Net Leverage is calculated by subtracting the cash holdings of the
firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt and dividing that by the book value of total
assets. Leverage is constructed by dividing the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term debt by the book
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of All Option Measures for Treated and Untreated Firms
This figure displays the distibution of Option Ratio and Option Grant Ratio mean values by years for the firms
paying CEO salaries less than $1 million, i.e. the untreated firms, and for the companies paying CEO salaries
equal to or greater than $1 million, i.e. the treated firms. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes value of the
option grants for the CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined as the
amount of options granted to the CEO in ten thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions.
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A.2 Difference-in-Difference Analysis with different CEO Salary Groups  





Option grant ratio 0.002 0.001
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post -0.001 -0.001
0.001 0.001
Option grant ratio*treated 0.003 0.003
0.003 0.003
Option grant ratio*post*treated -0.005*** -0.005**
0.002 0.002
Option ratio -0.043*** -0.042***
0.013 0.013
Option ratio*post 0.059** 0.054*
0.030 0.030
Option ratio*treated 0.056 0.042
0.047 0.047
Option ratio*post*treated -0.077 -0.062
0.050 0.051
Table 1.9: Difference in Difference Analysis of Leverage on Option Measures
This table reports difference-in-difference analyses estimates for option ratio, option grant ratio and their interactions
with treatment variables along with CEO tenure, operating profitability, growth, leasing, tangibility, size, cash flow
volatility, average industry debt as control variables, and also year dummies and fixed effects. The analyses are
conducted using two different option measures for two different leverage measures individually. Net Leverage is
formulated by subtracting the cash holdings of the firm from the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long-term
debt and dividing that by the book value of total assets. Leverage is calculated by dividing the sum of the debt in
current liabilities and long-term debt by the book value of total assets. Option Ratio is the ratio of the Black-Scholes
value of the option grants for the CEO over the CEO’s total compensation for that year. Option Grant Ratio is defined
as the amount of options granted to the CEO in thousands divided by the number of shares outstanding in millions.
Post is a dummy that equals one for values in post period (1994-1997) and zero otherwise. In Panel A, Treated is a  
dummy that equals one for CEO salaries equal to or geater than $0.9 million and zero otherwise; while in Panel B,
Treated is a dummy that equals one for CEO salaries equal to or geater than $0.8 million and zero otherwise. Option
ratio*post, Option ratio*treated, Option ratio*post*treated, Option grant ratio*post, Option grant ratio*treated, Option
grant ratio*post*treated, and Post*treated are the interaction variables of Option Ratio, Option Grant Ratio, Treated









Treated -0.003 0.000 -0.017 -0.010
0.015 0.015 0.021 0.022
Post -0.007 -0.014 -0.028 -0.033*
0.019 0.018 0.019 0.020
Post*treated 0.002 -0.001 0.022 0.014
0.015 0.014 0.019 0.020
Constant 0.494*** 0.682*** 0.610*** 0.768***
0.226 0.216 0.218 0.225
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.26 0.07 0.23 0.06
No of Obs. 1329 1329 1329 1329
No of Firms 410 410 410 410





Option grant ratio 0.001 0.000
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*treated 0.004 0.005**
0.002 0.002
Option grant ratio*post*treated -0.006*** -0.006***
0.001 0.001
Option ratio -0.043*** -0.045***
0.015 0.015
Option ratio*treated 0.056 0.049
0.036 0.036
Option ratio*post*treated -0.013 -0.007
0.029 0.029
Treated 0.022 0.018 0.003 0.001
0.012 0.012 0.018 0.017
Post*treated -0.019 -0.029 -0.022 -0.032
0.021 0.020 0.022 0.021










Constant 0.536** 0.713*** 0.629*** 0.779***
0.223 0.214 0.222 0.215
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-sq. 0.27 0.07 0.24 0.06
No of Obs. 1329 1329 1329 1329
No of Firms 410 410 410 410
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Does Internal Board Monitoring Affect The Debt Maturity?  - A Natural 
Experiment 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I consider the internal monitoring feature of strong corporate governance as 
a substitute for the external monitor via short term debt. Fama (1980) discusses that as the 
number of outside members increase in the board of directors, the board becomes more 
independent and acts more effectively as monitors because the outsiders want to protect 
reputation capital and they are not associated with the internal incentives and company 
politics. A board with independent outside members establishes strong corporate 
governance which can mitigate the agency problem between firms and lenders by 
establishing a monitoring mechanism of managers. In the presence of a powerful board 
with efficient control of the firm, lenders don’t necessarily have to restrict themselves to 
the short term debt as monitoring the management is done by that strong independent 
board. Consequently, lenders may become more willing to issue longer term debt as firms 
have more independent and stronger board12. This is the hypothesis I test in this paper. 
                                               
12 As an alternative channel to the creditor driven force in explaining the shift towards long term debt, one 
can also focus on the firm-centric force as well: As internal board monitoring becomes stronger via the 
increase in the number of independent directors, the CEO is conditioned to take a longer-term view in her 
strategy and therefore, she makes long term investments. If so, due to "duration matching" of investment 
to financing, the CEO decides on more long term debt. 
 64 
 
The determinants of the debt maturity structure have been long researched in 
literature. As suggested by Morris (1975), Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer 
(1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), Ozkan (2000), Scherr and Hulburt (2001); leverage, 
growth options, asset maturity, profitability and tangibility are counted among the main 
factors explaining the maturity decisions of firm debt. Other studies by Arslan and Karan 
(2006), Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) focus on the corporate governance in terms of 
large shareholder ownership and the shareholder rights and try to rationalize the debt 
maturity structure using these aspects. Yet, the other features of corporate governance 
remain unexamined. In this study, I try to investigate further the internal monitoring 
feature of strong corporate governance.  
One of the main challenges in examining the effect of board independence on 
debt maturity is to identify exogenous changes in board. In this study, I construct a 
natural experiment and use the  Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX hereafter) and the 
following corporate governance rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 
hereafter) in 2003, as the exogenous shock. SOX consists of eleven sections about 
corporate board responsibilities and requires the SEC to implement rules operationalizing 
the law. In 2003, important corporate governance rules of the NYSE and the NASDAQ 
are enacted under Section 303A and 5605A, respectively. One of the regulations for the 
listed companies is the requirement of the majority independence of the board of 
directors. Following that rule, firms modified their boards and we observed a significant 
increase in board independence at NYSE and NASDAQ firms. As the exogenous shock, 
the SOX regulations only impact the independence of the board but not the maturity of 
firm’s debt, and thus, it proves to be a valid instrument for the natural experiment. Due to 
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the improvements in board independence via the SOX rules, the causality occurs from the 
corporate governance towards the debt maturity structure, and it allows me to research 
how changes in board independence resulting from that shock cause changes in debt 
maturity. 
In the natural experiment, I use the difference-in-difference analysis where I 
compare the firms, affected by the SOX regulations after the exogenous shock, to the 
companies before the shock. I document the impact of the changes in board independence 
on the debt maturity structure. I’m also interested in investigating this relation under 
different economic conditions separately, in particular, the crisis periods.  
During the financial instability, the risk of payments and the default risk of firms 
can be high, and thus, lenders may be more hesitant to supply debt. They can act 
differently in providing debt with certain type of maturities and be more conservative in 
bad times compared to years with financial stability. In order to research the board 
independence and debt maturity relation in such different economic conditions, I use the 
same difference-in-difference analysis setting but I restrict my sample to consist of years 
of financial instability only.  
The main finding of this study suggests firms have debt with longer maturity as 
board independence increases and internal board monitoring becomes stronger. I find the 
relation between internal monitoring and debt maturity becomes less clear during times of 
financial instability. 
To show the robustness of my results, I conduct placebo tests in which I keep the 
main structure of my model the same but only shift the time range of the study. By doing 
this, I can observe whether there are other firm related endogenous or independent 
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exogenous shocks influencing the relation between the board independence and debt 
maturity. Aside of that analysis, I also focus on distinctive aspects of organizational 
structure and debt issuance. Conglomerate firms are often seen as large companies which 
have a complex organizational structure. Therefore, compared to the simple single 
segment firms, conglomerates may benefit more from an efficient internal control over 
the management of multiple segments together. I need to control the possible influence of 
the firm’s organizational structure on the relation between the board independence and 
debt maturity. Moreover, in further analysis, I concentrate only on the maturity structure 
of the new debt issuance rather than the one of the total outstanding debt while 
researching the impact of the board independence. Lastly, I investigate the CEO duality 
issue in the firms and show how the board independence and debt maturity relation is 
affected depending on whether the CEO is the chair of the board or not. The CEO duality 
may affect independence of the board because CEO as the chair of board may influence 
the decisions. On the other hand, the SOX amendments provide necessary conditions to 
mitigate any potential effect by the CEO even if there is CEO duality issue in the firm. 
After implementing all these robustness tests in my analyses, I observe that the original 
results for the relation between the board independence and the maturity structure of the 
firm’s debt stay unchanged. 
 In this study, I contribute to the debt maturity literature by introducing board 
independence as a new measure for effective internal board monitoring and research its 
impact on debt maturity. I suggest the board independence as a significant determinant of 
the long term debt via solidly identifying this factor and investigating its effect with an 
exogenous shock in a natural experiment setting. I also provide more insight into this 
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relation by considering different aspects of debt issuance, organizational structure and as 
well as the times with financial crises. Therefore, this paper presents clear findings and 
offers a baseline for future studies on the debt maturity.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses and presents the empirical method used to 
examine the board independence and debt maturity relation. Section 4 describes the data 
selection and the variables. In Section 5, I discuss the empirical findings and the 
robustness of these results. Section 6 concludes the study. 
2.2 Literature Review 
In the finance literature, the determinants of the debt maturity have always been an 
interesting topic for the researchers. Morris (1975) develops a hypothesis regarding the 
factors influencing average maturity of the corporate debt such as capital structure, asset 
maturity, size and growth. Morris (1975) finds that firms match their maturity of the 
assets to the debt maturity and decide on shorter term debt if they have growth options 
and highly variable income. When large firms increase the amount of debt, they go for 
longer maturities. Myers (1977) also investigates the factors affecting the maturity 
decision of debt. He expands on Morris (1975) matching maturity idea and shows that 
lack of matching the maturities can lead underinvestment. Myers (1977) suggests firms 
with high growth opportunities should issue short term debt because the shorter maturity 
reduces the worries and the hesitation by the debtholders about the payments from risky 
investments due to the growth options. Thus, the short term debt can mitigate this 
underinvestment problem. Also, Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1980) consider the debt 
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maturity structure while suggesting a solution for the agency issue of debt associated with 
informational asymmetry and risk incentives. They recognize that short term debt and 
long term debt with call option reduce the incentive for risky asset substitution and 
discourage managers from engaging in suboptimal risky contracts which transfer wealth 
from bondholders to stockholders. Further, Titman and Wessels (1988) use balance sheet 
measures for debt maturity and verify that smaller firms have a greater proportion of the 
debt with shorter maturity due to the relatively high costs of long term debt. In addition to 
that, Mitchell (1991) focuses on the information asymmetry dimension and finds that 
firms facing a high degree of information asymmetry choose debt with shorter maturity to 
reduce adverse selection cost.  
While analyzing the factors in relation with the debt maturity decision, 
researchers also focus on the bond ratings. Barclay and Smith (1995) examine firm 
quality along with size and growth opportunities and find that the term to maturity of debt 
increases with size and credit quality and decreases with growth opportunity. In addition, 
Stohs and Mauer (1996) introduce the signaling and the maturity matching hypotheses in 
their study and obtain similar results suggesting that firms with poor growth opportunities 
and larger firms issue debt with longer maturity. In their study, Guedes and Opler (1996) 
examine the determinants of the maturity of new public debt issues. Contrary to previous 
work, Guedes and Opler (1996) claim a quadratic relation between credit ratings and the 
debt maturity choice and argue that large firms with high credit ratings either choose 
short term or long term debt, while firms with speculative grade credit ratings borrow in 
the middle of the maturity spectrum. Moreover, Ozkan (2000) considers the relation 
between the debt maturity structure and size, growth opportunities, asset maturity and 
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signaling. Focusing on the UK firms over the period 1983-1996, Ozkan (2000) finds 
consistent results with previous studies but rejects that firms use the maturity structure to 
signal information to the market. Further, Scherr and Hulburt (2001) examine small firms 
and conclude that the probability of default, capital structure and asset maturity are 
economically and statistically important for small firms deciding on their debt maturity 
structure. 
 The potential impact of corporate governance has also been investigated in the 
debt maturity literature. Arslan and Karan (2006) consider the Turkish firms as 
companies operating in an emerging market and examine the effect of large shareholders 
and a concentrated ownership structure under the corporate governance concept. Arslan 
and Karan (2006) find that companies with large shareholders via high ownership 
concentration choose debt with longer maturity. Their findings also support the previous 
studies investigating the relation between debt maturity and asset maturity, size and 
growth options. Moreover, Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) focus on corporate 
governance in terms of shareholder rights. Using the GIM index as the measure for the 
strength of the shareholder rights, Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007) suggest an inverse 
relation between that and debt maturity. In particular, the managers of firms with weak 
shareholder rights avoid debt with shorter maturity to minimize the external monitor. 
As stated in agency theory, managers can extract benefits from lenders’ money 
when the monitoring mechanism is weak. In such a case, Petersen and Rajan (1995) state 
that banks and lenders in the bond market prefer to issue short term debt because the 
short term maturity requires contact between the firm and the lender during continuous 
renewals and allows creditors more flexibility to effectively monitor managers with 
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minimum effort. Stulz (1990 and 2000) also shows that shorter maturity of debt makes it 
more difficult for managers to defraud creditors since it provides creditors the 
opportunity to vary terms of financing before the managers make wealth shifting 
decisions. So, short term debt can be a powerful tool to monitor management and deter 
moral hazard by enabling lenders to detect borrowers’ opportunistic behavior and punish 
it via superior liquidation and renegotiation of the debt. 
In this paper, I investigate the relation between debt maturity and strong corporate 
governance in terms of an effective monitoring. Monitoring the manager is one of the 
duties of the board of directors, and one way to describe the effectiveness of monitoring 
is to examine the independence of the board from the internal corporate politics and 
influences. Fama (1980) suggests that as the ratio of outside versus inside directors 
increases, the board becomes more independent because outside members are expected to 
be less associated with the internal dynamics and the conflict of interests within the firm. 
An independent board can monitor the CEO more effectively, and so, the lenders may not 
need to supervise the managers strictly via the debt with shorter maturity, for instance.  
2.3 Hypotheses and the Empirical Method 
In this study, I examine the impact of strong corporate governance on debt maturity 
through an independent and efficient board of directors. As stated by the agency theory, 
managers tend to benefit from outstanding debt via investing in wealth increasing risky 
projects in the absence of a powerful monitoring mechanism. Therefore, the lenders 
prefer to provide debt with a shorter maturity and interact with the firm frequently via the 
renewal of the contract which enables them to supervise the manager’s actions. On the 
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other hand, this external control can be shifted towards the firm as an internal monitoring 
mechanism with the help of a neutral, independent board. In that case, the lenders don’t 
feel a strong necessity of monitoring the managers and consider offering debt with longer 
maturity. In addition to that, the CEO may also be encouraged to take a longer term view 
in her strategy and therefore make long term investments.  Due to "duration matching" of 
investment to financing, the CEO focuses on more long-term debt. Because of these 
reasons, I empirically estimate the relation between the board independence and the 
maturity of firm’s debt under the null hypothesis of no relation and allow the data to 
inform me which hypothesis dominates. 
H0:  The board independence has no effect on the maturity of the firm’s 
debt. 
H1a: With a strong governance provided by a high board independence, 
the firm has debt with longer maturity. 
H1b: With a strong governance provided by a high board independence, 
the firm has debt with shorter maturity. 
 As mentioned earlier, the literature on the debt maturity focuses on various factors 
as the determinants of the maturity in order to explain the maturity structure of the firm’s 
debt. Aside of the most common factors such as, asset maturity, leverage, profitability, 
tangibility, growth options, cash holdings, volatility and industry concentration; only a 
few researchers consider the potential effect of the corporate governance on the debt 
maturity via the shareholder rights and the ownership structure. But interestingly, the 
monitoring feature of the board has been out of the scope of the studies. In this paper, I 
differ from the previous studies by introducing the board independence as a measure of 
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the strong corporate governance. I investigate the influence of board independence on the 
firm’s debt maturity structure through a valid natural experiment while supporting all my 
work with the agency theory in the literature. That’s why; the central theme of my study 
is to answer the following question:  
How do the changes in the board independence affect the maturity 
structure of the firm’s debt? 
 In order to answer the main research question in my paper, I need to use a natural 
experiment setting with a valid instrument as the exogenous shock. Thus, in my study, I 
employ the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) which was enacted in 2002 and it is a 
United States federal law that set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public company 
boards, management and public accounting firms. The act contains 11 sections, ranging 
from additional corporate board responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires the 
SEC to implement rulings on requirements to comply with the law. Following that 
amendment, corporate governance rules were enacted for the NYSE and NASDAQ under 
Section 303A and 5605A, respectively. According to that regulation, companies listed on 
the NYSE and NASDAQ must comply with certain standards regarding corporate 
governance such as the majority independence of the board of directors. Consequently, 
those companies started to adjust their corporate boards following these rules for stronger 
governance. As an exogenous shock, the SOX amendments clearly fulfill the 
requirements for the identification of improved corporate governance because these rules 
only influence the board characteristics such as majority independence but not the 
maturity structure of the firm’s debt. Due to the changes in the corporate governance, 
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causality occurs from the corporate board structure towards the firm’s debt maturity 
decision.  
 My natural experiment has the time interval from 1996 until 2009 which 
compares a seven year – period before the SOX regulations, 1996-2002, to the seven year 
– period after these rules, 2003-2009. The pre-period time includes a three year dot-com 
crisis, 2000-2002, sub-period. In order to have a comparable after period time interval, I 
need to consider a similar structure after the SOX rules. That’s why; I decide to have a 
seven year post-period which contains a three years long sub-prime mortgage crisis time, 
2007-2009.  
Before focusing on the natural experiment and the multivariate analyses, I 
conduct several univariate tests in order to take a broader view of the board independence 
and the maturity structure of the firm’s debt. I compare the mean values of the dependent 
variable, debt maturity, and the independent variable, board independence, each before 
and after the exogenous shock and show the significance of those findings. Additionally, 
I examine the validity of the exogenous shock. I regress the debt maturity variables on the 
board independence along with controls and run this regression analysis for each year. I 
display the coefficient estimates for the board independence every year. I expect to see 
clustered estimates before and after the shock at different levels. Also, a sudden change in 
the cluster right after the exogenous shock verifies that there is not any ongoing trend, but 
the SOX regulations are the only factor influencing the relation between the board 
independence and the debt maturity. 
The main model in this paper is a difference-in-difference analysis. In this 
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with the interactions from these variables with the board independence measure. So, I can 
examine all the possible effects from board independence variations on the debt maturity 
structure. The post-period data cover all observations after 2003 and beyond.13 The model 
is specified as follows: 
 
(2.1) 
where Y is the debt maturity measure; X is the board independence measure; the firm-
year observation is i= 1, … , N; the entire period is t = 1996, … , 2009;  the number of 
control variables is l = 1, … , 10; and α, β, θ, γ, δ, μ are the coefficients of the constant 
term, post-period, board independence measures,  post-period board independence 
measures, controls, error term, respectively.  
 The firm leverage is one of the control variables in my model. In literature by 
Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003), it has been discussed that the 
decisions for the leverage and the maturity of the debt are made simultaneously in the 
firm. Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2012) suggest a system-of-equations approach via 
the simultaneous equations where they use the lagged dependent variables to incorporate 
the intertemporal dependencies within variables and prevent the potential omitted 
variables bias. Taking these arguments into account, I build a simultaneous equations 
model. In the first step of the equations, I predict the leverage via the lagged debt 
maturity measure and the common factors mentioned in the capital structure literature. In 
the second step, I use a difference-in-difference analysis and I regress the debt maturity 
                                               
13 The NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms which already have majority in independent directors before the 
new regulations are excluded from the sample because the exogenous shock via the SOX amendments may 
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where Z is the leverage measure; Y is the debt maturity measure; the firm-year 
observation is i= 1, … , N; the entire period is t = 1996, … , 2009;  the number of control 
variables is l = 1, … , 8; and σ, τ, φ, ε are the coefficients of the constant term, debt 




where Y is the debt maturity measure; X is the board independence measure; W is the 
asset maturity as a control variable; Ẑ  is the predicted leverage measure as a control 
variable; the firm-year observation is i= 1, … , N; the entire period is t = 1996, … , 2009;  
the number of control variables is l = 1, … , 8; and α, β, θ, ε, ρ, π, ω, μ are the 
coefficients of the constant term, post-period, board independence measures,  post-period 
board independence measures, controls, the asset maturity, the predicted leverage 
measure and the error term, respectively. 
In order to examine the potential effects of crisis period on the independence and 
debt maturity relation, I use the same difference-in-difference model but with different 
time intervals. I compare the dot-com crisis period before the SOX regulations, 2000-
2002, to the mortgage crisis period after the amendments, 2007-2009. I use a dummy 
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variable representing the crisis period after the SOX rules, along with the interaction from 




where Y is the debt maturity measure; X is the board independence measure; the firm-
year observation is i= 1, … , N; the crisis period is t = 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 
2009;  the number of control variables is l = 1, … , 10; and α, β, θ, γ, δ, μ are the 
coefficients of the constant term, post-period crisis time, board independence measures, 
post-period crisis time board independence measures, controls, error term, respectively. 
 To check the robustness of the results, I focus only on the new debt issuance by 
the firms. While the lenders decide on a new debt, they consider the current board power 
in terms of monitoring the manager and agree on the maturity structure accordingly. 
Therefore, concentrating on the new debt issuance every year may provide a better 
understanding of the monitoring effect via the board independence on the maturity 
structure of the new debt.  
Moreover, following the debt maturity literature, I control for the bond ratings and 
the executive ownership level in the firms since these measures reflects the strength and 
the credibility of the company and the board of directors, respectively. Further, the 
organizational structure of the firm may impact the need and the nature of the debt 
maturity too. Conglomerate firms are often considered as complex and big companies 
which require more effort and resources to run compared to single segment firms. Thus, 




















decision of the debt; and also an efficient internal monitoring over the management of the 
entire segments of the company can be more useful compared to the case of a simple 
single segment firm. As I want to examine the monitoring power of the board via the 
independence only, I need to control for all these factors. I also focus on other aspects 
which may influence the board independence and the debt maturity relation. The CEO 
duality is a factor needed to be controlled because having the CEO as the chair of the 
board can contradict with the strength and effectiveness of the board in terms of 
monitoring the CEO herself. Thus, I need to control this factor in my analyses as well.  
The correct choice of the exogenous shock for a solid identification is essential in 
this study. In order to examine the robustness of the natural experiment with the SOX 
regulations, I run placebo tests where I keep the main structure of my model the same but 
only shift the time range of the study +/- two years. So, I can test the existence of other 
possible firm related endogenous or independent exogenous shocks influencing the 
relation between the board independence and debt maturity.  
2.4 Data Selection and Variable Construction 
I collect my data sample using the Compustat and Risk Metrics databases for the years of 
1996-2009. I exclude financial firms and utilities. I restrict my sample to have positive 
values for the total assets and the capital expenditures. Moreover, in my sample, I require 
the total assets have a greater value than the capital expenditures and property, plant and 
equipment measure. Further, I drop the data where the total liabilities are greater than the 
total assets and also where the sum of long and short term debt is greater than the total 
assets. I also winsorize the variables with extreme values at 1% and 99% in order to 
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mitigate the effect of outliers. While the data related to the board independence come 
from the Risk Metrics, the data necessary for the debt maturity measures and the controls 
come from the Compustat database. My sample consists of 8,715 observations with 1,300 
firms. 
 In my analyses, I define “Board Independence” as the percentage of the outside 
members in the board of directors. Fama (1980) suggests that as the ratio of outside 
versus inside directors increases, the board becomes more independent. The outside 
members in the board are expected not to be associated with the internal dynamics, the 
conflict of interests or the power struggle within the firm. So, they stay neutral and 
independent from the firm’s internal politics and can act more effectively as monitors.  
I evaluate the maturity structure of the firm’s debt via three different variables. 
One of them is the “Short Term Ratio”. It concentrates on the shorter term debt which is 
the portion of the firm’s debt maturing less than one year. Short Term Ratio is calculated 
by dividing debt in current liabilities over the sum of the debt in current liabilities and 
long term debt which is the total debt of the firm. The second measure for the debt 
maturity structure is the “Long Term Ratio” suggested by Barclay and Smith (1995), 
which focuses on the long term horizon of the firm’s debt. It is constructed by dividing 
the sum of all the long term debt maturing in more than two years over the total debt.14 
Lastly, I use “Weighted Average Maturity” which is calculated via multiplying the 
fraction of each type of debt with its maturity in years. Compared to the previous debt 
maturity measures which provide a more general focus on debt maturity, the “Weighted 
                                               
14 Following Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007), I construct another Long Term Ratio which represents the 
percentage of long term debt maturing in more than 5 years. Using this additional dependent variable for a 
longer term horizon provides robust results. 
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Average Maturity” which is also suggested by Morris (1975), Stohs and Mauer (1996) 
and Scherr and Hulburt (2001), offers more insight about the maturity length of debt. It 
concentrates on each maturity type of the firm’s debt separately and amplifies its strength 
according to the length of the maturity. By using several measures for the maturity 
structure of the firm’s debt, I seek to capture the different features of the maturity and 
establish the robustness of the board independence and the debt maturity relation. 
Following the debt maturity literature by Morris (1975), Barclay and Smith 
(1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), Ozkan (2000), Scherr and 
Hulburt (2001), Johnson (2003), Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003), Arslan and Karan 
(2006), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Jiraporn and Kitsabunnarat (2007), and 
Erhemjamts, Raman, Shahrur (2010), I use several control variables. Growth option is 
controlled via two variables. MB represents market to book ratio and it is calculated by 
dividing common shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price of one share over the 
common equity. Growth is the second variable and defined as capital expenditures over 
total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.15 Tangibility is measured by 
dividing property, plant, and equipment total over total assets. Profitability is defined as 
the earnings before interest and taxes over total assets. Cash is controlled via dividing the 
cash and short term investments over the total assets. Volatility is calculated via the daily 
stock price volatility of the previous year. Asset Maturity is also controlled. It is defined 
as the ratio of the fixed assets over the annual depreciation expense.16 I compute the 
                                               
15 I also use the natural logarithm of the net sales as Size. My findings stay robust. 
 
16 Alternatively, I also compute the Asset Maturity measure as suggested by Stohs and Mauer (1996) and 
Johnson (2003). It is (gross property, plant, and equipment / total assets) x (gross property, plant, and 
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Leverage as the sum of debt in current liabilities and long term debt over the total 
assets.17 Lastly, I also control the possible effects of the industries on the board 
independence and the debt maturity relation. I use the industry concentration, the HHI, 
which is computed via the Text-based Network Industry Classification method as 
suggested by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). 
 Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics for all of the variables used in the 
models. In my sample, approximately 34% of the firm’s debt has the maturity less than 
one year. The right skewness of the Short Term Ratio suggests that some firms issue 
large amount of debt when they decide on the short term maturity. On the other hand, 
Long Term Ratio has a slight left skewness and claims on average 53% of the firm’s debt 
in the sample matures in longer than 2 years. Weighted Average Maturity and Board 
Independence have means close to the median values. The average maturity of the firm’s 
debt is about 3 years and 3 months while the average board independence is 
approximately 65%. Taking the statistics for the remaining firm characteristics into 
account, they all show a right skewed pattern, except the profitability measure. That 
shows my sample consists of companies some of which have high grow options, 
tangibility, volatility with longer asset maturity and larger size while some firms have 
very low, in some cases even negative, profitability. The statistics for the industry 
concentration, HHI, claim an average of 0.218, a value between 0.150 and 0.250, which 
states that the firms in my sample operate in moderately concentrated industries.  
                                                                                                                                            
equipment / depreciation expense) + (current assets / total assets) x (current assets / cost of goods sold). I 
obtain robust results. 
 





Variables Mean Stdev P75 P50 P25
Short Term Ratio 0.343 0.365 0.612 0.178 0.035
Long Term Ratio 0.529 0.380 0.892 0.617 0.083
Weighted Average Maturity 3.212 1.607 4.614 3.198 1.712
Board Independence 0.655 0.182 0.800 0.667 0.545
Leverage 0.203 0.210 0.342 0.148 0.001
Profitability -0.015 0.277 0.113 0.057 -0.031
Asset Maturity 0.152 0.168 0.174 0.108 0.064
MB 3.636 5.921 3.636 1.975 1.134
Size 5.270 2.336 6.825 5.158 3.576
Growth 0.058 0.068 0.071 0.035 0.016
Tangibility 0.255 0.237 0.379 0.173 0.067
Cash 0.212 0.234 0.324 0.115 0.031
Volatility 0.170 0.243 0.204 0.137 0.092
HHI 0.218 0.230 0.281 0.126 0.064
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
This table provides descriptive statistics for the mean, standard deviation, 75th, 50th, and 25th
percentiles of all types of variables used in the regression model. There are 1,300 firms with 8,715
firm-year observations. Short Term Ratio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the
sum of the debt in current liabilities and long term debt which is the total debt of the firm. Long
Term Ratio is constructed by dividing the sum of all the long term debt maturing in more than two
years over the total debt. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of
each type of debt with its maturity in years. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside
members in the board of directors. MB represents market to book ratio and it is calculated by
dividing common shares outstanding times closing price of one share over the common equity.
Growth is defined as capital expenditures over total assets. Tangibility is measured by dividing
property, plant, and equipment total over total assets. Profitability is defined as the earnings before
interest and taxes over total assets. Cash is the ratio of the cash and short term investments over the 
total assets. Volatility is calculatedvia thedaily stock price volatility of the previous year. Size is the
natural logarithm of total assets. Asset Maturity is defined as the ratio of the fixed assets over the
annual depreciation expense. Leverage is the sum of debt in current liabilities and long term debt
over the total assets. Industry concentration, HHI, is computed via the Text-based Network Industry
Classification method as suggested by Hoberg and Phillips (2010).
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I examine the big picture about the relation between the board independence and 
the maturity structure of the firm’s debt in Figure 2.1. It shows the yearly average values 
of the two main variables in my models, Board Independence and Short Term Ratio. 
Before the exogenous shock via the SOX regulations, the pre-period, both of the 
measures follow a similar slightly incremental pattern. Between the years 1996 and 2002, 
Board Independence increases about 2%, from 46% to 48%. Right after exogenous shock 
in 2003,Board Independence jumps 17% to 65% and keep rising towards 78% until 2009.  
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Board Independence and Short Term Debt Measures
This figure displays the mean distibution of Board Independence and Short Term Ratio by years. Board
Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of directors. Short Term Ratio is
calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the sum of the debt in current liabilities and long
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That sharp increase is a clear sign of the exogenous shock hitting the companies, mainly 
the amendment of SOX rules. Although Short Term Ratio is increasing in general from 
35% to 38% before the shock, it starts to decline rapidly from 38% to 31% after the 
exogenous shock until 2009 which indicates a decrease in the amount of short term debt 
in firms on average after the SOX legislations. This reversed relation between these two 
variables around the exogenous shock clearly exhibits the impact of the corporate 
governance changes via the board independence after 2002 on the debt maturity decisions 
in the firms. Further, Figure 2.2 compares the behavior of Board Independence, Long 
Term Ratio and Weighted Average Maturity on yearly average basis. The variables 
representing the debt maturity follow a very similar distribution. In the pre-period, the 
annual mean values of Long Term Ratio and Weighted Average Maturity decrease from 
51% to 47% and from 3.15 to 3.00, respectively. With the exogenous shock after 2002, 
both measures increase quickly. While Long Term Ratio reaches to 56%, Weighted 
Average Maturity becomes almost 3.4 years which denotes a rise in long term debt after 
the exogenous shock. The change in patterns in Board Independence, Long Term Ratio 
and Weighted Average Maturity provides evidence of the effect from board 









Figure 2.2: Distribution of Board Independence, Long Term Debt and Weighted Average Maturity
This figure displays the mean distibution of Board Independence, Long Term Ratio and Weighted Average
Maturity values by years. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of directors.
Long TermRatio is constructed by dividingthe sumof all the long term debt maturing inmore than two years over


































































2.5 Results  
2.5.1 Univariate Analyses 
As a part of the univariate analyses, I compare the behavior of each of my proxies for the 
board independence and the debt maturity structure before and after the exogenous shock. 
I use a mean comparison test of two groups, i.e. pre- and post-period. Table 2.2 provides 
the results of my first univariate analysis. Focusing on a comparison of the pre- and post-
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periods, I find a statistically significant increase of 27% for Board Independence. The 
exogenous shock clearly impacts the outsider percentage in the board of directors 
positively which manifests the validity of the SOX rules as an instrument in the natural 
experiment. I also obtain statistical significance in the results for the debt maturity 
measures. Short Term Ratio declines about 5% on average after the exogenous shock 
while the Long Term Ratio increases approximately 7%. Moreover, Weighted Average 
Maturity also increases approximately from 3 to 3.4 years, an increase of 4 months in 
maturity. The findings on the debt maturity structure states an obvious increase in the 
amount of long term debt of the firm after the exogenous shock. 
Table 2: Mean Comparision for Board Independence and Debt Maturity Measures
I II
Pre-Period Post-Period
Board Independence 0.467 0.733
dif
p-val
Short Term Ratio 0.367 0.315
dif
p-val
Long Term Ratio 0.497 0.566
dif
p-val
Weighted Average Maturity 3.083 3.365
dif
p-val
This table presents results of the t -test mean comparison for Board Independence, Short Term
Ratio, Long Term Ratio and Weighted Average Maturity. In Column and Column II, the mean
values of each of these variables are given for the pre-period (1996-2002) and the post-period












I further investigate the validity of the SOX regulations in terms of the effect of 
the board independence on the maturity of the firm’s debt. I regress the debt maturity 
variables individually on the board independence along with controls and run this 
regression analysis for each year in my sample. I display the coefficient estimates for the 
board independence every year. If the SOX amendments are the only reasons influencing 
the board independence in its impact on the debt maturity, in other words, if the 
exogenous shock is a valid instrument in my natural experiment, then it can be revealed 
through this analysis and I should see clustered estimates before and after the shock at 
different levels. Such a finding would validate nonexistence of an ongoing trend but the 
direct impact of the SOX rules as an exogenous shock.  
Figure 2.3 presents the yearly coefficient estimates for Board Independence in the 
regression analysis for Short Term Ratio. Considering the period before the exogenous 
shock, the estimates are gathered between -0.05 and 0.05, more or less around zero, 
which indicates that Board Independence has almost no effect on the debt maturity 
structure. When the board independence increases after the SOX regulations, the yearly 
estimates become largely negative and they are grouped between -0.10 and -0.15 which 
states the negative impact of Board Independence on the short term debt after the 
exogenous shock. Considering the estimates all together, there is no evidence of an 
existing trend passing on through the exogenous shock. Contrary, there is a sudden 
change in the cluster of the estimates after the SOX and the SEC rules, which manifests 
the validity of the exogenous shock in the impact of the board independence on the 





The Board Independence coefficient estimates for Long Term Ratio are given in 
Figure 2.4. Before the exogenous shock, the estimates show up mainly between the 
values of 0 and 0.05 claiming there is slightly a positive impact of board independence on 
the long term debt. After the SOX amendments, the estimates become more positive and 
are usually gathered between 0.1 and 0.2. That finding shows the positive impact of the 
exogenous shock on the board independence in its relation to the debt maturity. This 
considerable change also validates the choice of the exogenous shock as a correct 
instrument in the natural experiment. 
Figure 2.3: Yearly Board Independence Coefficient Estimates for Short Term Ratio
This figure displays the distibution of the yearly coefficient estimates for Board Independence in the regression
analysis for Short Term Ratio. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of
directors. Short TermRatio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the total debt of the firm. The
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Figure 2.5 displays the yearly coefficient estimates of Board Independence for 
Weighted Average Maturity. Before the SOX regulations, the estimates are generally 
between -0.6 and 0, and they become strongly positive after the exogenous shock, 
ranging between 0.2 and 0.6. This significant change in estimates denotes the stronger 
positive effect of the board independence on the long term debt after the exogenous shock 
is applied in my natural experiment. Along with the lack of any existing trend throughout 
the years, this large change provides the evidence of the shock as a valid instrument. 
 
Figure 2.4: Yearly Board Independence Coefficient Estimates for Long Term Ratio
This figure displays the distibution of the yearly coefficient estimates for Board Independence in the regression
analysis for Long TermRatio. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of
directors. LongTermRatio is constructedbydividing thesumof all the longtermdebt maturing inmore than two
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2.5.2 Multivariate Analysis (Difference-in-Difference Regression Model) 
The difference-in difference analysis is the main model to examine the relationship 
between the strong corporate governance via the board independence and the maturity 
structure of the firm’s debt. A dummy variable, Post, is used that equals to one for the 
values after the SOX regulations (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Board 
Independence*Post, is the interaction variables of Board Independence and Post. This 
Figure 2.5: Yearly Board Independence Coefficient Estimates for Weighted Average Maturity
This figure displays the distibution of the yearly coefficient estimates for Board Independence in the regression
analysis for Weighted Average Maturity. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the
board of directors. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of each type of debt with
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analysis enables me to study any potential impacts from the board independence in the 
post-period. The major focus should be on the estimated coefficient for Board 
Independence*Post since it explains the influence of the increased number of outsiders in 
firms’ board of directors after the SOX and the SEC rules, on the maturity decisions on 
the firm’s debt. In my model, I also control the possible effects from leverage, 
profitability, asset maturity, growth, tangibility, size, book-to-market, volatility, cash and 
the industry concentration18. Further, I also estimate the debt maturity simultaneously 
with the control variable, leverage, where I use the predicted leverage values which I 
obtain from the first step regression because in the debt maturity literature, it’s been 
argued by Barclay, Marx, and Smith (2003) and Johnson (2003) that leverage and debt 
maturity are endogenously determined. 
 Table 2.3 displays the baseline regression estimates. As suggested in literature by 
Morris (1975), Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler 
(1996), Ozkan (2000), Scherr and Hulburt (2001), Johnson (2003), Barclay, Marx, and 
Smith (2003), Arslan and Karan (2006), Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and  Jiraporn 
and Kitsabunnarat (2007); my results denote that larger, more profitable and less risky 
firms operating in less concentrated industries and have high cash and high tangibility 
tend to issue longer term debt. Moreover, I also find that companies match the maturities 
of their assets and the debt together and issue higher amount of debt if they agree on the 
longer term structure. Consistent with Stohs and Mauer (1996), my results for MB and 
growth opportunities suggest either insignificant or a positive effect, stating that firms 
with higher growth options are more likely to issue longer term debt.  
                                               
18 In all my analyses, I include year fixed effects in order to capture the changes in term structure of interest 



















Leverage -0.399*** 0.490*** 2.068***
0.016 0.018 0.067
Leverage-(p) -0.621*** 0.625*** 3.558***
0.047 0.054 0.202
Profitability -0.131*** -0.066*** 0.115*** 0.061*** 0.474*** 0.303***
0.014 0.019 0.015 0.021 0.059 0.081
Asset Maturity -0.118*** -0.090*** 0.142*** 0.107*** 0.751*** 0.484***
0.018 0.022 0.020 0.025 0.077 0.096
MB 0.008 -0.001** 0.006 0.002*** 0.004** 0.010***
0.043 0.001 0.048 0.001 0.002 0.002
Size -0.039*** -0.002 0.056*** 0.011** 0.227*** 0.002
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.018
Growth -0.128*** -0.038 0.274*** 0.081 1.110*** 0.194
0.038 0.043 0.042 0.050 0.162 0.190
Tangibility -0.177*** -0.045 0.117*** 0.028 0.524*** 0.066
0.026 0.031 0.029 0.035 0.109 0.135
Cash -0.070*** 0.030 0.130*** 0.041 0.812*** 0.347***
0.019 0.023 0.021 0.026 0.080 0.100
Volatility 0.019*** -0.006 -0.014* 0.006 -0.063** 0.030
0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.028 0.029
HHI 0.025** -0.006 -0.032** -0.015 -0.149*** -0.037
0.012 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.052 0.060
Table 2.3: Baseline Regression Model for the Debt Maturity Measures
This table reports baseline regression estimates for Leverage, Leverage-(p), Profitability, Asset Maturity, Market-to-Book (MB), Size,
Growth, Tangibility, Cash, Volatility, and IndustryConcentration (HHI) via thefixed effects. The regressions with Leverage-(p) consist
of lagged variables. The analysis is conducted for three different debt maturity measures. Short Term Ratio is calculated by dividing
debt in current liabilities over the total debt of the firm. Long Term Ratio is constructed by dividing the sumof all the long termdebt
maturing in more than two years over the total debt. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of each type
of debt with its maturity in years. Leverage is the sumof debt in current liabilities and long termdebt over thetotal assets. Leverage-(p)
represents the predicted leverage values obtained from the first step regression. Profitability is defined as the earnings before interest and 
taxes over total assets. Asset Maturity is defined as the ratio of the fixed assets over the annual depreciation expense divided by
hundred. MB is calculated by dividing common shares outstanding times closing price of one share over the common equity. Size is the  
natural logarithm of total assets. Growth is defined as capital expenditures over total assets. Tangibility is measured by dividing
property, plant, and equipment total over total assets. Cash is the ratio of the cash and short term investments over the total assets.
Volatility is calculated via the daily stock price volatility of the previous year adjusted by hundred. HHI is computed via the Text-based





The results from the board independence impact on the debt maturity structure are 
given in Table 2.4. Board Independence*Post represents the Board Independence for the 
firms after the exogenous shock that are influenced by the SOX and the SEC regulations 
and expected to affect the maturity structure of the firm’s debt. That’s why; they are the 
only companies which can show the true impact of the changed independence of the 
board of directors on the debt maturity. In first, third and fifth columns, Board 
Independence*Post has both statistically and economically significant and strong 
estimates. It is negatively related to the short term debt ratio and positively related to both 
the long term debt ratio and the weighted average debt maturity. Consequently, this 
finding suggests that firms have more long term and less short term debt as the 
independence of the board increases after the exogenous shock from the SOX 
amendments. Particularly, the amount of debt which matures less than one year, declines 
by 2.7% (=0.156 * 0.172) with one standard deviation increase (about 17%) in the board 
independence after the exogenous shock. Similarly, the Long Term Ratio rises by 2% 
(=0.113 * 0.172) with one standard deviation increase in the board independence which 


















Constant 0.706*** 0.479*** 0.044* 0.325*** 1.128*** 2.358***
0.022 0.027 0.024 0.031 0.092 0.118
Adj. R-sq. 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.03
No of Obs. 27,091 19,962 27,091 19,962 27,091 19,962
No of Firms 6,535 4,875 6,535 4,875 6,535 4,875
Table 2.3 (cont.): Baseline Regression Model for the Debt Maturity Measures
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states that the amount of debt maturing over 2 years increases 2% as there are 17% more 
outside members in the board of directors after the SOX amendments.  
 



















Board Independence 0.037 -0.002 0.017 0.043 -0.133 0.010
0.048 0.053 0.056 0.063 0.230 0.253
Post 0.106*** 0.063 -0.076* -0.040 -0.306* -0.051
0.034 0.040 0.040 0.043 0.162 0.172
Board Independence*Post -0.156*** -0.118** 0.113* 0.102 0.526** 0.434
0.054 0.059 0.064 0.071 0.260 0.283
Leverage -0.439*** 0.602*** 2.373***
0.037 0.044 0.178
Leverage-(p) -0.901*** 1.117*** 7.196***
0.132 0.155 0.602
Profitability -0.126** 0.084 0.116* -0.061 0.606** -0.309
0.055 0.059 0.065 0.071 0.264 0.284
Asset Maturity -0.183*** -0.123** 0.217*** 0.181*** 0.959*** 0.590**
0.048 0.048 0.056 0.058 0.228 0.232
MB -0.015 -0.086 0.084 0.031 0.835 0.395
0.108 0.111 0.127 0.134 0.520 0.536
Size -0.023** 0.018* 0.036*** -0.022* 0.199*** -0.215***
0.011 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.051 0.051
Growth -0.184* -0.124 0.213* 0.274** 0.727 0.565
0.105 0.106 0.123 0.128 0.503 0.513
Tangibility -0.067 0.152** 0.079 -0.213*** 0.067 -1.193***
0.066 0.068 0.078 0.082 0.316 0.327
Table 2.4: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Board Independence on the Debt Maturity Measures
This table reports difference-in-difference analysis estimates for Board Independence along with Leverage, Leverage-(p),
Profitability, Asset Maturity, Market-to-Book (MB), Size, Growth, Tangibility, Cash, Volatility, and Industry Concentration (HHI) 
as control variables. The regressions with Leverage-(p) include lagged control variables. The analysis is conducted for three
different debt maturity measures. Short Term Ratio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the total debt of the
firm. Long Term Ratio is constructed by dividing the sum of all the long term debt maturing in more than two years over the total
debt. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of each type of debt with its maturity in years. Board
Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of directors. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the
post-period (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*Post is the intercation variable of Post and Board Independence.
In Columns II, IV and VI, the analysis is repeated with Leverage-(p), which represents the predicted leverage values obtained




According to the Weighted Average Maturity measure, the jump is about 9.1% (=0.526 * 
0.172) for a board independence increase of one standard deviation which indicates a rise 
of about one month (=9.1% * 1 year) in average maturity of the firm’s debt. Considering 
the second, fourth and the sixth columns, I have very similar results when I repeat the 
analysis via simultaneously estimating the leverage, Leverage-(p), and the debt maturity 
measures19.  
Moving on to the other estimates, for all companies from 1996 to 2009, Board 
Independence has a weakly positive and rather insignificant relation with Short Term 
Ratio. Similarly, the estimate of Board Independence for Long Term Ratio and Weighted 
Average Maturity is either weakly negative or insignificant. It suggests that there is no 
                                               
19 In untabulated difference-in-difference analyses, I focus on small cap firms only due to the possible 
concern that the SOX regulations may not be as effective as in large companies due to relatively high cost, 
effort, etc. Compared to my original findings, I obtain similar and significant results confirming the 
positive impact of board independence on long term debt. 
Maturity Measures
















Cash -0.037 0.068 0.062 -0.056 0.515** 0.109
0.048 0.049 0.056 0.058 0.229 0.234
Volatility 0.063 -0.082 -0.075 0.186** -1.210*** 0.808**
0.070 0.075 0.083 0.090 0.338 0.360
HHI 0.033 0.025 -0.021 -0.057* -0.170 -0.312**
0.027 0.028 0.032 0.034 0.130 0.137
Constant 0.501*** 0.356*** 0.201* 0.455*** 1.775*** 3.179***
0.089 0.087 0.105 0.104 0.428 0.416
Adj. R-sq. 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05
No of Obs. 8,715 8,004 8,715 8,004 8,715 8,004
No of Firms 1,300 1,227 1,300 1,227 1,300 1,227
Table 2.4 (cont.): Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Board Independence on the Debt 
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impact of the independence of the board on the debt maturity considering all years 
together. The reason is mainly the following: In addition to the post-period, the variable 
Board Independence also includes the period before the exogenous shock where the 
board monitoring is weak due to the considerably low ratio of outsiders in the board of 
directors, and the pre-period effect weakens the relation between the board independence 
and debt maturity. Focusing on the post period only via the variable Post, I find relatively 
strong and statistically significant estimates for the debt maturity. In particular, more 
short term debt and less long term debt are issued after the SOX regulations. The finding 
states that, if not only Board Independence but all features of the companies are taken 
into consideration in the post-period time via the variable Post, then those other potential 
firm characteristics overcome the impact of the Board Independence, which leads to 
opposite results than the original findings via Board Independence*Post.  
Following the difference-in-difference analysis with Board Independence, I can 
conclude that after the SOX regulations, firms have majority in outside members in their 
board of directors which is a change leading to stronger corporate governance with 
powerful monitoring ability; and this improvement enables the lenders to provide debt 
with longer maturity, consistent with the agency theory. This result rejects the null 
hypothesis of no relation and supports the H1a hypothesis of a positive relation between 
the high board independence and the debt with longer maturity20. 
                                               
20 Considering the other provisions by SOX and SEC aside of the board independence, I also control for the 
existence of nominating committee, full independence of nominating, auditing and compensation 
committees in the main difference-indifference analysis. I also repeat the main analysis by substituting the 
board independence with these variables. Loss of significance in the results shows that other provisions are 
not effective on debt maturity as the board independence since it provides a stronger corporate governance 
via a broader coverage of independence for the entire board and not only for the key committees. Slightly 
increased standard errors in the findings also confirm the other provisions are in fact noisy measures in 
relation to debt maturity.  
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2.5.3 The Case of Crisis Periods 
The capital structure and financing decisions are generally different during the crisis 
times. Due to the high volatility and uncertainty, periods of financial instability have 
complex dynamics. Several factors such as, the increased risk of default, financial 
distress, loss of strong credibility can result in a low supply of money in financial 
markets. Lenders become more cautious in monitoring the managers and may trust less 
the effectiveness of the inside monitoring even by a strong and independent board of 
directors. Consequently, they may become sensitive and reluctant to provide debt, 
specifically with a long term maturity due to its less supervisory feature. Because of these 
reasons, the pure impact of the board independence on the debt maturity structure may 
not be examined clearly under the crisis conditions. So, I decide to investigate the board 
independence and debt maturity relation specifically for the times of financial instability.  
The sample for this analysis consists of years with financial instability only: 2000-
2002 and 2007-2009. The dummy variable, PostCrisis stands for the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis period after the SOX regulations, 2007-2009. Similar to the previous model, I have 
the interaction variable: Board Independence*PostCrisis. I apply my main model of 
difference-in-difference analysis and compare the dot-com crisis period before the 
exogenous shock, 2000-2002, to the mortgage crisis time after the shock, 2007-2009, so 
that I can investigate the relation between the board independence and the debt maturity 
during the time of financial instability. 
Table 2.5  displays  the  estimates  from  the difference-in-difference  analysis  













































Board Independence -0.021 -0.058 0.051 0.132 0.120 0.432
0.091 0.092 0.106 0.111 0.419 0.433
PostCrisis 0.094 0.019 -0.073 0.304*** -0.245 0.011
0.076 0.040 0.089 0.049 0.352 0.193
Board 
Independence*PostCrisis -0.057 -0.081 0.123 0.156 0.345 0.300
0.113 0.117 0.132 0.141 0.521 0.551
Leverage -0.422*** 0.612*** 2.387***
0.067 0.078 0.308
Leverage-(p) -0.952*** 1.066*** 7.499***
0.256 0.298 1.108
Profitability -0.104 0.323*** 0.094 -0.171 0.765* -1.200**
0.093 0.117 0.108 0.140 0.427 0.548
Asset Maturity -0.117 -0.123 0.146 0.140 0.629 0.796**
0.090 0.086 0.105 0.103 0.415 0.399
MB 0.035 -0.003 -0.146 0.001 0.194 0.017*
0.212 0.002 0.248 0.002 0.978 0.009
Size -0.050** -0.015 0.039* 0.010 0.279*** -0.022
0.020 0.019 0.023 0.023 0.092 0.090
Growth -0.426** -0.302 0.385* 0.346 1.567* 0.155
0.190 0.198 0.222 0.238 0.874 0.930
Tangibility 0.001 0.178 -0.116 -0.421*** -1.335** -2.228***
0.123 0.123 0.144 0.148 0.567 0.572
Table 2.5: Difference-in-Difference Test of Board Independence on Debt Maturity for Crisis
This table reports difference-in-difference analysis estimates during the crisis time periods before and after the
SOX regulations for Board Independence along with Leverage, Leverage-(p), Profitability, Asset Maturity,
Market-to-Book (MB), Size, Growth, Tangibility, Cash, Volatility, and Industry Concentration (HHI) as control
variables. The regressions with Leverage-(p) include lagged control variables. The analysis is conducted for three
different debt maturity measures. Short Term Ratio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the
total debt of the firm. Long Term Ratio is constructed by dividing the sum of all the long term debt maturing in
more than two years over the total debt. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of
each type of debt with its maturity in years. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the
board of directors. PostCrisis is a dummy that equals one for values in the sub-prime mortgage crisis time in the
post-period (2007-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*PostCrisis is the intercation variable of
PostCrisis and Board Independence. In Columns II, IV and VI, the analysis is repeated with the control variable
Leverage-(p), which represents the predicted leverage values obtained from the first step regression. The ***




Board Independence*PostCrisis represents the Board Independence for the firms 
throughout the mortgage crisis years after the exogenous shock. Board Independence 
seems to have a weakly negative relation with short term and a weakly positive relation 
with the long term debt ratio and weighted average maturity measures. They are rather 
insignificant and there is no strong evidence for an effect of the board independence on 
the debt maturity during the financially instable times. One of the possible explanations 
for that might be the fact that lenders may be more conservative during the times of 
financial troubles because the risk of payments and the default risk. So, no matter how 
strongly a company is monitored, they may be hesitant to supply debt with certain type of 
maturities. Thus, it is not clear the possible impact of improved corporate governance via 
increased board independence on debt maturity structure during these troubled times. 
Focusing on Board Independence and PostCrisis estimates, I obtain weak and 
insignificant results as well. 
Table 2.5 (cont.): Difference-in-Difference Test of Board Independence on Debt Maturity 
 for Crisis Time


















Cash -0.010 0.002 -0.050 -0.03 0.339 0.298
0.099 0.090 0.115 0.107 0.455 0.419
Volatility 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.012** -0.006
0.001 0.001 0.001 (\0.002 0.005 0.006
HHI 0.041 -0.008 -0.038 -0.072 -0.249 -0.001
0.056 0.057 0.065 0.068 0.256 0.267
Constant 0.698*** 0.663*** 0.205 0.215 1.398* 1.964**
0.163 0.176 0.190 0.211 0.751 0.824
Adj. R-sq. 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.07
No of Obs. 2,238 2,067 2,238 2,067 2,238 2,067
No of Firms 1,009 933 1,009 933 1,009 933
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Considering all these findings for the crisis periods, it can be stated that there is 
not sufficient evidence to claim a relation between the board independence and the debt 
maturity decision in the firm for the years with financial crisis due to the complex and 
different dynamics of those troubled periods. 
2.5.4 Robustness 
In my analyses, I focus on the firm’s total debt outstanding. Some may argue that the new 
debt issuance should be related to the board independence as the lenders consider the 
current monitoring efficiency of the board when they decide on the maturity of the new 
debt. In order to test the robustness of the original findings, I concentrate on the new debt 
issuance only and repeat the main difference-in-difference analysis. The results are 
presented in Table 2.6.  The positive impact of the increased board independence on the 
debt with longer maturity that is supported by my previous findings persists in this 
robustness test. Companies have less new debt with shorter maturity and more new debt 
with longer maturity as the board’s monitoring power increases via the board 
independence. 
In order to provide vigorous findings in my study I need to control other potential 
channels which may affect the decision on the debt maturity structure. The organizational 
structure and the CEO influence are two important factors needed to have a further 
examination.21 First, I consider the potential impact of different organizational structures.  
 
                                               
21 Following the literature by Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Scherr and Hulburt 
(2001), Arslan and Karan (2006), I also focus other potential factors. I include the corporate bond ratings 
and the executive ownership as control variables in the main model separately, so that I can control the 
strength and the credibility of the company and the board of directors provided by these measures. My 




















The firm structure and the business dynamics are often different between the multi-
segment, i.e. conglomerate, firms and the single segment companies. Conglomerate firms 
are usually big, complex entities which necessitate greater effort and resources to manage 
and monitor because they operate in several industries with different characteristics. 
Therefore, compared to the single segment firms, conglomerates may benefit more from 
an efficient internal control over the management of multiple segments together. 



















Board Independence -0.012* 0.005 -0.208** -0.074 -1.181*** -0.825**
0.007 0.005 0.090 0.087 0.439 0.413
Post 0.006 -0.028*** -0.301*** -0.227*** -1.441*** -1.219***
0.006 0.006 0.058 0.054 0.281 0.259
Board Independence*Post -0.014* -0.012* 0.171* 0.058 1.023** 0.750*
0.008 0.007 0.099 0.094 0.480 0.447
Leverage 0.021*** -0.028 -0.003
0.007 0.037 0.182
Leverage-(p) 0.293*** 0.359** 1.803**
0.025 0.163 0.779
Constant -0.018 0.024*** 0.368*** 0.246*** 1.710*** 1.284***
0.015 0.005 0.062 0.057 0.302 0.270
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09
No of Obs. 7,177 6,484 7,177 6,484 7,177 6,484
No of Firms 1,206 1,185 1,206 1,185 1,206 1,185
Table 2.6: Difference-in-Difference Test of Board Independence on Maturity via New Debt Issuance
This table reports difference-in-difference analysis estimates for Board Independence along with Leverage, Leverage-(p),
Profitability, Asset Maturity, Market-to-Book (MB), Size, Growth, Tangibility, Cash, Volatility, and Industry
Concentration (HHI) as control variables. The analysis is conducted for three different debt maturity measures and using
the new debt issuance data only. Short Term Ratio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the total debt of
the firm. Long Term Ratio is constructed by dividing the sum of all the long term debt maturing in more than two years
over the total debt. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of each type of debt with its
maturity in years. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of directors. Post is a dummy
that equals one for values in the post-period (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*Post is the intercation
variable of Board Independence, Post and Treated. In Columns II, IV and VI, the analysis is repeated with the control
variable Leverage-(p), which represents the predicted leverage values obtained from the first step regression. The *** 
indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Moreover, transparency of the business transactions and the auditing become more 
difficult and also vital to achieve for complex and diverse conglomerate firms compared 
to single segment firms. As the exogenous shock, the SOX bring several requirements for 
the companies which may have greater influence for the conglomerates. It compels 
enhanced financial disclosure via disclosing off balance sheet transactions in the sections 
401-409. Through sections 701-705, the SOX also ask for the companies to provide 
studies and reporting by the SEC and the audit firms. Specifically in section 404, it 
requires the assessment of the internal control. This assessment rule via external auditing 
certainly creates extra costs for the firms which may not be easy to handle by small, 
single segment firms compared to big conglomerates. In addition to that, the section 
303A of the SEC regulations ask firms to provide continuous education to the directors in 
the board for expertise which can be another extra heavy cost item for the single segment 
firms. Further, the Title 2 of SOX discusses the independence of board which can clearly 
provide an efficient internal control over the management of multiple segments of a 
conglomerate. That feature can be more beneficial for a complex multi segment firm than 
for a single segment company. Because of these reasons, I need to investigate the effect 
of firm’s organizational structure on my findings in this natural experiment.  
The CEO duality may affect the independence and the neutrality of the board 
because the CEO as the chair of the board may influence the decisions and also contradict 
with the power and effectiveness of the board in terms of monitoring the CEO herself. On 
the other hand, the SOX amendments provide necessary conditions to mitigate any 
potential effect by the CEO even if there is the CEO duality issue in the firm. In addition 
to the rules in sections 401-409 and 701-705 covering the enhanced financial disclosure, 
 102 
 
the assessment of the internal control, studies and reporting by the SEC; the SOX bring 
criminal penalties for the influenced administration in the firm and also for the fraud in 
financial statements by the CEO via the sections 802 and 906. These regulations certainly 
discourage the CEO to engage any fraud or empower herself as the chair of the board and 
impact the board’s decisions for her own benefits. Due to these reasons, I also examine 
any possible effects of the CEO duality on my previous results.  
I apply two methods to explore any potential influence by the organizational 
structure. First, I introduce the dummy variable SingleSegment which equals to one if the 
company has one segment and zero otherwise. I conduct the main difference-in-
difference model including this new control variable. The results are presented in Table 
2.7. The positive relation between the board independence and the long term debt persists 
in these findings which show the robustness of my original results. Second, I build two 
sub-samples with single segment firms and conglomerate firms. Then, I run the 
difference-in-difference analysis with two different samples. The outcomes are presented 
in Table 2.8. Comparing the findings for both types of companies, I obtain stronger 
results for multi-segment firms supporting the idea that for conglomerates, the board 
independence is more effective in terms of monitoring via the SOX regulations, and it has 
a significantly positive effect on the debt with longer maturity which provides evidence 
for the robustness of the original findings. 
To test any potential influence by CEO duality, I construct the dummy variable 
ChairCEO. It equals to one if the CEO is the chair of the board of the directors and zero 
otherwise. I conduct the main difference-in-difference model with this control variable. 
The results are presented in Table 2.7. Similar to my original findings, I obtain significant 
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and negative relation between board independence and short term debt while a positive 









































Board Independence 0.0349 0.019 -0.120 0.037 0.018 -0.129
0.048 0.056 0.230 0.048 0.056 0.230
Post 0.105*** -0.075* -0.301* 0.106*** -0.076* -0.308*
0.034 0.040 0.162 0.034 0.040 0.162
Board Independence*Post -0.155*** 0.112* 0.521** -0.156*** 0.113* 0.526**
0.054 0.064 0.260 0.054 0.064 0.260
SingleSegment -0.028** 0.024* 0.153***
0.012 0.014 0.058
ChairCEO 0.003 -0.017* -0.092**
0.008 0.010 0.039
Constant 0.525*** 0.180* 1.646*** 0.499*** 0.211** 1.830***
0.090 0.106 0.431 0.089 0.105 0.429
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07
No of Obs. 8,715 8,715 8,715 8,715 8,715 8,715
No of Firms 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
Table 2.7: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Conglomerate Firm and CEO Duality Controls
This table reports the estimates from the replication of the difference-in-difference analysis including the additional
controls: SingleSegment and ChairCEO. The analysis is conducted for three different debt maturitymeasures. Short Term
Ratio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the total debt of the firm. Long Term Ratio is constructed by
dividing the sum of all the long term debt maturing in more than two years over the total debt. Weighted Average
Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of each type of debt with its maturity in years. Board Independence is
the percentage of the outside members in the board of directors. Post is a dummy that equals one for values in the post-
period (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*Post is the intercation variable of Board Independence and
Post. SingleSegment is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has one segment and zero otherwise. ChairCEO is a
dummy that is one if the CEO is also the chair of the board and zero otherwise. Columns I, II, III display the results with











































Board Independence*Post -0.138** 0.183** 0.830*** -0.086 -0.085 -0.394
0.066 0.079 0.317 0.121 0.142 0.585
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08
No of Obs. 5,933 5,933 5,933 2,784 2,784 2,784

















Board Independence*Post -0.175** 0.077 0.561** -0.083 0.160 0.824*
0.068 0.080 0.224 0.103 0.123 0.498
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
No of Obs. 4,859 4,859 4,859 3,856 3,856 3,856
No of Firms 769 769 769 531 531 531
PANEL B: The Analysis with Segment Sub-Samples
Conglomerate Single Segment
Table 2.8: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with CEO Duality and Segment Sub-Samples
This table reports the estimates from the replication of the difference-in-difference analysis using the sub-samples for
CEO duality and conglomerate firms. Panel Adisplays the findings with the sub-samples for the CEO duality: CEO
is Chair and CEO is not Chair; and Panel B presents the outcomes with the sub-samples for the firm segment types:
Conglomerate and Single Segment Firms. The analyses are conducted for three different debt maturity measures.
Short Term Ratio is calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the total debt of the firm. Long Term Ratio
is constructed by dividing the sum of all the long term debt maturing in more than two years over the total debt.
Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via multiplying the fraction of each type of debt with its maturity in years.
Board Independence is the percentage of the outside members in the board of directors. Post is a dummy that equals
one for values in the post-period (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*Post is the intercation
variable of Board Independence and Post. The *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
PANEL A: The Analysis with CEO Duality Sub-Samples
CEO is Chair CEO is NOT Chair
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While one sample consists of companies with the CEO as the chair of the board, the other 
sample has firms without the CEO duality. After I conduct the difference-in-difference 
test with these subsamples and compare the results, I observe the significant and positive 
effect from the board independence on the long term debt for the firms with CEO duality. 
The findings are presented in Table 2.8. This result shows the restricting effects of the 
SOX rules on the CEO as the chair which leads to a more effective board monitoring and 
a relation with the debt maturity.  
I conduct placebo tests in which I shift the time range of the study +/- two years 
while keeping the main structure of my model the same. By doing this, I can examine the 
existence of other potential firm related endogenous or independent exogenous shocks 
influencing the board independence and debt maturity relation. If I have any significant 
results from the placebo tests, it means there are other trends or shocks than the SOX 
regulations that affect the increase in board independence. In the first test, I move the 
time frame of the difference-in-difference analysis two years back and define a dummy 
variable, Post1, that equals one for values in the shifted post-period (2001–2006) and 
zero otherwise. In the second test, I shift the time range of the model two years forward 
and use a dummy variable, Post2, that equals one for values in the shifted post-period 
(2005–2009) and zero otherwise. The findings are given in Table 2.9. These analyses 
provide statistically insignificant results that support the validity of the use of the SOX 
rules in the natural experiment as the only exogenous shock affecting the relation 
between the board independence and debt maturity.22 
                                               
22 I also conduct additional placebo tests with a time shift of +/- one year and I obtain insignificant results 
which suggest that not any other trends but the SOX rules are the only exogenous shock affecting the 










































Board Independence -0.080 0.051 -0.092 -0.054 0.128** 0.406**
0.079 0.065 0.261 0.044 0.051 0.205
Post1 0.020 0.007 -0.126
0.039 0.038 0.155
Board Independence*Post1 -0.040 0.046 0.449
0.086 0.071 0.287
Post2 0.079** 0.026 0.110
0.035 0.041 0.165
Board Independence*Post2 -0.051 -0.018 -0.109
0.049 0.057 0.229
Constant 0.257* 0.266* 2.236*** 0.606*** 0.133 1.396***
0.148 0.147 0.593 0.113 0.133 0.532
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07
No of Obs. 8,004 8,004 8,004 6,530 6,530 6,530
No of Firms 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,170 1,170 1,170
Table 2.9: The Placebo Tests for the Difference-in-Difference Analysis
This table presents the placebo test estimates for the difference-in-difference (dif-in-dif) analysis. In the first placebo test, the time 
frame of the dif-in-dif analysis is shifted two years back and the estimates are given in columns I - III. In the second placebo test,
the time frame is shifted two years forward and the estimates are shown in columns IV - VI. The analyses comprise control
variables and year fixed effects. The analyses are conducted for three different debt maturity measures. Short Term Ratio is
calculated by dividing debt in current liabilities over the total debt of the firm. Long Term Ratio is constructed by dividing the
sum of all the long termdebt maturing in more than two years over the total debt. Weighted Average Maturity is calculated via
multiplying the fraction of each type of debt with its maturity in years. Board Independence is the percentage of the outside
members in the board of directors. Post1 is a dummy that equals one for values in the shifted post-period (2001-2005) and zero
otherwise. Post2 is a dummy that equals to one for values in shifted post period (2005-2009) and zero otherwise. Board 
Independence*Post1, Board Independence*Post2 are the intercation variables of Board Independence, Post1 and Post2. The ***




Throughout this study, I investigate the relation between strong corporate governance in 
terms of monitoring and the maturity structure of the firm’s debt. In particular, I measure 
the effective board monitoring via the independence of the board of directors and try to 
reveal any impact of the increased board independence on the debt maturity choice. I 
control for other possible channels of influences on the debt maturity and also estimate 
the firm leverage simultaneously. I construct a natural experiment for the period of 1996 
to 2009 using the SOX regulations as an exogenous shock and find that companies have 
more debt with longer maturity as they have stronger internal monitoring via more 
independent board of directors. This result rejects the null hypothesis of no relation and 
supports the H1a hypothesis of a positive relation between the board independence and 
the long term debt. 
 This paper contributes to the debt maturity literature by further investigating the 
effect of strong corporate governance on the debt maturity structure. To the best of my 
knowledge, the monitoring characteristic of the board via the board independence has not 
been researched as one of the determinants of the debt maturity decision. Furthermore, I 
conduct my study via a natural experiment to make it sure that the variables in the 
researched relation are clearly identified without any issues. In order to find out any 
potential influence by other factors, I also examine specific conditions of board and 
organization characteristics, such as CEO duality and segment type of firms; and I 
provide robustness of the original findings. As an additional contribution, I explicitly 
focus on the era of financial instability and research how the relation between the board 
independence and the debt maturity is affected. Taking everything into account, I can say 
 108 
 
that my paper not only solidifies the reliability of the variable identifications via a natural 
experiment but also provides an unexplored effect of the internal board monitoring via 
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Changes in Corporate Governance: Externally Dictated vs Organically 
Determined 
3.1 Introduction 
Several major corporate scandals in the United States during the early 2000s brought 
attention to the corporate governance mechanisms of US companies. Not long after these 
scandals, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX hereafter) 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC hereafter) announced certain 
corporate governance regulations in order to restore public confidence in the governance 
of public corporations. While significant research has been conducted on the corporate 
governance and firm performance relationship, there are only a few studies investigating 
SOX’s impact on companies’ governance structure. Among these papers, consensus has 
not emerged on the influence of governance structure changes on firm performance nor 
whether SOX and SEC legislations have been necessary and successful in improving the 
performance of companies. 
 Previous literature concentrates on different characteristics of the corporate 
governance mechanism in order to explain any potential influence on the firm 
performance and provides mixed results. Schellenger et al. (1989), Daily and Dalton 
(1993), Brown and Caylor (2006), Dey (2008), Lin and Jen (2011) investigate board 
independence and the independence of key governance committees, such as audit, 
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nominating and compensation committees. In their empirical studies, they find a positive 
relation between governance and performance suggesting that increasing the number of 
outside members reduces the agency cost and improves the firm performance. Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) focus on GIM and BCF indices that measure the corporate governance in 
firms and find that board independence has a negative impact on firm performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Daily and Johnson (1997), Klein (1998), Bhagat and 
Black (1999, 2002) and Adjaoud et al. (2007) are also interested in the governance and 
performance relation. They do not find significant evidence supporting any kind of an 
influence. There are a few papers in the literature particularly concentrating on SOX. 
Switzer (2007) examines the effects of SOX compliance on Canadian small-cap 
companies and proposes that SOX has performance improving influence on those firms. 
Moreover, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) discusses the SOX and SEC changes in their 
paper stating that SEC regulations are beneficial for companies while SOX might have 
performance reducing impacts for small firms due to the additional variable cost of 
complying with it. They also believe that in general, SOX can have somewhat negative 
effects in the short term, declining over time. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) also 
investigate the SOX effects and consider the small size firms, claiming a positive 
influence for less compliant companies with a negative impact for small firms. 
Furthermore, Romano (2004) specifically focuses on the SOX and challenges that SOX 
provisions are ill-conceived. She proposes they should be optional rather than mandatory 
for all companies.  
This study departs from the previous literature by focusing on the efficiency of 
the government imposed mandatory changes versus the organic changes done voluntarily. 
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By doing that, we try to clarify the ambiguity in existing literature which is about whether 
improvements in the corporate governance should be dictated by external forces such as 
government, regulators and the exchanges or decided internally by the firm in order to 
increase the firm performance. To test these opposite hypotheses and mitigate the related 
identification issues, we concentrate on regulatory reforms mandated by SOX and 
embraced by SEC. We conduct analyses to provide significant empirical evidences 
favoring one of the main stream ideas. One fair concern might be the difficulty of 
separating two types of firms after SOX and SEC regulations: The ones that still 
voluntarily deciding on changes after these imposed rules; and the others that are forced 
to modify their governance structures. First of all, the vast majority of the firms are 
obliged to change their corporate governance mechanisms; thus, the analysis is still 
plausible to the largest extend. Secondly, any negative or insignificant results on 
performance after SOX and SEC announcements would certainly show the overcoming 
influence of externally dictated governance modifications over the voluntarily decided 
changes. As another interesting part of this work, we research the effects of changes 
during the recession periods to provide an additional insight via the case where the firms 
try to survive in a severe business environment and appreciate the functionality of a 
strong board. Finally, we also employ a specific aspect of firm characteristics and 
evaluate the impact of the modifications for the small cap companies only.  
 We confirm that when companies decide on changes in board and key governance 
committee structure internally relying on the firm dynamics and needs, it enhances firm 
performance. On the other hand, when these modifications are dictated uniformly to all 
companies, it destroys the performance. The positive relation is supported by the agency 
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theory. Fama (1980) suggests that as the ratio of outside versus inside directors or 
members increases, the board and the committees become more independent. This 
reduces the agency cost because outside directors act more effectively as monitors due to 
their desire to protect reputation capital and also lack of association with the internal 
incentives and company politics. The latter result of this study is also backed up by 
Romano (2004) claiming that making the governance changes mandatory for all firms 
disregarding the firm specific dynamics can not be performance improving; such 
regulations should be optional for companies. Moreover, we find that during crisis 
periods, these results are partly strong in terms of board structure changes. Focusing on 
small-cap companies, we can not find significant difference between the firm 
performance outcomes in pre- and post-periods implying that there is not a significant 
relationship between governance changes and performance.  
This paper makes important contributions to the literature. Firstly, it provides 
insight about the validity and true influence of imposing rules that alter firm governance 
structure on the performance measures, results not covered in such content in previous 
research. Secondly, we use the SOX and SEC regulations as a valid instrument for 
imposed rules and compare the performance measures in before and after periods. 
Focusing on this event enables distinction between imposed and organically generated 
governance. Besides, we introduce additional explanatory measures in the analyses to 
cover most aspects of these legislations. Finally, we investigate the influence of changes 
on performance during recession periods which has not been researched before.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the corporate governance and firm performance relationship as well as the 
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effects of SOX and SEC rules along with two different opinions on mandated rules. 
Section 3 describes the empirical methodology. Section 4 explains the data, the variables 
and provides explanatory statistics. In section 5, we discuss the empirical findings and 
robustness of these results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Literature Review 
The relationship between the corporate governance and the firm performance has been an 
interesting topic for most of the researchers for decades. Tremendous amount of studies 
have been conducted to clarify this relationship; yet the results are mixed. According to 
agency theory by Fama (1980), the independence of the board of directors can be 
increased by raising the ratio of external to internal directors making the board more 
effective in reducing the agency cost via better monitoring. Independent boards have a 
superior ability of limit the opportunism of board members and also the directors are 
more involved in strategic decision making which decreases the agency cost and 
improves the firm performance while protecting the reputational capital of the directors. 
Schellenger et al. (1989), Daily and Dalton (1993) conduct analyses on the board 
composition and its effects on the accounting performance measures. They provide 
significant evidence for a positive relationship. Brown and Caylor (2006) also explore 
key governance committee characteristics, such as independence of audit, nominating and 
compensation committees. Based on a dataset by Institutional Shareholder Services, they 
create a broad measure of corporate governance, Gov-Score; a composite measure of 51 
factors. Among their findings, they claim board, nominating and compensation 
committee independence is positively related to firm performance. Furthermore, Dey 
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(2008) investigates any potential relationship between corporate governance and the level 
of agency conflicts in companies. She uses principal component analysis on 22 individual 
governance variables and forms 7 factors representing different dimensions of 
governance for a firm. She discusses when the agency conflict in a company is high, the 
key committee and board independence is significantly associated with firm performance 
and have positive impact on it. In their paper, Lin and Jen (2011) focus on board 
structure. Their results show that outside independent directors have a positive impact on 
firm performance.  
 There are few studies in literature proposing a negative influence of corporate 
governance on firm performance. Among them, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) examines the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance, by taking into account the 
inter-relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital 
structure, and corporate ownership structure. Considering seven different governance 
measures in their study, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) measure the governance via GIM and 
BCF indices and show that board independence is negatively correlated with operating 
performance. 
 Contrary to the above stated literature, there are a considerable amount of 
research suggesting no relationship between corporate governance structure measures and 
the firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Daily and Johnson (1997) 
study the board independence and suggest that there isn’t a significant relationship 
between the board composition and company performance. Bhagat and Black (1999, 
2002) focus on any possible impact of board independence on the firm performance for 
large U.S. companies. They claim that although low profitability firms increase the 
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number of outside directors in their boards, this strategy doesn’t work to help companies 
perform better. Besides, Klein (1998) tries to demonstrate a linkage between the board 
structure and firm performance via also including the key governance committee 
structure in the study. Focusing on years 1992 and 1993, she suggests that there is not any 
significant effect of board, audit, nominating and compensation committee independence 
on the firm performance. Adjaoud et al. (2007) employ a score to define board quality for 
219 Canadian firms considering different board characteristics. Their results show that 
there is no relationship between board independence and the company performance using 
traditional accounting measures. 
 Considering the previous literature on firm performance by Klein (1998), Bhagat 
and Black (1999), Brown and Caylor (2006), Adjaoud et al. (2007), Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), Dey (2008); there are commonly used factors affecting the company 
performance. Their findings suggest that firms performing better usually have higher 
liquidity, higher growth, more free cash flow and more tangible assets. Larger firms are 
also associated with high company performance, as well as highly volatile companies. 
Moreover, levering the firm too much is linked to performance destruction. Finally, 
companies spending more on research and development are believed to perform better. In 
our research, we control the influence of all these factors in order to reveal the true 
impact of board and key committee structure changes on the firm performance. 
 Aside of the literature on the corporate governance structure modification and 
firm performance relationship, there is very few research conducted focusing on 
differentiation of the type of the governance change. More specifically, as stated by 
Finegold et al. (2007), previous studies show less attention on the governance mechanism 
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modifications which are dictated externally on companies. Furthermore, these papers also 
fail to agree on a common result about the effect of the mandated adjustments on the firm 
performance. Switzer (2007) examines the impact of SOX compliance on companies via 
contrasting performance of Canadian small-cap firms that are subject to SOX provisions 
with those that are not. He focuses the internal and external governance mechanisms of 
firms and their simultaneous interactions with performance. He states that SOX has 
beneficial effects on those small cap Canadian firms in terms of incremental increase in 
market valuation. In addition to that, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) also investigate 
2002 governance rules and use a four factor model on abnormal returns for 2001 and 
2002 period. They discuss companies which are less compliant with the provisions earn a 
positive return compared to the other firms. Considering the firm size, they claim less 
compliant small firms face with negative abnormal returns verifying the negative effect 
of SOX on the small companies. 
 Providing less optimistic opinions than other studies on the same topic, 
Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) examines the corporate governance changes and its 
current status for U.S. companies. They suggest SEC imposed modifications should have 
explicitly positive impact on firms overall whereas the influence of SOX is expected to 
be somewhat negative in the short run even though SOX helps to restore the confidence 
in the U.S. corporate governance system till certain extend. They also believe that SOX 
affects the smaller companies in a more negative way since the additional costs of 
complying with it are fixed rather than variable. Besides, Romano (2004) provides an 
assessment of the corporate governance mandates of SOX in her study. She claims that 
SOX was enacted as an emergency legislation due to the huge stock market fall and its 
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provisions are not a focus of any careful attention disregarding the facts proven in the 
scholarly literature. Showing evidences from the literature she proposes that SOX 
provisions should not be mandatory but rather optional. 
 As it is stated above, there is a lack of unification on the governance mechanism 
changes on firm performance; particularly when they are dictated externally. In this 
paper, we differ from previous literature by comparing the impacts of both internally and 
externally altered governance structures on the company performance via considering 
before and after periods of SOX and SEC regulations. By doing that, we employ a valid 
instrument representing the mandated modifications in order to test the impacts of both 
types of changes on the firm performance and clarify the ambiguity in this literature. we 
try to find answers to the following main question throughout the study. 
“How do the externally imposed adjustments in corporate governance 
structure of companies affect the firm performance compared to the 
organically decided changes?” 
3.3 The Empirical Method 
Various high-profile US corporate scandals in early 2000s have led to enactment of SOX 
and several regulations by US stock exchanges. These new mandatory rules are 
considered as the most important corporate governance legislation since 1930s. SOX 
institutes several new requirements for public company boards among which the most 
significant ones are the followings: The key committees must exist within each firm; such 
as audit committee, nominating committee and compensation committee. Besides, the 
board should consist of independent directors. In particular, the members of the audit 
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committee must be independent directors and at least one member of the committee must 
be considered a financial expert. In addition to these regulations imposed by SOX; in 
2003, the SEC approved several governance related reforms suggested by the three major 
US stock exchanges; NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. Among them, the most prominent 
ones are again related with the board independence. Both, nominating and compensation 
committees must consist of independent directors.  
 Considering the purpose of this study, SOX and SEC regulations clearly provide 
suitable conditions for a natural experiment. Before these legislations, companies apply 
necessary changes in their boards organically based on their own needs in order to 
improve the efficiency and performance of the firm. Starting from 2003, firms forced to 
reshape their corporate governance structure according to the mandatory rules by SOX 
and SEC. This enables us to investigate and compare the effect on firm performance by 
organic changes done by firms themselves versus the changes imposed by external 
forces, separately, which mitigates any potential endogeneity concerns related to 
identification issues. The time interval for our analysis is from 1996 till 2009. It covers a 
7-year period before the regulations by SOX and SEC become effective, namely 1996-
2002, and compares it to a 7-year period after the enactment, 2003-2009. One of the main 
reasons for the 7-year pre period is the availability of corporate governance data. 
Moreover, both 7-year pre and post periods include one financial crisis each, dot-com 
recession of 2000 and mortgage crisis of 2007, so that we can conduct a joint analysis 
with the financial crisis when the advice of a governing board is the most valuable. 




As the univariate analyses, we conduct three explanatory tests in which we 
examine whether using the regulations by SOX and SEC is a valid instrument for the 
natural experiment. We expect to receive results which demonstrate significant 
differences between before and after enactment periods so that these new rules can be 
employed as representatives of external forces requiring firms to change their board 
structure. In the first analysis, we compare both dependent and independent variables, 
namely, performance and board measures individually for pre and post periods to observe 
any significant differences in their values. It has been argued by Graham et al. (2011) that 
firms need and value the functions of a good board and strong corporate governance at 
most during a crisis time; thus, as a second test we focus on the crisis periods only and 
apply to same comparison between dot-com crisis as a recession period before the new 
legislations and mortgage crisis as a recession period after the new rules. In addition to 
these analyses, in the third univariate test, we concentrate on the possible impact of the 
firm size. In literature by Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003), Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007) it has been discussed that small cap firms bear higher costs relative to their size to 
adjust the board structure requirements of SOX. As a consequence, applying the 
provisions of SOX and SEC can be performance destructive for small size companies. In 
order to examine this hypothesis, we use the same comparison between pre- and post-
periods of new regulations but for small cap firms only. All these tests provide a general 




The next major step in the study is to perform a series of analyses23 in order to 
reveal the efficiency of externally imposed mandatory modifications on board structure 
versus the organic changes decided and applied by the firm itself and how they affect the 
firm performance. The first multivariate test is a cross sectional regression model. The 
industry adjusted firm performance average after SOX and SEC legislation period is 
regressed on the both post period and pre period average board structure measures along 
with controls, so that we can observe the individual impacts of board structure changes 
initiated by external versus internal sources on the firm performance in a joint model. We 
also intend to capture which type of channels altering the board characteristics majorly 




where Y is the industry adjusted average performance measure for 2003-2009; X is the 
average board structure measure for 1996-2002; Z is the average board structure measure 
for 2003-2009; firm observation, i= 1, …, N; number of control variables, l = 1, …, 8; 
and α, β, γ, ρ, μ are the coefficients of the constant term, board structure measures for, 
board structure measures in post-period, controls and error term, respectively. 
The second multivariate model in this paper is the difference in difference 
analysis. We conduct this analysis where a dummy variable for post enactment period is 
                                               
23 As a preliminary analysis which is not included in this paper, a time series regression model is developed 
in which the firm performance variables are regressed on the board structure variables along with controls, 
year dummies and fixed effects. This model is applied separately for 1996-2002 and 2003-2009; and the 
results of these tests are compared in order to provide evidence for how externally forced versus organic 
board modifications impact the firm performance. The same model is repeated for 2000-2002 and 2007-
2009 periods to focus on only the crises occurred in pre and post SOX periods. All these models provide 
results in the same direction and significance as the findings of the other models discussed in the paper. 
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included along with the intersection with the board structure measure; so that we can 
examine all the possible effects of governance measure variations on the industry 
adjusted firm performance. The post-period data start with 2003 and the model is built in 




where Y is the industry adjusted performance measure; X is the board structure measure; 
firm observation, i= 1, … , N; entire period, t = 1996, … , 2009; number of control 
variables, l = 1, … 8; and α, β, γ, δ, ρ, μ are the coefficients of the constant term, post-
period, board structure measures,  post-period board structure measures, controls and 
error term, respectively. 
As the third multivariate model, we adopt the same structure of the previous 
model but only focused on two crisis periods, namely dot-com recession (2000 – 2002) 
and mortgage crisis of (2007 – 2009), as representatives of financial recession before and 
after SOX – SEC regulations, respectively, so that we can investigate the efficiency of 
board structure modifications by external versus internal sources when the need of a 
strong corporate governance is higher than usual. The dummy variable post-crisis 































where Y is the industry adjusted performance measure; X is the board structure measure; 
firm observation, i= 1, …, N; crisis periods, t = 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008, 20009; 
number of control variables, l = 1, …, 8; and α, β, γ, δ, ρ, μ are the coefficients of the 
constant term, post-period crisis, board structure measures, board structure measures in 
post-period crisis, controls and error term, respectively. 
Taking the above stated analyses, it must be straight forward that the last two 
regression models are longitudinal while the first one is a cross sectional regression 
model. More specifically, the difference in difference analyses use fixed effects 
regression as the technique. Due to the nature of these tests, variation within each firm 
across the time period is the focus for this type of model. Because the correlation both 
between firm effects and explanatory variables and also between time effects and 
independent variables is important for this analysis, employing the fixed effects is the 
correct decision. Moreover, firm fixed effects approach controls the potential omitted 
variables differing between firms while constant over time which is a necessity for 
difference in difference analysis. For precision, we also conduct hausman test for these 
first two models which significantly suggests the use of fixed effects. The first model 
employs OLS regression with the standard variance estimator for the standard errors due 
to its cross sectional structure. 
To strengthen the robustness of our findings, we include additional board and 
governance characteristics discussed in the literature by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen 
(1993), Brown and Caylor (2006), Switzer (2007) and Dey (2008).  These governance 
features are the ones affected by the rules of other agencies which try to enhance the 
corporate governance and improve firm performance. Thus, considering these 
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supplementary board characteristics provides a different insight while we present 
evidence for the robustness of the results via these new measures. Moreover, we are also 
interested the possible impact of industries on our findings and their robustness against 
this factor. For that purpose, we adjust our firm performance measures according to the 
industries in which those firms operate using the 48 Fama-French industries. 
3.4 Data Selection and Variable Construction 
We take our data sample from Compustat and Risk Metrics databases for the years 1996-
2009. We exclude the financial firms and the utilities and restrict the sample to have data 
for all the variables for a given year and firm. We winsorize the variables with extreme 
values at 1% and 99%. While the data related to the firm performance and controls are 
collected from Compustat, data necessary for the board structure and corporate 
governance variables are obtained from Risk Metrics database. Our sample consists of 
10,942 observations with 1,813 firms. 
 Following the previous literature by Klein (1998), Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), 
Bhagat and Black (1999), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), in this 
study, we consider several board structure and corporate governance characteristics 
which can be summoned in two groups. There are board of directors characteristics which 
are affected by SOX legislations and the ones influenced by new SEC rules. Among the 
SOX enforced changes, the board independence is represented as the percentage of 
outside directors to the total number of directors in the board, namely “Board 
Independence”. The existence of the nominating committee is characterized by the 
dummy variable “Nominating-existence” which equals one if there is any member in the 
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nominating committee and zero otherwise. “Audit-full-independence” evaluates whether 
that committee entirely consists of outside directors, and it is a dummy variable equals 
one if so and zero otherwise. Among the SEC mandated changes, “Nominating-full-
independence” shows if all the members of this committee are outside directors, and it is 
a dummy variable equals one if so and zero otherwise. Similarly, “Compensation-full-
independence” is a dummy equals one if compensation committee is fully independent 
and zero otherwise. By using these several types of measures, we seek to embrace all the 
different aspects of the board structure modifications either enforced by SOX and SEC or 
done organically by firm itself which we believe affect the firm performance.  
 We evaluate the firm performance via three different measures. These measures 
are widely used in literature while investigating corporate governance and firm 
performance relationship by Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), Klein (1998), Bhagat and 
Black (1999), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bohren and Odegaard (2005), Core et al. 
(2006), Garcia and Anson (2007), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Dey (2008), Wang (2010), 
Lin and Jen (2011). The first performance measure is “Return on Assets (ROA)” 
constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. As an alternative 
performance measure “Net Profit Margin (NPM)”, is calculated by the ratio of net 
income to net sales. In order to capture a different feature of firm performance such as 
equity based representation, we use “Return on Equity (ROE)” which is constructed as a 
ratio of net income to common equity of the firm. Following Brown and Caylor (2006), 
all these performance measures are adjusted by their industry mean values to provide 
robustness against industry effects.  
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As stated in literature by Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (1999), Brown and 
Caylor (2006), Adjaoud et al. (2007), Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Dey (2008); we 
employ certain control variables in this study. One of them is the liquidity which is cash 
over total assets. Free cash flow is defined as the natural logarithm of the difference 
between cash flow from operations and capital expenditures. Firm growth opportunity is 
also controlled and constructed as natural logarithm of common shares outstanding 
multiplied by shares’ closing price over total assets. It is also proxied alternatively as the 
ratio of R&D expenses to net sales. Moreover, tangibility is defined as property, plant, 
equipment total over total assets. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Volatility is controlled as the monthly standard deviation of the closing prices of shares. 
Furthermore, leverage is proxied as a control via the sum of debt in current liabilities and 
long term debt over total assets. 
In Table 3.1, summary statistics are presented. Firm performance measures, ROA, 
ROE and NPM, show similar patterns in their distributions, even though ROE and NPM 
has higher volatility compared to ROA. Moreover, NPM displays a negative skewness 
stating that the majority of firm has relatively low net profit margins. Considering the 
explanatory variables, on average 68% of the firm’s board are outside directors. 
Furthermore, 74% of the firms have the nominating committee. Focusing on the 
committee independence, about 82% of all firms’ audit and compensation committees 
have completely outside directors. Interestingly, only 53% of the firms have the 
nominating committee with fully independent members. In general, the statistics for the 
firm characteristics are similar to the ones documented in previous studies. On the other 
hand, volatility has a right skewed distribution with a high standard deviation which 
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states that the sample consists of a large spectrum of firms with varying volatilities 
mainly of the ones with a higher risk level. Both of the growth measures, MB and 
Growth, have a high positive skewness claiming that the sample contains firms with very 




















Variables Mean Stdev P75 P50 P25
ROA 0.094 0.099 0.145 0.093 0.049
ROE 0.092 0.319 0.187 0.119 0.046
NPM 0.031 0.207 0.100 0.054 0.018
Board Independence 0.678 0.174 0.818 0.714 0.571
Nominating-existence 0.742 0.438 1.000 1.000 0.000
Nominating-full-independence 0.533 0.499 1.000 1.000 0.000
Audit-full-independence 0.820 0.385 1.000 1.000 1.000
Compensation-full-independence 0.833 0.373 1.000 1.000 1.000
Size 7.449 1.614 8.448 7.308 6.321
MB 1.578 1.856 1.875 1.080 0.626
Leverage 0.212 0.180 0.326 0.195 0.046
Liquidity 0.099 0.113 0.139 0.057 0.019
Tangibility 0.262 0.216 0.370 0.201 0.097
Volatility 5.391 5.275 6.383 3.763 2.246
Growth 0.047 0.101 0.045 0.000 0.000
Free Cash Flow 4.715 1.729 5.834 4.678 3.606
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
This table provides descriptive statistics, i.e. mean, standard deviation, 75th, 50th and 25th percentiles, of all
variables used in regression models. There are 1,813 firms with 10,942 firm year observations. ROA is
constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to common
equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio of net income to net sales. In analyses, industry mean adjusted versions of
these performance measures are used. Board Independence is the percentage of outside directors to the total
number of directors in the board. Nominating-existence is a dummy which equals one if there is any member in
the nominating committee and zero otherwise. Nominating-full-independence, Audit-full-independence,
Compensation-full-independence are dummy variables equal one if that specific committee entirely consists of
outside directors and zero otherwise. Liquidity is cash over total assets. Free cash flow is defined as the natural
logarithm of the difference between cash flow from operations operations and capital expenditures. Size is the
natural logarithm of total assets. MB is natural logarithm of common shares outstanding multiplied by shares’
closing price over total assets. Growth is the ratio of R&D expenses to net sales. Tangibility is property, plant,
equipment total over total assets. Volatility is calculated as the monthly standard deviation of the closing prices of
shares. Leverage is proxied via the sum of debt in current liabilities and long term debt over total assets.
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 In order to provide a broader picture of how externally forced regulations 
compared to internal needs alter the firm board structure and affect firm efficiency and 
performance, we focus on these factors more in detail in this section. Figure 3.1 shows 
the yearly average values of firm performance and board independence variables. Before 
SOX and SEC legislations from 1996 until 2002, board independence average climbs up 
from 59% to 65% which means even before the externally imposed rules companies 
changes their board structure organically as much as they need and decide on the level of 
board independence resulting in a better firm performance. In this pre-period, industry 
adjusted ROA and NPM values show the similar incremental pattern while ROE has a 
slight increase. Starting with the year 2002, all firms have to adjust their board structure 
even if it may not be for the best interest for some firms due to SOX and SEC rules. 
Consequently, the average number of board independence continues to increase but with 
a steeper trend from 65% to 79%. It is remarkable to observe how the average firm 
performance measures suffer and drop until 2009 as all the firms forced to increase the 
level of their board independence. All the performance values begin to decrease as it is 
recognizable mostly in ROA and NPM measures. Even the positive impact on firm 
performance by organic modifications which is observed before and supposedly after 
SOX and SEC rules is suppressed by the severe negative effect of forced changes in the 
post period. These preliminary facts clearly show the negative influence of new 






The statistical distribution of nominating committee existence by years is 
displayed in Figure 3.2. The average number of firms having nominating committee 
increases from 55% to 70% until 2002. After SOX and SEC rules, it rapidly jumps up to 
almost 100% in my sample which indicates that SOX and SEC regulations altered the 
firm corporate governance in terms of existence of the nominating committee.  
 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Firm Performance and Board Structure Measures
This figure shows distibution of board independence and industry adjusted ROA, ROE and NPMvalues of firms
by years. Board Independence is defined as the percentage of outside directors to the total number of directors in
the board. ROA is constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. ROE is the ratio of net
income to common equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio of net income to net sales. The values of industry adjusted















































 Figure 3.3 displays the full independence of key governance committees in 
companies by years. The average number of firms having fully independent audit 
committee rises from 55% to 70% until 2002 while that increase is from 20% to 40% for 
the nominating committee. The average number of companies with the compensation 
committee having all outside members fluctuates around 70% in pre period. After SOX 
and SEC legislations, firms modify their key committees making them fully independent. 
As a consequence, the average number of companies with fully independent committees 
reaches around 90-95% level for all committees.  
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Nominating Committee Existence
This figure displays distibution of nominating committee existence for firms by years. Nominating-existence is a



































3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Univariate Analyses 
In this section, we conduct univariate analyses in order to provide a broader view of the 
effect of external versus internal forces altering the firm’s board structure on the firm 
performance. In the first of these tests, we compare firm board structure measures from 
pre-period (1996-2002) to post SOX and SEC regulations period (2003-2009) to examine 
whether these new mandatory rules affect firm’s board of directors. Similarly, we 
perform the same evaluation for the firm performance variables. In addition to these 
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Key Committee Measures
This figure displays distibution of Audit-full-independence, Nominating-full-independence and
Compensation-full-independence values for firms by years. Audit-full-independence, Nominating-full-
independence and Compensation-full-independence are dummy variables which equal one if that specific 
































analyses, we repeat same tests for the crisis periods only, namely, 2000-2002 and 2007-
2009. So, we contrast the dot-com crisis period to the mortgage crisis period through 
which we examine the impact of SOX on the variables in this study. In all these analyses, 
we use two group mean comparison T-test technique.  
 Table 3.2 provides the results of first univariate analysis. Focusing on the pre- and 
post-period comparison, we find statistically significant increase in all board structure 
measures. In particular, the average board independence rises to 74% after SOX and SEC 
regulations while more than 95% of firms have nominating committee in that post-period. 
In pre-period, the average full independence values for nominating, audit and 
compensation committees are about 21%, 72% and 77%, respectively. After the SOX and 
SEC legislations, 80% of the companies on average have only outside directors in the 
nominating committee while the average value is around 90% in terms of audit and 
compensation committees. These results broadly suggest that mandated SOX and SEC 
rules are valid instruments to represent external forces altering the firm board structure. 
In Panel B, the findings for firm performance measures are given. Interestingly, both 
ROA and NPM of companies decease significantly after SOX and SEC rules which are 
the laws for all companies to improve their corporate governance and thus increase the 
firm performance. There is an increase for ROE but it is statistically not significant. The 
big decline in firm performance average in post period provides a clue that the imposed 





























Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Crisis Post-Period Crisis
Board Independence 0.611 0.735 0.632 0.770
dif
p-val




independence 0.211 0.804 0.294 0.903
dif
p-val




independence 0.766 0.891 0.723 0.950
dif
p-val
Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Crisis Post-Period Crisis
ROA (adj) 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000
dif
p-val
ROE (adj) -0.015 -0.009 -0.021 0.000
dif
p-val
NPM (adj) 0.075 0.018 0.124 0.028
dif
p-val
Table 3.2: T-Test Mean Comparison for Board Structure and Firm Performance Measures
This table presents results of t-test mean comparison for the board structure and firm performance measures in two main
columns regarding to two different samples, all periods and crisis periods only, respectively. In Column I, the mean values
of each of these variables for pre period (1996-2002) are compared to their mean values for post period (2003-2009). The
mean difference and related p-values are provided. In Column II, the same analysis is repeated for each variable
individually considering the crisis periods, (2000-2002) and (2007-2009) only. 






















Column II shows the findings of the same analysis considering the crisis periods 
only.  For  firm  board  characteristics,  I  obtain  similar  results  with  greater mean value 
differences when the dot-com crisis is compared to the mortgage recession. Considering 
the firm performance measures, all of them show bigger difference and statistical 
significance. While ROA and NPM decline during the crisis in post period, ROE 
increases. Even though there is not a unity among the performance measures, the 
majority of them claims companies perform poorly during the mortgage crisis period 
when the rules by SOX and SEC are dictated to them forcing all companies to modify 
their board structure.  
Before we move on to the more advanced models in our study, we want to 
investigate further the possible impact of firm size on the findings. As proposed in 
literature, the externally imposed rules forcing the firms to modify their board structure is 
a costly process. Thus, small companies influenced by these mandated rules face higher 
costs damaging their firm performance. In order to examine this hypothesis, we repeat the 
previous univariate analyses for small size firms only. Following the literature, we 
constraint our sample to have companies whose market capitalization is less than $1 
billion dollars. 
Table 3.3 presents the findings related to small size firms only. In Column I, the 
average of firm board structure and key committee independence measures are given. Not 
surprisingly, the average number of firms with nominating committee and the number of 
outside directors in board, audit, nominating and compensation committees increase after 
the SOX and SEC legislations for small companies. These results indicate that small 
firms are also affected by the SOX and SEC regulations. In terms of firm performance, 
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small firms perform slightly poorer in post-period compared to pre-period; but it is 
statistically insignificant except for NPM. That’s why; it is difficult to claim that the 
mandatory changes in board structure destroy the firm performance necessarily more for 
small firms. Because of that reason, we don’t pursue this weak hypothesis in our 
multivariate analyses. 
Column II provides findings for small companies in crisis periods only. The 
changes in board and committee independence are similar to the previous cases and 
statistically significant stating that SOX influences the small firms during the mortgage 
crisis too. Sure enough, the average values for firm performance decline for small firms 
in crisis time, but the difference between the dot-com crisis before SOX and the mortgage 
recession after SOX is neither sufficient nor statistically significant in majority of 
measures. Therefore, it’s hard to accept the claim that especially small firms perform 
worse than the other companies after SOX and SEC rules. So, this idea is not investigated 













Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Crisis Post-Period Crisis
Board Independence 0.591 0.717 0.621 0.747
dif
p-val




independence 0.173 0.777 0.244 0.880
dif
p-val




independence 0.752 0.881 0.721 0.934
dif
p-val
Pre-Period Post-Period Pre-Period Crisis Post-Period Crisis
ROA (adj) -0.021 -0.028 -0.023 -0.027
dif
p-val
ROE (adj) -0.064 -0.080 -0.071 -0.077
dif
p-val






















Table 3.3: T-Test Mean Comparison for Board Structure and Firm Performance Measures (Small 
Firms)
This table presents results of t-test mean comparison for the board structure and firm performance measures of
small companies only, in two main columns regarding to two different samples, all periods and crisis periods
only, respectively. The size constraint for two samples is that firms having market capitalization less than $1
billion. In Column I, the mean values of each of these variables for pre period (1996-2002) are compared to
their mean values for post period (2003-2009). The mean difference and related p-values are provided. In
Column II, the same analysis is repeated for each variable individually considering the crisis periods, (2000-
2002) and (2007-2009) only. 
Panel A: Board Structure Measures for Small Market Cap Companies
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3.4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
One of the major analyses in this paper is a difference in difference analysis. The dummy 
variable representing the period after SOX and SEC regulations is Post. The intersection 
of explanatory variables with Post are Board Independence*post, Nominating-
existence*post, Audit-full-independence*post, Nominating-full-independence*post, 
Compensation-full-independence*post. This test enables us to observe any possible 
impact of externally imposed as well as internally decided board and key committee 
modifications in pre- and post-periods. The primary focus should be concentrated on 
these intersection variables in the study because they are the major variables clarifying 
the effect of mandated vs. organic changes on firm performance. Year and fixed effects 
along with controls such as liquidity, growth, firm size, tangibility, free cash flow, 
leverage, R&D ratio and volatility are included in the model. The performance measures 
are adjusted by the industry averages in which the companies operate in order to mitigate 
and control any possible industry effects on the findings.  
Considering the baseline regression estimates in Table 3.4, we obtain mostly 
similar results documented in literature by Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (1999), 
Brown and Caylor (2006), Adjaoud et al. (2007), Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Dey 
(2008). Our findings suggest that companies with high tangibility, high volatility, high 
market-to-book ratio and high free cash flow seem to perform better while interestingly 
high leverage appears to have a destructive effect on firm performance. Contrary to 
literature, we find that highly liquid firms have poor firm performance, so do the large 
companies. Moreover, high R&D ratio seems also to be performance destructive for the 
companies in our sample, contradicting with previous literature.
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I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Board 




*post 0.047 -0.014** 0.004
0.040 0.007 0.024
Nominating-
existence 0.018* 0.001 0.022***
0.010 0.002 0.006
Nominating-
existence*post -0.020 -0.008* -0.032**
0.025 0.004 0.015
Post -0.071** -0.009* -0.134***-0.018 -0.012***-0.102***
0.029 0.005 0.018 0.024 0.004 0.015
MB 0.075*** 0.046*** 0.078*** 0.052*** 0.076*** 0.051***
0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005
Size 0.001 -0.036***-0.022***0.015 -0.026***0.046*** 0.015 -0.026***0.045***
0.008 0.001 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.006
Volatility 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001**
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Leverage -0.103***-0.061***0.029 -0.123***-0.073***-0.043** -0.125***-0.073***-0.044**
0.036 0.006 0.022 0.036 0.006 0.022 0.036 0.006 0.022
Performance Measures
This table reports the difference in difference analysis estimates for board independence, nominating committee
existence and their interactions with post-period dummy along with MB, size, volatility, leverage, tangibility,
liquidity, growth and free cash flow as control variables and also year and fixed effects. It also provides the
baseline regression results in columns I-III. The analysis is conducted using two different governance measures
for three different performance measures individually. ROA is constructed as operating income before
depreciation over total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to common equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio of 
net income to net sales. In analyses, industry mean values of these performance measures are substracted from
the performance variables to obtain the adjusted versions. Board Independence is the percentage of outside
directors to the total number of directors in the board. Nominating-existence is a dummy equals one if there is
any member in that committee and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy which equals one for values in post SOX
period (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*post and Nominating-existence*post are the
interaction variables of Board Independence, Nominating-existence and Post. The *** indicates statistical
significance at 1% level.




Columns IV-VI show the results from board independence impact on firm 
performance. Board Independence*post represents the board independence of the 
companies after SOX and SEC regulations; and thus they are the firms believed to reveal 
the true impact of mandated board changes on firm performance. The findings for ROE 
and NPM are both statistically and economically insignificant. In terms of ROA, the 
changes necessitated by SOX and SEC have even a statistically negative effect on firm 
performance. In particular, the return of firm’s assets declines by 0.24% (= 0.014 * 
0.174) with one standard deviation increase in board independence which is 17.4% more 
outside directors in the board. Focusing on the “Board Independence” estimates, the 
increase in the number of outside directors affects the firm performance positively when 
all years before and after SOX and SEC legislations included. This finding implies that 
making the board of directors more independent helps to improve the firm performance 
considering the externally imposed and organic changes all together for all time periods. 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Tangibility -0.017 0.026** 0.109*** -0.060 -0.001 -0.054 -0.062 0.001 -0.053
0.062 0.011 0.039 0.064 0.011 0.038 0.063 0.011 0.038
Liquidity 0.041 -0.020** 0.023 0.054 -0.009 0.093*** 0.059 -0.009 0.095***
0.045 0.008 0.028 0.045 0.008 0.027 0.045 0.008 0.027
Growth -0.689*** -0.258***-0.957***-0.686***-0.259***-0.964***-0.695***-0.260***-0.972***
0.105 0.019 0.066 0.105 0.019 0.063 0.105 0.019 0.063
Free Cash flow 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.005* 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.006***
0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002
Constant -0.042 0.236*** 0.209*** -0.164** 0.174*** -0.227***-0.130* 0.177*** -0.192***
0.065 0.011 0.040 0.071 0.012 0.043 0.070 0.012 0.042
Adj. R-sq. 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.18 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.12
No of Obs. 10,987 10,992 10,987 10,937 10,942 10,937 10,937 10,942 10,937
No of Firms 1,819 1,820 1,819 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,812 1,813 1,812
Performance Measures
Table 3.4 (cont.): Difference in Difference Analysis of Board and Nominating Committee Structure on
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These results are strong and statistically significant especially for ROE and NPM 
measures. These findings all together state that although there might be companies 
voluntarily modifying their boards after SOX, the negative impact by the externally 
forced changes is so strong that the relationship over all loses its positive significance and 
even becomes significantly negative in terms of ROA because those mandated changes 
may not be efficient and suitable for some companies. 
In terms of the existence of nominating committee after SOX and SEC rules in 
columns VII-IX, firms perform poorly when they are dictated to have a nominating 
committee. Especially, ROA and NPM values suffer severely according to statistically 
significant and negative Nominating-existence*post estimates. On the other hand, there is 
a significantly positive influence on firm performance, ROE and NPM, by “Nominating-
existence” taking all the years from 1996 to 2009 into account. All these findings propose 
that even though to found a nominating committee in firms may improve firm’s 
efficiency and functionality, the timing and the plan for this decision may not be right 
when it is dictated externally on them rather than leaving this choice to the companies 
that agree internally that they need such a change. 
Table 3.5 provides the estimates for the key governance committee variables. For 
post-period only, the results for full independence of nominating committee are negative 
and significant for NPM. This finding suggests the negative influence of mandated SOX 
and SEC regulations on the firm performance. Considering all years combined, the results 
show a mainly positive impact on firm performance by the change in full independence 
of nominating committee. It is especially strong and statistically significant for NPM. 
Shifting the focus to the findings for full independence of the other key committees, it 
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seems externally forcing that all firms should have independent audit and compensation 
committee, serves to the desired purpose and improves the firm performance because 
Audit-full-independence*post and Compensation full-independence*post have positive 
coefficients only for NPM. If either audit or compensation committee consists of entirely 
outside members, it has a negative and statistically significant influence on the firm 
performance considering all times combined. This finding parts away from the previous 
outcomes in this study. Therefore, it is investigated further also via different models in 
this paper.  
Taking all the results of this difference in difference analysis into account, it is 
evident to propose when governance structure of companies are altered via imposing 
externally decided regulations, it has a destructive effect on firm performance, rather than 
the case where these changes are made by the firms voluntarily relying on their needs. 
This phenomenon is particularly significant for the existence of a nominating committee 
and board independence, as well as the full independence of the nominating committee. 
As another multivariate analysis, we follow the previous model of difference-in-
difference analysis with a small difference in timing. Instead of focusing on the entire 
period before or after SOX, we concentrate on only the crisis times, namely dot-com 
crisis and mortgage recession. The time interval for this analysis is between 2000 and 
2002 as well as between 2007 and 2009. Post-Crisis is the dummy variable representing 
the mortgage crisis period after SOX and SEC legislations. The interactions of 
explanatory variables with Post-Crisis are the followings: Board Independence*post-
crisis, Nominating-existence*post-crisis, Nominating-full-independence*post-crisis, 




I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Nominating-full-
independence -0.005 0.003 0.016**
0.012 0.002 0.007
Nominating-full-
independence*post 0.018 -0.003 -0.016*
0.015 0.003 0.009
Audit-full-
independence -0.005 -0.004** -0.015**
0.011 0.002 0.006
Audit-full-
independence*post 0.018 0.004 0.026**
0.017 0.003 0.010
Compensation-full-
independence -0.017 -0.003 -0.027***
0.012 0.002 0.007
Compensation-full-
independence*post 0.025 0.003 0.024**
0.017 0.003 0.010
Post -0.042***-0.018***-0.120***-0.045***-0.022***-0.146***-0.050***-0.021***-0.144***
0.012 0.002 0.007 0.016 0.003 0.010 0.016 0.003 0.010
MB 0.076*** 0.050*** 0.076*** 0.050*** 0.076*** 0.050***
0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005
Size 0.018* -0.026***0.047*** 0.017* -0.026***0.048*** 0.017* -0.026***0.048***
0.010 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.010 0.002 0.006
Volatility 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001**
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Leverage -0.124***-0.074***-0.044** -0.121***-0.074***-0.046** -0.122***-0.074***-0.047**
0.036 0.006 0.022 0.036 0.006 0.022 0.036 0.006 0.022
Table 3.5: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Key Committee Structure on Performance Measures
This table reports the difference in difference analysis estimates for key committee full independence and their interactions with
post-period dummy along with MB, size, volatility, leverage, tangibility, liquidity, growth and free cash flow as control variables
and also year and fixed effects. The analysis is conducted using three different governance measures for three different
performance measures individually. ROA is constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. ROEis the ratio
of net income to common equityof the firm. NPMis the ratio of net income to net sales. In analyses, industry meanvalues of these
performance measures are substracted from the performance variables to obtain the adjusted versions. Nominating-full-
independence, Audit-full-independence and Compensation-full-independence are dummy variables equal one if that specific
committee entirely consists of outside directors and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy which equals one for values in post SOX
period (2003-2009) and zero otherwise. Nominating-full-independence*post, Audit-full-independence*post and Compensation-full-
independence*post are the interaction variables of Nominating-full-independence, Audit-full-independence and Compensation-full-












This model with these interaction variables allows us to examine any specific effect of 
mandated as well as organic board and key committee modifications particularly for 
crisis times when it is believed that the functionality of corporate governance is valued 
most. Year and firm fixed effects along with controls such as liquidity, growth, firm size, 
tangibility, free cash flow, leverage, R&D ratio and volatility are included in the model. 
Similar to previous analysis, the performance measures are adjusted by the industry 
averages to control any possible industry effects on results.  
The findings of the analysis for crisis periods are shown in Table 3.6. Considering 
the estimates for the board independence, for both crisis periods together, it is clear that it 
has a positive influence on firm performance, especially a statistically significant one in 
terms of NPM. Excluding the pre-period dot-com crisis time when the firms modify their 
board willingly if they need it, and concentrating on the mortgage crisis period after SOX 
and SEC regulations, the positive effect of board independence diminishes and even 
become negative in terms of ROA, but neither of these results or statistically significant 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Tangibility -0.060 0.001 -0.053 -0.056 0.001 -0.052 -0.052 0.002 -0.047
0.064 0.011 0.038 0.063 0.011 0.038 0.063 0.011 0.038
Liquidity 0.060 -0.009 0.096*** 0.057 -0.009 0.094*** 0.057 -0.009 0.094***
0.045 0.008 0.027 0.045 0.008 0.027 0.045 0.008 0.027
Growth -0.690***-0.260***-0.970***-0.692***-0.260***-0.969***-0.693***-0.260***-0.971***
0.105 0.019 0.063 0.105 0.019 0.063 0.105 0.019 0.063
Free Cash flow 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.007***
0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002
Constant -0.139** 0.178*** -0.198***-0.134* 0.179*** -0.189***-0.122* 0.178*** -0.179***
0.070 0.012 0.042 0.071 0.012 0.042 0.071 0.012 0.042
Adj. R-sq. 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.12
No of Obs. 10,987 10,992 10,987 10,937 10,942 10,937 10,937 10,942 10,937
No of Firms 1,819 1,820 1,819 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,812 1,813 1,812
Table 3.5 (cont.): Difference in Difference Analysis of Key Committee Structure on Performance Measures
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except for ROE. Interestingly, mandated regulations seem to have a positive impact on 
firm ROE during the mortgage crisis. Taking these findings into account, it’s hard to 
claim that externally imposed board changes have a totally different impact than organic 




















Performance Measures During Crisis Periods
I II III IV V VI
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Board Independence 0.082 0.014 0.071*
0.058 0.010 0.038
Board Independence*post-crisis 0.144* -0.017 0.064
0.087 0.015 0.056
Nominating-existence -0.041** -0.017*** -0.068***
0.020 0.004 0.013
Nominating-existence*post-crisis -0.051 0.002 -0.073
0.078 0.014 0.050
Post-crisis -0.150** -0.014 -0.197*** 0.035 -0.023* -0.048
0.068 0.012 0.044 0.077 0.014 (0.050
MB 0.080*** 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.083***
0.012 0.008 0.012 0.008
Size 0.020 -0.019*** 0.046*** 0.022 -0.018*** 0.051***
0.018 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.012
Volatility 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.001
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Leverage -0.017 -0.064*** 0.004 -0.020 -0.064*** 0.000
0.063 0.011 0.041 0.063 0.011 0.041
Tangibility 0.000 0.061*** 0.064 0.012 0.071*** 0.092
0.115 0.020 0.075 0.115 0.020 0.074
Table 3.6: Difference in Difference Analysis of Board and Nominating Committee Structure on
This table reports the difference in difference analysis estimates for board independence, nominating committee existence and
their interactions with post-period crisis dummy along with MB, size, volatility, leverage, tangibility, liquidity, growth and free
cash flowas control variables and also year and fixed effects. The analysis is conductedusing two different governance measures
for three different performance measures individually. ROA is constructed as operating income before depreciation over total
assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to common equity of the firm. NPMis the ratio of net income to net sales. In analyses,
industry mean values of these performance measures are substracted from the performance variables to obtain the adjusted
versions. Board Independence is the percentage of outside directors to the total number of directors in the board. Nominating-
existence is a dummy equals one if there is any member in that committee and zero otherwise. Post-crisis is a dummy which
equals one for values in mortgage crisis (2007-2009) and zero otherwise. Board Independence*post-crisis and Nominating-
existence*post-crisis are the interaction variables of Board Independence, Nominating-existence and Post-crisis. The ***













In columns IV-VI, the estimates for crisis periods are not clear for the existence of 
a nominating committee. There is a negative and significant influence on the firm 
performance when both crisis times are considered. The negative impact of Nominating-
existence*post-crisis seems to deteriorate and become insignificant for the after SOX 
crisis time which suggests that mandating the firms to have a nominating committee 
during crisis time helps to stop the negative effect on the performance. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the difference-in-difference analysis for the total 
independence of the key committees. Considering both crisis periods together, there is a 
positive relationship between Audit-full-independence and firm performance measures 
which is statistically significant for ROA. Contrary to that, the influence of having a 
nominating committee with outside members only is significantly negative. Moreover, 
there isn’t any noteworthy relation when the full independence of the compensation 
committee is concerned. Shifting the focus to the mortgage crisis period after SOX and 
Performance Measures During Crisis Periods
I II III IV V VI
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Liquidity -0.002 -0.009 0.048 0.005 -0.009 0.052
0.081 0.014 0.053 0.081 0.014 0.052
Growth -0.540*** -0.356*** -1.103*** -0.523*** -0.346*** -1.073***
0.188 0.033 0.122 0.188 0.033 0.122
Free Cash Flow 0.018*** 0.012*** -0.003 0.019*** 0.012*** -0.001
0.007 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004
Constant -0.247* 0.122*** -0.181** -0.187 0.127*** -0.133
0.137 0.023 0.089 0.133 0.023 0.086
Adj. R-sq. 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.16
No of Obs. 5,211 5,213 5,211 5,211 5,213 5,211
No of Firms 1,574 1,574 1,574 1,574 1,574 1,574
Table 3.6 (cont.): Difference in Difference Analysis of Board and Nominating Committee Structure on
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SEC regulations, the positive impact of having a fully independent audit committee is 
gone and it becomes insignificant which suggests that externally mandating all 
companies to have their audit committee fully independent may damage the firm 
performance. On the other hand, the negative effect of Nominating-full-independence 
completely flips to a positive influence during the mortgage recession where it is 
statistically significant for ROA. This result implies that imposing firms to have a 
nominating committee with all outside members increase the firm performance. In terms 
of full independence of the compensation committee, we can not obtain any evident and 
significant results for the post-period crisis. 
Relying on all of the results of this difference in difference analysis focusing on 
the crisis periods only, we can say that there is no clear evidence fully supporting one 
idea over the other. The main reason for that might be the fact that during the times of 
financial instability, there can be primarily other factors and market conditions which 
affect the firm performance; and the impact of those variables may overcome the 
influence of corporate governance on firm performance. Considering the findings, in 
terms of total independence of the audit committee, it can be proposed that it destroys the 
firm performance during financially troubled times when the governance structure of 
companies are modified via dictating externally decided regulations rather than the 
changes made by the firms internally based on their needs. Contrary to that, considering 
the existence and full independence of nominating committee which is brought to the 
attention by SEC legislations only, mandating these changes on companies improves the 
firm performance during times of financial instability compared to the case where these 


























I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Nominating-full-




crisis 0.051 0.010* 0.026
0.032 0.006 0.021
Audit-full-




crisis 0.050 -0.007 0.028
0.047 0.008 0.030
Compensation-full-




crisis 0.009 0.002 -0.030
0.042 0.007 0.027
Table 3.7: Difference in Difference Analysis of Key Committee Structure on Performance Measures
During the Crisis Periods
This table reports the difference in difference analysis estimates for key committee full independence and their
interactions with post-period crisis dummy along with MB, size, volatility, leverage, tangibility, liquidity, growth and
free cash flow as control variables and also year and fixed effects. The analysis is conducted using three different
governance measures for three different performance measures individually. ROA is constructed as operating income
before depreciation over total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to common equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio
of net income to net sales. In analyses, industry mean values of these performance measures are substracted from the
performance variables to obtain the adjusted versions. Nominating-full-independence, Audit-full-independence,
Compensation-full-independence are dummy variables equal one if that committee entirely consists of outside
directors and zero otherwise. Post-crisis is a dummy which equals one for values in mortgage crisis (2007-2009) and
zero otherwise. Nominating-full-independence*post-crisis, Audit-full-independence*post-crisis and Compensation-full
independence*post-crisis are the interaction variables of Nominating-full-independence, Audit-full-independence and

















Relying on all of the results of this difference in difference analysis focusing on 
the crisis periods only, we can say that there is no clear evidence fully supporting one 
idea over the other. The main reason for that might be the fact that during the times of 
financial instability, there can be primarily other factors and market conditions which 
affect the firm performance; and the impact of those variables may overcome the 
influence of corporate governance on firm performance. Considering the findings, in 
terms of total independence of the audit committee, it can be proposed that it destroys the 
firm performance during financially troubled times when the governance structure of 
companies are modified via dictating externally decided regulations rather than the 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Post-crisis -0.051* -0.031*** -0.150*** -0.074 -0.021** -0.168*** -0.028 -0.028*** -0.109***
0.029 0.005 0.019 0.046 0.008 0.030 0.041 0.007 0.026
MB 0.079*** 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.087*** 0.080*** 0.087***
0.012 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.008
Size 0.021 -0.019*** 0.047*** 0.020 -0.019*** 0.048*** 0.019 -0.019*** 0.047***
0.018 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.012 0.018 0.003 0.012
Volatility 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.0001
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Leverage -0.018 -0.063*** 0.003 -0.019 -0.064*** -0.001 -0.020 -0.064*** -0.001
0.063 0.011 0.041 0.063 0.011 0.041 0.063 0.011 0.041
Tangibility 0.008 0.066*** 0.071 -0.004 0.065*** 0.076 -0.003 0.062*** 0.070
0.114 0.020 0.075 0.114 0.020 0.074 0.114 0.020 0.074
Liquidity 0.007 -0.009 0.054 0.004 -0.008 0.051 0.004 -0.009 0.053
0.081 0.014 0.053 0.081 0.014 0.052 0.081 0.014 0.052
Growth -0.529*** -0.353*** -1.097*** -0.542*** -0.355*** -1.105*** -0.538*** -0.356*** -1.102***
0.188 0.033 0.122 0.188 0.033 0.122 0.188 0.033 0.122
Free Cash flow 0.018*** 0.012*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.012*** -0.003 0.018*** 0.012*** -0.003
0.007 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004
Constant -0.194 0.126*** -0.139 -0.198 0.124*** -0.155* -0.170 0.125*** -0.140
0.133 0.023 0.087 0.133 0.023 0.087 0.133 0.023 0.087
Adj. R-sq. 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.12
No of Obs. 10,987 10,992 10,987 10,937 10,942 10,937 10,937 10,942 10,937
No of Firms 1,819 1,820 1,819 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,812 1,813 1,812
Measures During the Crisis Periods
Table 3.7 (cont.): Difference in Difference Analysis of Key Committee Structure on Performance 
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changes made by the firms internally based on their needs. Contrary to that, considering 
the existence and full independence of nominating committee which is brought to the 
attention by SEC legislations only, mandating these changes on companies improves the 
firm performance during times of financial instability compared to the case where these 
decisions are left to the firms to take voluntarily. 
 The final major analysis in this study is a cross sectional regression model. We 
regress the industry adjusted firm performance averages after SOX and SEC regulation 
period on post-period as well as pre-period average board and key committee structure 
measures. While Board Independence-A, Nominating-existence-A, Nominating-full-
independence-A, Audit-full-independence-A and Compensation-full-independence-A 
represent the explanatory variables in the post-period after SOX and SEC legislation; 
Board Independence-B, Nominating-existence-B, Nominating-full-independence-B, 
Audit-full-independence-B and Compensation-full-independence-B stand for the 
independent variables defined in the pre-period. This joint model gives us a better chance 
to examine the individual effects of externally dictated as well as organically decided 
board and key committee structure changes on the firm performance. Moreover, we can 
investigate whether mandated or voluntary modifications in governance characteristics 
pick up the real impact on firm performance via this analysis. Control variables such as, 
liquidity, MB, firm size, tangibility, free cash flow, leverage, growth and volatility are 
included in the model. The performance measures are adjusted by the industry averages 
in order to mitigate and control any possible industry effects on the outcomes. 
Table 3.8 shows the results of the cross sectional regression analysis for board 
independence and existence of nominating committee. Before SOX and SEC rules, the 
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changes in board independence, Board Independence-B, which are decided voluntarily by 
companies based on the need, seem to have strongly positive and statistically significant 
influence on firm performance, specifically in terms of ROE and NPM. Contrary to that, 
in post-period, it damages the performance when all companies are forced to increase the 
number of outside directors in the board as the estimates for Board Independence-A are 
greatly negative and statistically significant particularly for ROE and NPM. These 
findings evidently shows that dictating companies to modify their board structure beyond 
their needs shifts the ultimate goal of improving the firm efficiency and functionality, and 
destroys the performance while leaving this decision to companies to be taken voluntarily 
helps the firm performance strengthen. 
In columns IV-VI, focusing on the existence of a nominating committee in 
companies, it seems that voluntary decisions by firms in pre-period, Nominating-
existence-B, don’t have any significant impact on the post-period firm performance. 
Interestingly, once all the firms are forced by SOX to assemble this key committee, 
Nominating-existence-A, that has a destructive impact on the firm performance in terms 
of ROA and NPM while the influence is suggested to be positive by ROE.  
Table 3.9 shows the cross sectional regression estimates for the total 
independence of key governance committees. The findings propose that before the SOX 
and SEC regulations, there is a clear positive and significant influence on the firm 
performance implying that as companies decide organically on having their audit, 
nominating and compensation committees consists of outside members only, the 
performance increases in the post-period; except for the relation between Compensation-




on Performance Measures 
I II III IV V VI
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Board Independence-A -0.075* -0.014 -0.037**
0.044 0.010 0.017
Board Independence-B 0.121*** 0.001 0.054***
0.029 0.006 0.011
Nominating-existence-A 0.064** -0.012* -0.021*
0.029 0.006 0.011
Nominating-existence-B 0.017 0.001 -0.004
0.011 0.003 0.004
MB 0.113*** 0.048*** 0.112*** 0.047***
0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003
Size 0.016** -0.049*** -0.009*** 0.017** -0.049*** -0.009***
0.007 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.003
Volatility 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002***
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Leverage 0.136*** -0.014** -0.027** 0.128*** -0.014** -0.025**
0.027 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.006 0.011
Tangibility 0.019 0.043*** 0.005 0.017 0.044*** 0.005
0.020 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.004 0.008
Liquidity 0.066 0.039*** -0.094*** 0.065 0.039*** -0.099***
0.053 0.011 0.020 0.053 0.011 0.020
Growth -0.527*** -0.090*** 0.042* -0.508*** -0.090*** 0.050**
0.059 0.012 0.023 0.059 0.012 0.023
Table 3.8: Cross Sectional Regression Analysis of Board and Nominating Committee Structure
This table reports the cross sectional regression analysis estimates for board independence and nominating
committee existence along with MB, size, volatility, leverage, tangibility, liquidity, growth and free cash flow as
control variables. The industry adjusted firm performance average after SOX and SEC legislation period is regressed
on the both post-period and pre-period average board structure measures along with controls. The analysis is
conducted using two different governance measures for three different performance measures individually. ROA is
constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to common
equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio of net income to net sales. In analyses, industry mean values of these
performance measures are substracted from the performance variables to obtain the adjusted versions. Board
Independence is the percentage of outside directors to the total number of directors in the board. Nominating-
existence is a dummy equals one if there is any member in that committee and zero otherwise. Board Independence-
A, Nominating-existence-A and Board Independence-B, Nominating-existence-B represent the post-period and the
pre-period averages of those board and committee characteristics, respectively. The *** indicates statistical




Considering the post-period changes in all key governance committees mandated by SOX 
and SEC, they have a negative and statistically significant impact on firm performance. 
Forcing all firms to have fully independent audit, compensation and nominating 
committees evidently destroys the firm performance in post-period which implies that 
dictating rules regardless to the firm’s specific characteristics and needs can be damaging 
for the overall firm performance. 
Taking all the results of this cross sectional regression model into the 
consideration, it is unmistakable when external forces such as laws and regulations 
dictate companies to modify their board and key committee structures, it damages the 
firm functionality and performance whereas voluntarily agreed decisions based on 
company needs and specific characteristics improve the performance. In particular, 
changes in board independence as well as all key committee full independence show 




Structure on Performance Measures 
I II III IV V VI
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Free Cash Flow 0.017*** 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.015** 0.052*** 0.027***
0.007 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.003
Constant -0.262*** 0.110*** -0.051*** -0.310*** 0.112*** -0.026*
0.036 0.007 0.014 0.039 (0.008 0.015
Adj. R-sq. 0.13 0.40 0.24 0.13 0.40 0.24
No of Obs. 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314


























I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Nominating-full-
independence-A -0.009 -0.007** -0.009
0.014 0.003 0.006
Nominating-full-
independence-B 0.078*** -0.001 0.012***
0.012 0.003 0.005
Audit-full-
independence-A -0.002 -0.009* -0.017**
0.020 0.004 0.008
Audit-full-








MB 0.112*** 0.047*** 0.113*** 0.047*** 0.114*** 0.048***
0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003
Size 0.014* -0.049***-0.009***0.017** -0.049***-0.009***0.018** -0.049***-0.008***
0.007 0.001 0.028 0.007 0.001 0.028 0.007 0.001 0.028
Volatility 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.002***
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
Table 3.9: Cross Sectional Regression Analysis of Key Committee Structure on Performance Measures
This table reports the cross sectional regression analysis estimates for key committee full independence along with MB, size,
volatility, leverage, tangibility, liquidity, growth and free cash flow as control variables. The industry adjusted firm performance
average after SOX and SEC legislation period is regressed on the both post-period and pre-period average key committee
structure measures along with controls. The analysis is conducted using three different governance measures for three different
performance measures individually. ROA is constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. ROE is the
ratio of net income to common equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio of net income to net sales. In analyses, industry mean values
of these performance measures are substracted from the performance variables to obtain the adjusted versions. Nominating-full-
independence, Audit-full-independence and Compensation-full-independence are dummy variables equal one if that specific
committee entirely consists of outside directors and zero otherwise. Nominating-full-independence-A, Audit-full-independence-
A, Compensation-full-independence-A and Nominating-full-independence-B, Audit-full-independence-B, Compensation-full-
independence-B represent the post-period and the pre-period averages of those key committee characteristics, respectively. The













3.4.3 Robustness  
In addition to governance structure measures discussed so far in this paper, there are   
other board characteristics which are believed by some agencies and literature to have 
influence on firm performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) focus on the 
relationship between board size and firm performance. They claim that the downsides of 
a larger board such as the poor communication and decision making outweigh the 
benefits obtained from increased monitoring in larger boards. Therefore, they suggest 
limiting board size improves the firm performance. Moreover, Switzer (2007) and Dey 
(2008) investigate any positive impact of board size on the firm performance. In their 
empirical studies, they couldn’t find significant evidence supporting such a positive 
relationship. Furthermore, Brown and Caylor (2006) conduct an intensive research on the 
effect of several governance characteristics on the firm performance suggesting that 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Leverage 0.131*** -0.015** -0.028***0.137*** -0.015** -0.028***0.136*** -0.015***-0.027**
0.027 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.006 0.011 0.027 0.006 0.011
Tangibility 0.018 0.043*** 0.004 0.025 0.044*** 0.005 0.020 0.043*** 0.005
0.020 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.020 0.004 0.008
Liquidity 0.067 0.039*** -0.096***0.074 0.042*** -0.093***0.072 0.039*** -0.098***
0.052 0.011 0.020 0.053 0.011 0.021 0.053 0.011 0.021
Growth -0.519***-0.088***0.050** -0.516***-0.092***0.047** -0.520***-0.089***0.049**
0.059 0.012 0.023 0.059 0.012 0.023 0.059 0.012 0.023
Free Cash Flow 0.017*** 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.016** 0.052*** 0.027*** 0.016** 0.052*** 0.027***
0.007 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.003
Constant -0.240***0.106*** -0.041***-0.293***0.105*** -0.040***-0.227***0.105*** -0.049***
0.030 0.006 0.012 0.034 0.007 0.013 0.032 0.006 0.013
Adj. R-sq. 0.14 0.40 0.24 0.13 0.40 0.24 0.13 0.40 0.24
No of Obs. 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314
Performance Measures
Table 3.9 (cont.): Cross Sectional Regression Analysis of Key Committee Structure on
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companies with smaller boards perform significantly better. They also examine whether 
there is a relationship between the mandatory retirement age for directors to exit and the 
firm performance. Interestingly, they find having more directors below age 70 in board 
increases the firm performance. 
Even though the aspects about the board structure mentioned above are not 
included in SOX and SEC regulations, they are very close in concept and also discussed 
among agencies, financial press, shareholder activist, business roundtable.24 It is highly 
likely that a great majority of firms follow the literature and discussions and decide to 
apply these changes in their boards if there is a need for that. Consequently, they may 
have similar impact as mandated modifications on firm performance. Following the 
literature, we define “Board Size” as the natural logarithm of the total numbers of 
directors in the board. Further, we construct “Board Age” which is calculated by the 
percentage of the board members below age 70. As robustness check, we rerun our major 
multivariate models using these additional board characteristics which also provide a 
different insight in our research. The results are presented in Table 3.10. Considering 
“Board Size”, we obtain results from the both difference in difference analyses 
supporting our previous findings: as firms decrease the number of directors in their 
boards in post-period since they feel obligated, it has a destructive effect on firm 
performance, while it improves the performance when companies decide on this change 
voluntarily according to their needs in pre-period. The cross sectional regression model 
                                               
24 In addition to the board and key committee structure measures discussed in this paper, we construct 
supplementary governance committee measures to test the robustness of our findings. We defined 
Nominating-independence, Audit-independence and Compensation-Independence as the percentage of the 
outside members in those committees. After repeating the difference-in-difference analysis and the cross 
sectional regression model with these new measures, we obtain estimates similar to our original findings 
and thus, we provide robustness of our results.  
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provides mixed outcomes. According to both the cross sectional model and the 
difference-in-difference analysis for crisis periods, findings for Board Age show support 
to our original results. Companies which decide voluntarily to have more directors 
younger than 70 perform better than the firms which reduce the number of older members 












































ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Board Size -0.033 -0.017*** -0.062***
0.023 0.004 0.014
Board Size*post 0.083*** 0.019*** 0.14***
0.024 0.004 0.015
Board Age -0.071 -0.004 -0.041
0.045 0.008 0.027
Board Age*post 0.060 0.001 0.001
0.049 0.009 0.029
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.04 0.18 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.12
No of Obs. 10,937 10,942 10,937 10,937 10,942 10,937
No of Firms 1,812 1,813 1,812 1,812 1,813 1,812
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Board Size -0.015 -0.027*** -0.113***
0.041 0.007 0.026
Board Size*post-crisis 0.194*** 0.037*** 0.266***
0.043 0.008 0.028
Board Age -0.045 0.026* 0.053
0.075 0.013 0.048
Board Age*post-crisis 0.031 -0.026* -0.148***
0.083 0.015 0.054
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.16
No of Obs. 5,211 5,213 5,211 5,211 5,213 5,211
No of Firms 1,574 1,574 1,574 1,574 1,574 1,574
Table 3.10: Robustness Tests for Additional Board Characteristics
This table reports the estimates for the difference-in-difference analyses and the cross sectional regression
model in three panels using new board characteristics along with the controls. The analyses are conducted
using two different governance measures for three different performance measures individually. ROA is
constructed as operating income before depreciation over total assets. ROE is the ratio of net income to
common equity of the firm. NPM is the ratio of net income to net sales. In analyses, industry mean values of
these performance measures are substracted from the performance variables to obtain the adjusted versions.
Board Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors in board. Board Age is the percentage of
the directors below age 70. Board Size*post, Board Age*post and Board Size*post-crisis, Board Age*post-
crisis are the interaction variables of Board Size, Board Age, Post and Post-crisis. Board Size-A, Board Age-
A and Board Size-B, Board Age-B represent the post-period and the pre-period averages of those measures,
respectively. The *** indicates statistical significance at 1% level.
Panel A: Difference-in-Difference Analysis 













This paper examines the influence from SOX and SEC regulations on firm performance. 
In particular, we investigate the individual impacts of externally dictated as well as 
organically decided board and key committee modifications on the performance while 
comparing and questioning the results of these changes. Controlling the other channels of 
potential effects on firm performance, we use SOX and SEC regulations as 
representatives for external forces imposing changes on companies. In this natural 
experiment setting with SOX and SEC rules as the exogenous shock, we conduct 
difference-in-difference and cross sectional analyses for the period of 1996 to 2009. The 
evidence supports significantly the agency theory along with the idea of the optional 
adjustment. The findings indicate when firms are forced externally to alter their 
governance structure, it damages the firm performance while it improves the performance 
when companies decide on these changes voluntarily based on their own needs and the 
time they think is right. 
ROE ROA NPM ROE ROA NPM
Board Size-A 0.070** -0.010* -0.053***
0.028 0.006 0.011
Board Size-B 0.036* -0.008* 0.004
0.021 0.005 0.008
Board Age-A -0.084** -0.015* -0.019
0.036 0.008 0.014
Board Age-B 0.108*** 0.003 -0.051***
0.038 0.008 0.015
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj. R-sq. 0.14 0.40 0.25 0.13 0.40 0.24
No of Obs. 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314 4,314
Table 3.10 (cont.): Robustness Tests for Additional Board Characteristics
Panel C: Cross Sectional Regression Model
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 This study contributes in corporate governance and firm performance joint 
literature by providing insight about the real impact from mandated regulations altering 
firm governance structure on the performance measures. The paper also examines the 
influence of voluntarily taken decisions on board and key committee modifications and 
compares these to the mandated ones in terms of firm performance using a natural 
experiment. Departing from the previous literature, we construct a cross sectional model 
where we use the SOX and SEC legislations as a valid instrument for imposed rules and 
contrast the performance measures in pre- and post-periods. Moreover, we explore the 
behavior of these externally versus voluntarily determined changes during the times of 
financial instability; and we investigate how important specifically the corporate 
governance on the firm performance is. Taking these facts into account, this study 
pioneers in literature with new, yet important aspects of corporate governance changes. It 
presents reliable findings via various models and thus clarifies the conflicting opinions 
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